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THE WAR POWER AFTER 200 YEARS: 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
AT A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1988 
U.S. SENATE, 
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITrEE ON WAR POWERS 
OF THE CoMMITrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
Washington, DC. 
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the com-
mittee) presiding. 
Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Adams, Moyni-
han, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, 
and McConnell. 
The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come 
to order. 
Today our committee commences work on a project of real sig-
nificance, an effort to evaluate and improve the War Powers Reso-
lutlon of 1973. Congress passed this law 15 years ago in the hope of 
fostering constructive executive-legislative interaction in the deci-
sion to employ U.S. forces abroad. 
Unfortunately, this intent has never been fulfilled. Indeed, from 
the moment of its enactmen10ver President Nixon's veto, the reso-lution itself has been an object of dispute rather than an instru-
mentality of cooperation. 
This past year's contentious debate over the Resolution's applica-
bility to the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf has served to under-
score the irony that now surrounds this crucial law. For the motive 
behind the War Powers Resolution was a determination to estab-
lish a procedure that would ensure national unity. 
The aim was to devise a mechanism, consistent with the Consti-
tution, through which Congress and the President would act to-
gether in the momentous decision to commit U.S. forces to hostil-
ities. 
Critics of the War Powers Resolution continue to characterize it 
as an idiosyncratic product of its time, an effort to prevent another 
Vietnam. But that involves a distortion. 
The War Powers Resolution was not intended to prevent the nec-
essary use of American military power, but rather to prevent the 
commitment of power unaccompanied by careful analysis and the 
commitment of national will. 
The framers of the Constitution intended that Congress be an 
active participant in the decision to commence hostilities. While 
(1) 
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the War Powers Resolution in its current form has failed, a way 
must be found to give modern meaning to constitutional intent. 
Pursuant to this purpose, the committee last December author-
ized the establishment of a Special Subcommittee on War Powers. 
Today the subcommittee begins hearings that will provide for a full 
airing of the constitutional dimensions of the question, while con-
sidering practicalities as well as principles. 
The chairman of the subcommittee is Senator Biden our col-
league, who is completing recuperation from surgery and for whom 
I will sit in until he returns in a few weeks. 
These hearings will extend through August and into September, 
and will involve former and present Government officials, includ-
ing President Ford and a number of eminent constitutional schol-
ars. 
And now the subcommittee is pleased to be able to commence its 
hearings with testimony from four people who played a role in the 
genesis of the law we have set ourselves to evaluate. 
Chairman Fascell and Congressman Broomfield have since as-
sumed the leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Sen-
ators Eagleton and Mathias have retired and graduat~ to new ca-
reers. All four have records of distinguished service to our country, 
and the subcommittee is very pleased by their presence today. 
I would ask Senator Pressler if he has an opening statement. 
[The prepared statement of Senator Pell appears in the appen-
dix.] 
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRESSLER 
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. 
I am pleased to serve as the ranking member on the Republican 
side. This is the first, as you pointed out, in a lengthy series of 
hearings on the War Powers Resolution, often referred to as the 
War Powers Act. It has been a matter of major concern for the 
Congress over the past 15 years, and each time there is a new 
international crisis it is at the forefront. It may well be the subject 
of debate for the next 15 years. 
The administration opposes this legislation on constitutional and 
practical grounds. I strongly support the administration's position. 
Nevertheless, the reason we are meeting here this morning and 
listening to the testimony of these distinguished witnesses is the 
result of the continuing political controversy over that Resolution. 
It is a political statute, pure and simple. 
Weare inquiring not only into the nature and legality of the 
War Powers Resolution, but we are also examining the war power 
itself. Thus, we are exploring the isssue of the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers at the very time we are celebrating the bicenten-
nial anniversary of the U.S. Constitution. 
This is a curious way to celebrate a document that is not only 
the world's oldest written constitution, but also has made our 
system of Government the political wonder of the world. 
I have long been a critic of the War Powers Resolution. It is un-
constitutional in law and politically unwise in fact. It has seriously 
strained the relationship between the executive branch and the leg-
islative branch at a time and under·circumstances when coopera-
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tion and not confrontation should be paramount for our own na-
tional interest. 
I do not criticize, nor do I seek to undermine, the process of con-
gressional oversight. The watchdog function of Congress with re-
spect to the executive branch has been in place since the very first 
Congress. 
The way the Constitution was written and the way it was origi-
nally intended was that each branch of Government keep an eye 
on the others. A cursory reading of the Federalist Papers, the best 
commentary ever written on the U.S. Constitution, reveals a seri-
ous concern by the framers over the potential abuse and misuse of 
power. James Madison warned specifically about that possibility in 
Federalist No. 48. 
The founding fathers intentionally blurred the edges of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, well realizing that complete separation 
might bring about stagnation and inflexibility. To quote the former 
Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger, in his majority 
opinion in the case of Bowsher v. Synar, 1986: 
That system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, 
and discordance at times. But it was deliberately so structured to assare full, vigor-
ous and open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues 
for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power. 
The debate will be evident in the hearing that we are holding, 
but the current conflict between thf'. legislative and the executive 
on who controls foreign policy is quite another matter. 
The issue is well stated in the very first paragraph of the recom-
mendations section of the Tower Commission Report of 1987: 
Whereas the ultimate power to formulate domestic policy resides in the Congress, 
the primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of national secu-
rity policy falls on the President. 
It then goes on to say: 
It is the President who is the usual source of innovation and responsiveness in 
this field. 
This means quite simply that in foreign policy the President 
leads. No one to my knowledge has maintained that the President 
absolutely controls. Congress has the explicit power under the Con-
stitution to declare war. The President has the constitutional ex-
plicit power to defend the national security interests of the United 
States. I will have more to say about the Constitution's intentions 
and obligations at our next hearing tomorrow afternoon. 
Only 2 weeks ago, the Chief Justice of the United States, William 
Rehnquist, wrote in his majority opinion in Morrison v. Olson that: 
Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme 
of the separation of powers into the three coordinate branches. 
This is why the Supreme Court has held the one-house veto to be 
unconstitutional in the Bowsher case and in INS v. Chadha, 1983. 
Indeed, several Justices in both cases have indicated that a two-
house legislative veto is also of dubious constitutionality. 
I believe without question that section 5(c) of the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973, providing for removal of U.S. forces from any 
theater of conflict, if Congress approves a concurrent resolution to 
that effect, is a clear violation of the presentment clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, found in article I, section 7, clause 3. 
j 
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In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I welcome these hearings as an op-
portunity to reacquaint ourselvs with the Constitution and with 
constitutional theory in this bicentennial anniversary year of the 
ratification of that great document. 
It is particularly important, I believe, to get things straight in 
this Presidential election year. The great issues of war, peace, and 
national security should be debated in this Congress and in the 
public arena. That is what democracy is all about. When we do 
this, we demonstrate to the world the openness of our system and 
the strengths of the democratic process. 
But debate is one thing. "Constitutional encroachment," as Madi-
son warned, is quite another. I find myself in rare agreement, Mr. 
Chairman, with the distinguished speaker of the House when he 
wrote in another context: 
What people really mean when they say "the system is not working" is simply 
that they are not getting their way. 
The Congress is trying too hard to get its way. 
Congressman John Marshall declared on the floor of the House 
of Representatives at the beginning of the last century that "The 
President is the sole organ of the Nation in its external relations." 
The future Chief Justice of the United States spoke clearly then, 
and his words should be equally clear today. Congress has the 
power to declare war. It has the power to support, or to withdraw 
support, from the Armed Forces of the United States. 
The President is Commander in Chief, as laid out by the Consti-
tution, and he is charged with defending the national security in-
terests of the United States. 
The War Powers Resolution was a legacy of the political turmoil 
caused by the Vietnam war, a war in which I served and which I 
still remember. But that war ended almost 15 years ago. It is time 
to set the ship of state back on course, and to discard the War 
Powers Act as a faded relic of that contentious era. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler. 
Senator Simon. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMON 
Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased these 
hearings are being held and I commend you for your leadership on 
this. 
Just a couple of observations. One is the constitutional provision 
that we declare war is something that is probably never going to be 
used again. The formal declaration of war in the world in which we 
live is probably a thing of the past. 
What can substitute for that in part is a genuine bipartisan for-
eign policy. Unfortunately, that has almost not existed in recent 
years. I think that has been one of the deficiencies of this adminis-
tration. 
The War Powers Act seems to me to be the sensible provision to 
provide restraint. But if the War Powers Act cannot be imposed, 
for example, in the Persian Gulf situation, I do not know where we 
will ever use the War Powers Act. 
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It clearly ought to be applicable to that situation. And so I hope 
out of these hearings we can fmd some mechanism that can pro-
vide the congressional restraint that was intended by those who 
wrote the Constitution. 
And let me just add, Mr. Chairman, I welcome our first two wit-
nesses. I remember being on a trip with Senator Mathias. He was 
reading a biography of Boswell. How many times have you been on 
a trip where a Member of Congress has been reading a biography 
of Boswell? He is a Jeffersonian-type, and we welcome him. 
And Senator Eagleton of course has contributed also in a variety 
of ways. I remember when we had the unfortunate duty to consider 
an impeachment of a judge, and the best analysis by far was the 
statement by Senator Eagleton summing up where we were. 
He does lack, Mr. Chairman, a sense of humor. But other than 
that, he has been an outstanding member in this body. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes. 
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SARBANES 
Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
I will not speak to the substance of our hearings at this time, but 
I simply want to underscore my delight in having two of our 
former colleagues, Senator Eagleton and Senator Mathias, here 
today to lead off our set of hearings. 
I cannot imagine two better qualified people for us to hear from. 
The Nation has benefited greatly by their very able and distin-
guished public service over the years, and in particular their inci-
sive work in this specific area. I look forward to hearing their testi-
mony. 
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 
I would add here that this legislation that will be coming before 
us is before our committee. For example, Senate Joint Resolution 
323, which is the War Powers Resolution introduced by Senators 
Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell, and probably there will be 
other thoughts that we will be considering as we move along. 
I would like to apologize, incidentally, to our visitors because this 
is going to be a rather sporadic, interrupted morning. We have a 
vote at 10 o'clock and then we have a caucus for Governor Dukakis 
at 11 :45. So, there will be some moving back and forth. 
Congressman Broomfield has indicated he will not be able to be 
with us, but his testimony will be included in the record in full. 
And I would also say how much I, speaking as an individual, 
have missed Senators Eagleton and Mathias, and how much less 
agreeable a place the Senate is since their departure. And I only 
wish they were still here. 
Senator Eagleton, would you care to lead off! 
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Our first panel consists of Prof. Edwin B. Firmage, University of 
Utah, College of Law, in Salt Lake City, UT; Prof. Michael J. Glen-
non, University of California, Davis, Law School, Davis, CA; Wil-
liam Taylor Reveley III, Esquire, practicing attorney and author 
from Richmond, VA; and Prof. Robert F. Turner, Associate Direc-
tor, Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia 
Law School, Charlottesville, VA. 
Gentlemen, welcome to you all. 
Why don't we begin in the order that your names were called, 
unless you all have decided there is a more rational way to pro-
ceed. 
Professor, welcome. 
STATEMENT OF EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, COLLEGE OF LAW, 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
Mr. FiRMAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Let me simply summarize very quickly a much longer paper in 
six quick points. 
Senator BIDEN. By the way, before we begin, I would like your 
entire paper placed in the record. 
Mr. FIRMAGE. Of course. Thank you very much. 
The war power of Congress is complete. The war power of the 
United States, in the sense of the decision for war or peace, is en-
tirely in the Congress of the United States. 
The sole exception to this is the power of the President to re-
spond to sudden attack upon the United States. 
The text makes this abundantly clear, the power to declare war 
and grant letters of marque and reprisal. 
The first century of our history bore out this interpretation. 
There were exceptions, as Presidents exceeded the empowerment of 
statutes of Congress, but never until Korea and Vietnam did you 
have an effort to justify, under the Commander in Chief clause, a 
separate base of power to decide for war. 
The Commander in Chief clause in the original ur ... d~rstanding 
simply made the President Congress' general. These were the 
terms of Alexander Hamilton, a proponent of strong Presidential 
power. He, nevertheless, saw the paradigm shift from a European 
model of a monarchical power to decide for war to a congressional 
power to decide for war or peace. 
Thomas Jefferson, though not present at the Philadelphia con-
vention, where the Constitution was struck, rejoiced at this change, 
and he noted that they had gone a long way toward chaining the 
"dog of war." 
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The power over foreign relations, the matrix within which the 
war power sits at the heart of congressional power, was clearly 
meant to be collegially conducted and determined by the Congress 
and the President. The treaty power, I think, as Louis Henkin dem-
onstrated a decade ago, gives us this insight. 
Unlike the present time, in the 18th century, foreign relations 
would have been conducted dominantly through the treaty power, 
and there, with the Sen.ate and the President joining together, we 
see the original idea. 
A relevant question, nevertheless, after any analysis of original 
intent, is whether two centuries' experience and radical changes in 
technology make that original understanding insufficient. 
1 believe quite the contrary. 
As one looks at ICBM technology and at the power of thermonu-
clear weapons, I see nothing so enticing in nuclear war as to en-
courage us to make war more easily accomplished, rather than 
less. 
I think, quite the contrary, that every restraint of law on Gov-
ernment and diplomacy should be placed upon the inclination to go 
~ war that posaibly can be. 
While one thinks, perhaps loosely without thinking it through, 
that ICBM time of 15 minutes, or 20, or 25 minutes, might make a 
quick decision absolutely necessary, when you stop and think about 
the actual situations where nuclear weapons could possibly be 
used, if, in fact, deterrence fails, what's the hurry? 
If you think through the scenarios of the likely use, or first use, 
particularly, of nuclear weapons, I see no reason to drop restraints 
of the Congress of the United States upon a decision for war or 
peace, but enormous reasons to do just precisely the opposite. 
Beyond the question of the use of nuclear weapons, I would like 
to address two more issues. 
I believe that covert war has come to be the type of war of our 
time. I would hope that in some manner the War Powers Resolu-
tion can be strengthened to cover covert war. 
Two factors, I believe, combined to make covert war the form of 
international violence of our time. First, the enormous power of 
nuclear weapons, paradoxically, limited the likelihood that they 
would ever be used. Second, a Manichaean world view-seeing the 
world in an absolutist vision of good and evil-grew understand-
ably out of our experience in World War II. In that war, far more 
than in World War I, Vietnam, the Korean war, or the War of 
1870, totalitarian dictatorships made war against nations at peace. 
But it would be disastrous to adopt this black-and-white world view 
as the paradigm rather than the exception. We emerged from 
World War II, nevertheless, with the view that we were continuing 
to fight against unadulterated evil, therefore excusing what ever 
vicious means we chose to employ. 
We have been so totally assured of our own righteousness and 
yet deterred from all-out war in the model of World War II that we 
have waged covert action, and done so, I think, with great harm to 
others and to ourselves. 
I think we have had short-term embarrassment and long-term 
disaster consistently in our use of covert action and covert war. 
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Congress is responsible for this form of war not one whit less 
than for overt war. The term "grant letters of marque and repris-
al" in the 18th century was a way of saying Congress has the total 
war power, announced, declared or undeclared, public or private, 
fought by the official forces of this country in uniform or by merce-
naries, done by whatever means. If one wanted to make Francis 
Drake, pirate, who was preying upon Spanish shipping and who 
might be hanged as a criminal if caught, into Sir Francis Drake, 
confidant of the Queen, empowered and authorized by the state, 
one granted letters of marque and reprisal. 
When we see mercenaries not authorized by the Congress of the 
United States fighting war or committing acts of war, we see abuse 
of the war power of Congress by the President. 
Finally, how do we go about remedying these things? 
I think the reality is that the view that the courts are the least 
dangerous branch is most surely true here. They are the least dan-
gerous and the least helpful. They have the least power. 
I hope that there are ways, probably peripheral, that the courts 
can come into play, and I have proposed this in my testimony. I 
have slight hope, really, that the central issues will be resolved 
there. The only other big guy on the block with the President of 
the United States is the U.S. Congress, where the war power was 
originally reposited and where it should remain. 
I support the War Powers Resolution with great reluctance. I 
think it is simply the least worst way we have practically available 
now of going about things. 
It assumes continued Presidential initiative in committing Amer-
ican troops into hostilities or situations where hostilities are likely, 
and it assumes congressional subservience in this process, both in 
reporting and consulting roles. 
In the original understanding-and in my view, nothing has hap-
pened since then to change the wisdom of that understanding-we 
should be speaking of congressional authorization, not consultation 
and of censure or impeachment, not reporting, for Presidential vio-
lation of congressional power over the decision for peace or war. 
I support strongly the War Powers Resolution but only because 
practically I do not see at this present time how to restore congres-
sional virtue that was lost, I think tragically, in Korea and Viet-
nam. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of l\lr. Firmage appears in the appen-
dix.] 
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Professor. 
Professor Glennon. 
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, LAW SCHOOL, DA VIS, CA 
Mr. GLENNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Let me begin by thanking the subcommittee for inviting me to be 
here today. 
I wish to note at the outset. that, although I serve as counsel to 
the congressional plaintiffs in Lowry v. Reagan, the views that I ex-
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press here today do not necessarily represent those of my clients in 
that case. 
My remarks will be directed to the constitutionality of the War 
Powers Resolution and also to the Use of Force Act set forth in 
Committee Print No. 1. 
I understand that Committee Print No.1 is intended not as a 
proposal but, rather, as a focal point for analysis. I believe that 
each of its provisions is constitutional; but I am less convinced that 
certain of those provisions are wise from a policy perspective. I 
would thus suggest that primary consideration be devoted to policy 
considerations in Committee Print No. 1. 
In discussing issues of constitutionality, it seems appropriate to 
begin with a comment upon the September 14 testimony of the 
State Department Legal Adviser, Abraham Sofaer. In that testimo-
ny and in his answers to the chairman's written questions, Mr. 
Sofaer launched a broad attack upon the congressional warmaking 
power, referring throughout to "independent" power conferred 
upon the President by the Constitution and reiterating the proposi-
tion, transposed in various forms, that independent Presidential 
power is not subject to statutory limitation. 
The observation is, of course, true and, indeed, truistic: What his 
claim comes down to is that Congress cannot act unconstitutional-
ly. -
Yet, Mr. Sofaer repeatedly overlooks the fact that there is a 
second category of Presidential power that is subject to congres-
sional regulation: concurrent power. This is constitutional power 
that may be exercised initially by the President in the face of con-
gressional silence, but which Congress may, nonetheless, subse-
quently choose to restrict. 
It is this class of power to which Justice Jackson referred in his 
famous concurring opinion in the 1952 Steel Seizure case. 
In that case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the sei-
zure of the steel mills during the Korean war by President Harry 
Truman, Jackson wrote: "Presidential powers are not fIxed, but 
fluctuate, dependin? upon their disjunction or conjunction with 
those of Congress.' He continued, "When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers, minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential 
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting 
upon the subject." 
The Supreme Court formally adopted Justice Jackson's mode of 
analysis in Dames & Moore v. Regan, in which Justice William 
Rehnquist applied Jackson's approach to uphold President Jimmy 
Carter's Iranian hostage settlement agreement as having been au-
thorized by Congress. In so doing, Rehnquist wrote that Jackson's 
opinion "brings together as much combination of analysis and com-
monsense as there is in this area." 
Rehnquist then quoted from Jackson a passage that, today, in 
this context, is as significant as it is timely. He said: "The example 
of such unlimited Executive power that must have most impressed 
the Forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and 
the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads 
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me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his 
image." 
The War Powers Resolution, therefore, placed certain Presiden-
tial use of armed force in this third category of Justice Jackson's 
analysis, where his power is at its lowest ebb. Under this analytical 
approach, the time limits of the War Powers Resolution, as well as 
the "prior restraints" set forth in the earlier Senate version, seem 
clearly constitutional. The scope of the President's concurrent 
power is a function of the concurrence or nonconcurrence of the 
Congress; once Congress acts, its negative provides "the rule for the 
case." 
Mr. Sofaer ignores the learning of the Steel Seizure case, howev-
er, and can barely list the parade of horribles set to march by the 
time limits: They interfere with the "successful completion" of the 
President's initiative; they "may signal a divided nation, giving ad-
versaries a basis for hoping that the President may be forced to 
desist"; they provide "an undesirable occasion for interbranch or 
partisan rivalry." 
The curious thing about these arguments, Mr. Chairman, is that 
every one of them is an argument not against the War Powers Res-
olution but against constitutional limitations on Presidential war-
making power. Every one of these arguments is an argument for 
untrammeled Presidential discretion to use the Armed Forces 
whenever, wherever, and for whatever purposes the President may 
choose. 
Indeed, on close analysis, it becomes clear that this is precisely 
Mr. Sofaer's view: "Explicit legislative approval for particular uses 
of force has never been necessary," he candidly said. 
The President thus could have used armed force in World War I, 
World War II, or Vietnam without any declaration of war or any 
other legislative approval. 
This view of warmaking power is, of course, not new. But it 
should suffice to say at this point in our history that the divine 
right of kings approach was ventilated and rejected in 1789, and I 
see no point in reopening that debate today. 
The constitutional theory underpinning the War Powers Resolu-
tion is different from that underpinning the Use of Force Act. The 
War Powers Resolution confers no authority upon the President; as 
section 8 makes clear, it merely places limits upon the use of au-
thority that otherwise might lay unregulated. 
The Use of Force Act, on the other hand, afTrrmatively delegates 
power to the President to use armed force in certain specified in-
stances. That distinction is critical. As early cases demonstrate, 
where Congress delegates authority, limits imposed incident to that 
delegation are constitutionally valid. 
This important premise undergirds the approach of the Use of 
Force Act. 
Mr. Chairman, a number of proposed modifications of the War 
Powers Resolution are before the subcommittee, ranging from the 
Byrd-Nunn proposals and Committee Print No.1, to the De Fazio 
approach to simple repeal. 
I would simply say, in concluding, that none of these modifica-
tions of the Resolution will, in themselves, to quote the War 
Powers Resolution, "erusure that the collective judgment of both 
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the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of 
U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities." 
Fifteen years after the War Powers Resolution's enactment, it 
has become clear that the Resolution's sponsors were naive to be-
lieve that any law could achieve that objective. The most that a 
statute can do, however artfully drawn, is to facilitate the efforts of 
individual Members of Congress to carry out their responsibilities 
under the Constitution. 
To do that requires understanding and it also requires courage. 
It demands a insight into the delicacy with which our separated 
powers are balanced and the fortitude to stand up to those who 
would equate criticism with lack of patriotism. 
For a Congress comprised of such Members, no War Powers Res-
olution would be necessary. For a Congress without them, no War 
Powers Resolution will be sufficient. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glennon appears in the appen-
dix.] 
Senator BID EN . Thank you. 
Professor Turner. 
STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. TURNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 
CENTER FOR LA\V AND NATIONAL SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF 
VIRGINIA LAW SCHOOL, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA 
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
It is a great pleasure to be back here. I spent 5 years sitting on 
the other side of your bench, in the back row, when I was working 
for a member of the committee. It is good to see the committee is 
still as active and as effective as it was in the old days. 
Senator BIDEN. Which is easier? 
Mr. TURNER. Ask me that in 10 minutes. 
Senator BIDEN. All right. 
[General laughter.] 
Mr. TURNER. I have a rather lengthy statement that--
Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. Would you start the clock for this 
witness again. . 
Professor Glennon has been here so often and back here, too, 
that he didn't even use his 10 minutes, which means he didn't 
learn any of the lessons Senators taught hinl. 
Mr. TURNER. How long a warning is there? 
Senator BIDEN. We always go over 10 minutes. 
Mr. TURNER. How long a warning do we have on the yellow 
light? 
Senator BIDEN. I think it is 1 minute and then your seat is eject-
ed. 
[General laughter.] 
Mr. TuRNER. I was wondering. I thought the device beneath the 
lights might be some sort of laser weapon. 
I have a rather lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I would 
like to submit for the record. 
Senator BIDEN. The entire statement will be placed in the record. 
Also, I ask unanimous consent--that Professor Glennon's state-
ment be placed in the record. 
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Mr. TURNER. I would also like to emphasize that the views I ex-
press this morning are my own and not those of the University of 
Virginia, the Center for Law and National Security, the ABA or 
any other group with which I am associated. 
This is a very important issue, and I am determined to be as 
candid and as honest as I can with the committee. 
It is appropriate to notethat we meet here today on the 50th an-
niversary of the opening of the 1938 Munich Conference; because, 
in my view, the War Powers Resolution stems from the same intel-
lectual tradition which led Neville Chamberlain to think he could 
promote "peace for our time" by appeasing aggression, and which 
led Senator Nye and other isolationists during the same era to pass 
statute after statute, tying the President's hands, in an effort to 
legislate peace. 
In the interest of time, I would like to focus primarily on the sep-
aration of powers issue. I want to help you "break the code" on 
how the Founding Fathers sought to separate powers between the 
President and the Congress. 
Before doing that, I would like to make a few brief statements 
that are discussed at great length in my prepared testimony, which 
might provide the subject for discussion during the question-and-
answer period. 
First of all, as I testified last month at length in the House, the 
Congress was a full partner in getting the United States involved 
in Vietnam. The suggestion that it was not is not in my view un-
supportable. I believe, in essence, the War Powers Resolution was a 
political fraud aimed at persuading the American people that Con-
gress had had no role in that unpopular war. 
Among the things which lead me to this conclusion are, first of 
all, the Senate, in 1955, consented to the ratification, with only one 
dissenting vote, of the SEATO Treaty. It created a legal obligation 
for the United States to go to the defense of certain countries in 
Southeast Asia that were victims of aggression, in response to their 
request, and, of course, acting pursuant to our constitutional proc-
ess. 
In carrying out those constitutional process in August 1964, by a 
vote of 416 to 0 in the House and 88 to 2 in the Senate, Congress 
enacted statutory authorization empowering the President to use 
armed force in Indochina. 
Senator Javits said that this made Congress a full partner in the 
commitment. During the debate prior to passage, a colloquy took 
place between the chairman and ranking minority member of this 
committee, in which Senator John Sherman Cooper said that 
"Looking ahead, Mr. Chairman, if the President determined it 
were necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will be 
giving that authority by this Resolution." 
Chairman Fulbright responded, "That is the way I would inter-
pret it." 
Later, in 1970, Senator Sam Ervin, a very distinguished constitu-
tional scholar, said that in his view, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
represented "a declaration of war in a constitutional sense." 
In 1967, when this committee issued its report on the national 
commitments resolution, it stressed that such resolutions as the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution were "a full alternative to a declaration 
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of war and were an appropriate means of Congress giving authority 
for hostilities." 
Section 2(cX2) of the War Powers Resolution expressly recognizes 
the legality of the Commander in Chief using armed forces pursu-
ant to "specific statutory authority." That's exactly the situation 
we had in Vietnam. 
Before the public turned against the war, Congress, for several 
years, appropriated tens of billions of dollars for the war, often by 
90 percent or greater majorities. During the month surrounding 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Johnson's popul8.l-ity shot 
up not 30 percent, but 30 points-30 percentage points-an inc~­
ble increase, all attributed to the popularity of the Vietnam war in 
the early days. 
My second conclusion is that Congress, in reacting to the imple-
mentation of the legislation, has been guided by political expedient 
rather than constitutional principle. 
Let me illustrate by mentioning just three examples. When 
President Ford rescued the crew of the Mayaguez, he violated arti-
cle 2(cXC) and article 3 of the Resolution-not to mention the 
Cooper-Church amendment, which prohibited spending funds to 
send combat troops into that region. And yet, this committee 
passed a unanimous resolution praising his action and saying it 
was in full compliance with the War Powers Resolution. 
In contrast, when President Carter tried to rescue endangered 
American citizens in Iran, under very similar circumstances-but 
in the absence of a statutory prohibition against sending troops 
into the area-the chairman and ranking minority member of this 
committee denounced his action as being in violation of the War 
Powers Resolution. 
To me, the only clear distinction is that the public supported the 
successful Ford operation; they opposed the unsuccessful Carter op-
eration. 
Grenada is even a clearer example, because people like House 
Speaker Tip O'Neill stood up immediately and denounced the 
President upon learning of the operation. The House Foreign M-
fairs Committee called a hearing to investigate the legal aspects. 
Later that afternoon, students landed at the airport, kissed the 
ground, and praised Ronald Reagan. The polls that came in over-
night showed better than a 90-percent support for the operation, 
both within the United States and among the people of Grenada. 
House Speaker O'Neill announced that he had "reconsidered" the 
operation and had decided the President was fully justified. The 
House Foreign Affairs Committee decided to "postpone" their hear-
ing on the legal issues, and those hearings still have not been re-
scheduled. 
In essence, what Members of Congress have been doing is using 
the War Powers Resolution as cover. If there is a crisis, if there is a 
risk of the use of force, they shout "Fire" and run to the hills. 
If the President, with the adversary knowing the country is di-
vided, nevertheless succeeds, they come down from the hills, pick 
up a flag, and walk in the victory parade-saying that of course 
they supported the President from the begitming. If there is a fail-
ure, as occurred in Iran and Beirut, they solemnly come down from 
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the hills, charge that the President "broke the law," and then 
shoot the wounded. 
These divisive congressional debates have done a great deal to in-
crease the likelihood of war and to harm the cause of peace. 
Today, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the 1988 Nobel Peace 
Prize to U.N. peacekeeping forces. The United States, in 1982 and 
1983, tried to participate in a very similar peacekeeping effort in 
Lebanon. By no strain of the imagination could it be said that 
sending American Marines to Beirut as part of an international 
peacekeeping force-at the request of all the governments in the 
area-constituted either an act of war or an infringement upon the 
power of the Congress to declare war. And yet, I think in large part 
because of the divisive debates in the Senate, President Assad of 
Syria concluded the Americans were "short of breath." 
Right after the Senate debate, less than a week before the bomb-
ing of the Marines, the American press quoted intelligence ac-
counts of intercepted Moslem militia messages that said, and I 
quote, "If we kill 15 Marines, the rest will leave." 
A few days later, terrorists killed 241 Marin~ I believe the U.S. 
Congress, and especially the Senate, deserves a great deal of ;:-e-
sponsihility for that tragedy. 
In essence, by passing a War Powers Resolution that says any 
time a terrorist anywhere in the world takes a shot at an Ameri-
can soldier, that will start a clock and the President will have to 
withdraw all U.S. forces within 60 or 90 days, you have surren-
dered the initiative to the terrorist-and in the process you have 
placed a bounty on the lives of American servicemen. 
Mr. Chairman, my final conclusion is suggested by the title of 
my paper, "Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections 011 the War 
Powers Resolution at Fifteen." 
Although some of you may not believe it, Congress can violate 
the law. Each of you took an oath of office to support the Constitu-
tion, and when -you pass a law that seeks to take away from the 
President part of the Commander in Chief power vested in him by 
the American people through the Constitution-the essence of 
which is the control of t.} ~- deployment of armed forces-you are 
violating the law. 
Let me turn briefly to the question of "breaking the code" of sep-
aration of powers. 
There is a theory today that perhaps the F'ounding Fathers 
didn't really think ah{ ... t~t separation of powers, or perhaps they 
couldn't decide how tv dtvide them, so they decided to just leave 
the two . parties to struggle. That is not in my view an accurate ac-
count of what happened. 
To really . understand what the Founding Fathers intended, first 
of' all; y?u have to understand the views of John Locke, Mqntes-
quieu, ;;uld Blackston~the primary theorists who influenced the 
, constitutional -Framers on separation of pwers matters. 
They all argued that legislative bodies were not competent to 
-handle · foreign afthlrs because battles would quickly change, 
'princes would die, and it was necessary to be able to act with 
speed, dispatch, and secrecy-and for a variety of other reasons 
having to do with the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the 
two political branches. 
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Locke used the term "federative power" to refer to the power of 
controlling "leagues and alliances, war, peace, and all transactions 
with all persons and communities without the commonwealth." 
But he said the federative power required the same attributes for 
its execution as the power to execute the municipal laws passed by 
the legislative branch and, thus, both should be placed in the same 
hands. 
Montesquieu distinguished between "the Executive in respect of 
things dependent upon the laws of nations" and "the Executive in 
regard to matters that depend upon civil law." 
One you understand the 1787 meaning of "Executive power," you 
understand why, when the Founding Fathers in article 2, section 1, 
vested "the Executive power" in the President, as Quincy Wright 
said in his classic 1922 study, "The Control of American Foreign 
Relations," and I quote, "When the Constitutional Convention gave 
Executive power to the President, the foreign relations power was 
the essential element of the grant." 
I would like to close with just two other quotat.i.ons to show that 
both Jefferson and Hamilton, two arch rivals in tne initial Govern-
ment, strongly agreed on this subject. 
Jefferson, in 1790, said, "The transaction of business with foreign 
nations is executive altogether. It belongs, then. to the head of that 
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submit-
ted to the Senate. The exceptions are to be construed strictly." The 
same theme of exceptions to Executive power being construed 
, strictly was picked up by Madison. 
If I might conclude with an almost identical statement 3 years 
later by Alexander Hamilton, he wrote in his first "Pacificus" 
letter, "It deserves to be remarked that, as the participation of the 
Senate in the making of treaties and the power of the Legislature 
to declare war are exceptions out of the general 'Executive Power' 
vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly and ought 
to be extended no further than is essential to their execution." 
So, what I am suggesting is that the Founding Fathers vested in 
Congress a power of veto-a n~gative-over a decision by the Presi-
dent to launch a war, an offensive war, the kind of war for which a 
formnl declaration would historically be associated. Short of that, 
the deployment of military forces, the entire question of what vie 
do with our military and also how we fight wars either authorized 
by Congress or initiated by a foreign government, is left entirely to 
the discretion of the President under the Constitution. 
The War Powers Resolution conflicts with this theory. 
Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. I want you to keep going, but I want 
to make sure that I heard you correctly. 
Did you say the Constitution vests in the Congress a veto power? 
Is that what you said? 
Mr. TURNER. I used the term "veto," or "negative" which is ex-
actly the term that Jefferson used. 
Senator BIDEN. I understand. I just want to make sure that I 
heard what you said. It's a veto power. 
Mr. TuRNER. Yes, OVPl" a decision by the President to launch an 
offensive war. 
The classic case of the proper congressional role occurred under 
Andrew Jackson, when the President decided he wanted to launch 
, 
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a war against France because the French had not made good on 
their promise to repay certain debts owed to the United States 
from Napoleon's seizure of American merchant ships. Jackson 
went to the Congress and said in essence "I'm going to send the 
Navy over there and chastise the French and they will pay their 
debts." But Henry Clay, the chairman of this committee, said "No 
you're not," for a variety of reasons, and Congress blocked the 
President. 
That was exactly the kind of adventuristic Executive initiative 
that the Founding Fathers were trying to guard against by the 
"declaration of war" clause. 
It is a very important clause. But the critical point I am making 
is that that clause was not violated in Vietnam. The constitutional 
system was not broken. What happened in Vietnam was that Con-
gress, after initially strongly supporting the war-and, indeed, 
many of the people who pushed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 
had in the early 1960's denounced President Kennedy and Presi-
dent Johnson for not doing more, for not sending combat troops to 
Vietnam. A classic example was Representative Paul Findley. 
At any rate, my bottomline is that the War Powers Resolution 
was a fraud. It exceeds the constitutional powers of the Congress. I ' 
strongly believe that it should be repealed. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner appears in the appendix.] 
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Reveley, please pro-
" ceed. 
STATEMENT OF W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, ESQUIRE, PRACTICING 
ATTORNEY AND AUTHOR, RICHMOND, VA 
Mr. REVELEY. I have a long statement that I would appreciate 
being included in the record. 
Senator BIDEN. It will be. 
Mr. REVELEY. I will orally cover only the first 5 pages of it. 
The theme of my remarks, Mr. Chairman, is let's be practical. 
In my judgment, the country does need war powers legislation. 
We need it to help solve the severe, debilitating war powers prob-
lem that afflicts us. 
The problem is not that the President is deliberately, wickedly, 
usurping ancient congressional prerogatives over war and peace. 
Nor is the problem that Congress is deliberately, wickedly, invad-
ing hereditary powers of the President over the use of force. 
The problem is that the country lacks a constitutional consensus 
about the process by which the President and Congress are to 
share authority over American decisions to use force. 
We continue to bicker over which branch gets to decide what and 
when. This bickering occurs at profound cost to the country. Four 
sorts of harm come quickly to mind. 
First, the bickering poisons relations between the President and 
Congress. To be accused of constitutional usurpation is simply no 
fun. It engenders anger, fear, defensiveness, countercharges. 
Constitutional theologians from both sides, the President's and 
Congress', insist with passion of truly religious intensity that their 
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view of the Constitution is the "only true view," that all others are 
heresy. 
The fate of heretics in the hands of the righteous is well-known. 
Second, the bickering undermines public confidence in the rule 
of law and in the legitimacy of both the President and Congress. 
The political branches of Government cannot go on year after 
year accusing one another of illegality in one of the most sensitive 
areas of American life, war and peace, without seriously eroding 
the faith of the people in both of these branches of Government. 
Third, the bickering prevents focused attention to policy; that is, 
focused inquiry into what the United States ought to do about par-
ticular foreign and military situations, what our realistic alterna-
tives are for dealing with them, what the costs and benefits of 
these alternatives are, and which alternatives we ought to pursue 
to maximize our national interest. 
Rather than focusing on these policy issues, the debate all too 
often focuses on process issues, on which branch is constitutionally 
entitled to decide what and when. Focused attention on whether 
the United States ought in the national interest to commit troops 
abroad is sacrificed to bickering over the precise way in which the 
President and Congress are to make whatever decision is ultimate-
ly to be made. 
Fourth and finally, the bickering denies American war and peace 
decisions the wisdom and the staying power that can come only 
from having both the President and Congress meaningfully in-
volved in our decisions to use force. It is unavoidable that the Con-
stitution divides the war powers between the two branches. Thus, it 
is inescapable that for American foreign and military policy to 
work, the two branches must cooperate in the exercise of their 
overlapping prerogatives. 
But wait, some people say, these sorts of harms occur not be-
cause we lack a constitutional consensus on process but simply be-
cause the country lacks a current consensus on policy. We had a 
policy consensus from the end of World War II to sometime in the 
mid-1960's, they say, but now we've lost it and that's the problem. 
Well, of course, when people can easily agree on what policy to 
adopt-whether these people are spouses dealing with one another, 
parents and children, university faculties and administrators, cor-
porate officers and directors, litigants, voters, or Presidents and 
Congresses-when consensus on policy does exist, then little atten-
tion is paid to the nature of the decisionmaking process. 
But how often do people agree easily about difficult and impor-
tant issues? History suggests not all that often, and the more diffi-
cult it is to get agreement on policy, the more important it becomes 
to have agreement on process. 
There are two reasons. First, when people agree on how a deci-
sion should be made-that is, when they accept that a particular 
person or group is entitled to make a particular sort of decision-
then they are far more likely to accept the decision that is ulti-
mately made, even if they disagree with it as a matter of policy, 
than they are likely to accept such a decision if they believe it was 
made by people not authorized to decide. 
Every day, in countless contexts, people accept and support deci-
sions whether they like them or not because the decisions have 
) . 
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been made by a process that people thought was legitimate. In 
other words, agreement on process helps produce agreement on 
policy. 
When we disagree over both process and policy-over who gets to 
decide as well as over what the decision ought to be-a two-front 
struggle results, with dismal effect for focused inquiry into what 
we ought to do in the national interest. Sound policy suffers. 
In short, process matters. We badly need a constitutional consen-
sus on how the President and Congress are to go about making war 
and peace decisions. 
To reach at least minimal agreement on process, all the crucial 
constitutional threads must be drawn together. The President's 
constitutional theologians must stop ignoring the fact that the lan-
guage of tbe Constitution and its Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes 
create an enduring role for Congress in American decisions to use 
force. 
At the same time, Congress' constitutional theologians must stop 
ignoring 200 years of practice under the Constitution. From George 
Washington's administration to date, practice also has been central 
to this country's constitutional journey. War powers practice indi-
cates that, when Congress has provided the necessary tools to the 
President-men, money, and materiel, for instance-and when 
Congress has not previously banned a particular use of force, then 
the President may begin it on his own initiative. Two hundred 
years of practice make that clear. 
It is essential that we weave these threads together in war 
powers legislation. 
We might just as well howl into the wind as try to put into place 
. a process that ignores either the country's deep rooted constitution-
al expectation of congressional involvement on the one hand, or 
the country's equally deeprooted constitutional expectation of Pres-
idential initiative on the other. 
Both expectations must be met if we are to develop a war powers 
process that actually works. 
For now, we should focus on the irreducible constitutional mini-
mum, on the "nothing less" bedrock that must exist if Congress is 
to be involved consistently in decisions about the use of force and if 
the President is to retain the initiative that practice has given him 
and that he will exercise, in light of the hazard, pace, and complex-
ity of foreign and military affairs and his greater capability than 
Congress, to deal quickly and quietly with these affairs. 
What is the irreducible minimum? In my view, it is this: 
First, means to encourage the President and Congress to consult 
meaningfully together before and during moments of truth; 
Second, recognition that, informed by this consultation, the 
President may act alone if he thinks it in the national interest, for 
instance, because he believes speed or secrecy is crucial to U.S. suc-
cess; and 
Third, recognition that, when the President alone does initiate 
the use of force, it thereafter is for Congress to approve, disap-
prove, or limit the use if Congress chooses to act. 
The irreducible minimum does not include time limits within 
which Congress must act either to approve, or be deemed to have 
disapproved, Presidential initiatives. It is far from clear that disap-
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proval by inaction is constitutional; an.d it is quite clear that the 
President, all Presidents, will resist such a concept relentlessly and 
that Congress will rarely try to enforce it. Time limits won't work 
in the real world. 
Is disapproval by concurrent resolution part of the irreducible 
constitutional minimum? In my opinion, it can go either way. After 
Chadha, Presidents will also probably resist relentlessly the con-
cept that concurrent resolutions can constitutionally curb their ini-
tiatives. 
But, as a practical matter, if the President commits troops who 
remain in the field a week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, 2 months after their 
initial commitment, and Congress, by majority vote in both Houses, 
acts to limit or end the use of force, it is most unlikely that the 
President will simply disregard such an expression of congressional 
will. If he did, Congress has remedies, easy remedies-for instance, 
the power of the purse. 
In sum, the War Powers Resolution, as passed in 1973, has not 
succeeded. It needs to be reduced to its most basic and workable 
elements. These elements, together, can lead the way to the consti-
tutional consensus we so desperately lack. The consensus would in-
volve less than either Presidential or congressional theologians 
insist is their branch's constitutional due. But the consensus would 
work. 
One final note. 
Some people say, if war powers legislation is to be so reduced, 
why bother to have it? Better to kill the 1973 resolution outright 
and thereby vindicate the Presidential view of the Constitution; or 
better to beef up the Resolution to require Congress' prior approval 
for any use of force, except for a few specified sorts, and, thereby, 
enshrine the congressional view of the Constitution. And, anyway, 
the irreducible minimum just described already exists. The Presi-
dent and Congress do not need a War Powers Resolution in order 
to consult one another. The President has been acting alone and 
reporting to Congress from time to time without such legislation, 
and Congress can already act before or during Presidential initia-
tives to block, limit, or end them in a variety of ways. 
True, but simply because most of us could exercise daily, eat 
sparingly and otherwise see to our bodies does not mean that most 
of us do it. V! e are more likely to do it when pushed by an action-
forcing regimen. 
The War Powers Resolution is an action-forcing regimen for both 
the President and Congress. It hasn't worked well so far because it 
carries too much baggage, such as sections 2(c) and 5(b). 
Stripped to its irreducible minimum, however, the Resolution 
just might bring the President and CongTess to engage one another 
constructively on questions of war and peace-to consult, let the 
President act first if he feels so compelled, but then force the Presi-
dent to report and let Congress act second to approve or disapprove 
his initiative, if it feels so compelled. 
To repeal the War Powers Resolution, leave it as it is, or amend 
it to impose more restraints on the President would do nothing for 
constitutional consensus. Repealed, the Resolution would greatly 
disappoint expectations that Congress must play a sustained, mean-
ingful role in use of force decisions. Left as it is, the Resolution 
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would continue to work so fecklessly as to suggest that consistent 
collaboration between the two branches on the use of force is hope-
less. Amended to try to restrain further the President, the Resolu-
tion would surely be ignored by just about everyone. 
Cut to its irreducible minimum, however, the Resolution could 
lead us to constitutional consensus. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reveley appears in-the appen-
dix.] 
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. 
We thank all of you for very concise and well-reasoned state-
ments, close to within the time limit. 
I have a number of questions. But let me begin in a slightly un-
orthodox way. 
Would any of you like to raise questions about anything any of 
your colleagues have said? 
Mr. FIRMAGE. I have two points in regard to comments that have 
been made regarding Vietnam and foreign policy generally. 
The point of Vietnam that was so disastrous is' not that Congress 
didn't have an input into the decision, much to its regret, I believe. 
I think the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was, in effect, an unconstitu-
tional attempt to delegate the warmaking power of Congress to the 
President. 
I think that the Congress may well have been deliberately misled 
by the President in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, too. 
Nevertheless, I agree with my colleagues that Congress had an 
input in that decision to go to war. The problem that is even more 
disastrous than the disaster of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution itself is 
that Presidents made an argument that they didn't need it 
anyway, that, through the Commander in Chief clause, the Presi-
dent had the power to go to war and Congress could "go fIsh." 
That argument, following the same argument from Korea, is, 
what I think, represents a vast difference from the past. 
Of course we have had a checkered history. Of course Presidents 
have exceeded power given them. They have done things that per-
haps they should not have done, and exigencies will arise when a 
President perhaps should cross a constitutional line, to be later, 
retrospectively, saved by Congress. 
But what is very dangerous is an argument that the President 
has the power, under the Commander in Chief clause, to ignore 
any need of authorization from Congress and decide for war or 
peace. That does not have precedent in the past and it has no text 
to support it, either. 
In regard to power over foreign relations, no doubt the transac-
t ion of foreign business is to be done by the President, as John 
Marshall noted before Congress. John Marshall speaking before the 
House of Representatives in defense of a controversial action taken 
by President John Adams, fIrSt described the President as "The 
sole organ of the Nation in its external relations, and its sole repre-
sentative with foreign nations." What Mr. Marshall meant, of 
course, was that the President is our singular voice in the conduct 
of foreign relations-see Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage, 
"To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History 
and Law" 181, 1986. But the determination of that foreign policy 
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and the author$tion of that policy, as well as the funding of that 
policy, is in the congressional bailiwick. There, I think, along with 
the general intent that we see from the treaty power, that foreign 
policy be conducted collegially, places Congress squarely in the role 
of determining the nature of, and then authorizing our foreign 
policy. This power collegially to help determine the content of our 
foreign policy is a separate empowerment of Congress, expressed in 
a multitude of constitutional texts, apart from the congressional 
power exclusively to decide for war or peace, absent a sudden 
attack upon this country. 
Senator BIDEN. Would anyone else like to make a comment.? 
Mr. TURNER. I could easily go on for 20 minutes, Mr. Chairman, 
but I will not. I will make just one point. . 
Professor Glennon, an old colleague from our years with the com-
mittee, made reference to the Steel Seizure case. It is very common 
for people analyzing the separation of powers issue to do that. I 
think it is an error, however, with respect to foreign affairs. 
I would note that Prof. Louis Henkin, who testified here recent-
ly, I understand-though I have not seen his testimony-notes in 
his book, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," that the Steel Sei-
zure case is not generally viewed as a foreign relations case. In the 
case of Goldwater v. Carter in 1979, four members of the Supreme 
Court, including the current and immediate past Chief Justices, 
distinguished that case from Steel Seizure, arguing that-unlike 
Goldwater and Curtiss-Wright- Steel Seizure was not a foreign af-
fairs case. And, if you read both Justice Black's majority opinion 
and the famous Jackson concurring opinion in }Toungstown-which, 
at the time, of course, was joined by not one other member-they 
both stressed that at issue in Steel Seizure was a President who, 
although he made reference to his Commander in Chief power, was 
trying to seize privately owned steel mills. Under the fifth amend-
ment, the President is not empowered to seize privately owned 
property of U.S. citizens for any purpose without due process of 
law, and certainly the Commander in Chief power has to be exer-
cised pursuant to all of the other constraints in the Constitution. 
So, I would argue that relying upon the language in the Steel 
Seizure case is a serious error in · trying to understand foreign af-
fairs powers; because, in that case, the President was not exercising 
his Executive power of general control over foreign relations; but, 
rather, he was infringing upon the constitutional rights of U.S. citi-
zens. 
Senator BIDEN. I assume, Professor Glennon, that you would like 
to say something. 
Mr. GLENNON. Mr. Chairman, I think that Mr. Turner's theory 
concerning the irrelevance of the Steel Seizure case is belied by the 
facts of the Steel Seizure case, the analysis of the Court in the Steel 
Seizure case, and the subsequent analysis of the Supreme Court in 
Dames & Moore v. Regan. 
In the Steel Seizure case, President Truman argued that seizure 
of the · steel mills was permitted under his independent power as 
Commander in Chief because of the indispensibility of steel as an 
element in the war effort to prosecute the war in Korea. 
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The Supreme Court held that that was not so; that his independ-
ent power as Commander in Chief did not support the seizure of 
the steel mills. 
In 1981, the issue of the validity of the Iranian hostage settle-
ment agreement confronted the Supreme Court, and the Court had 
to decide what analytical framework was to be applied to resolve 
that dispute. Justice Rehnquist wrote, in speaking for a majority of 
the Court, that the analysis of Jackson in the Steel Seizure case 
"brings together as much combination of analysis and common-
sense as there is in this area." He proceeded to apply the analysis 
of the Steel Seizure case to resolve the validity of this international 
agreement. • 
Mr. Turner might be right, but I would be inclined to agree with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Mr. TuRNER. This is very important, so let me try to be precise. 
I think in both the Iran Claims case and in the Steel Seizure case 
the facts involved the property rights of individual American citi-
zens. They were in that respect essentially domestic disputes. All 
powers of the Constitution have to be exercised consistent with all 
of the constraints of the Constitution. 
If the President decided that he was angry at Canada, and 
wanted to send the Army up td launch an invasion of CanadR over 
some economic or political grievance, before he could do that-and 
in this case, I might disagree with my dear friend, Taylor Reveley; 
what Taylor said was ambiguous-but if he meant to say that the 
President could essentially launch a war if he felt it were an emer-
gency and then to go Congress, I would disagree. 
I think the President can only launch a war, the kind of war 
with which declarations of war have historically been associated-
which excludes a defensive war-after he has to come to Congress 
and obtained approval from both Houses. 
But short of that, in Justice Jackson's opinion--
Senator BIDEN. Let me stop you there. 
How about if the President of the United States concluded that 
he wished to send troops into Mexico because he believed that, 
absent doing so, the Communist Sandinistas would take control of 
Mexico City? Would he be able to do that without the consent of 
Congress? 
Mr. TURNER. I would argue that if the Government of Mexico 
asked him to come in, he might well be able to do it, but--
Senator BIDEN. Without Congress' approval? 
Mr. TURNER. Well, it depends upon the specific circumstances. 
If he is going in for the purpose of engaging in war or in sus-
tained hostilities, I would argue that he should: ideally, come to 
Congress first. But there are some 'cases where, for example, under 
a treaty, I can make an argument that the President-let's say if 
the Soviets invaded Germany tomorrow-I could make you a con-
stitutional case that the President could respond to that immedi-
ately, even ignoring the fact that \ve've got tripwire troops there 
that he would also be permitted to protect. 
But, my own judgment is, which is in part based on constitution-
al and in part political consideration, that he ought to get the ap-
proval of Congress as quickly as possible, if not in advance. 
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Senator BIDEN. Professor Turner, I think there is no one who 
would disagree that it would be better if the President and the 
Congress agreed. But the key question is, If the President concludes 
that he needs to project U.S. forces into an area where any reason-
able person woulds-expect that there would be a resistance to those 
forces being placed there, does he need congressional approval to 
do that. . 
Mr. TURNER. I would argue in general "No," but in some specific 
cases, he might. 
The reality is that many decisions of how the military forces of 
the country are deployed during peacetime run the risk of another 
country getting angry and attacking or declaring war against us. 
The question of whether the President may use the Navy to 
convoy merchant ships first came up in 1798, when Congress was 
passing a law in the House that had a provision "authorizing" the 
President to use the Navy to convoy ships. Speaker of the House 
John Dayton, the youngest man to sign the Constitution, said "We 
can't have this clause in here because the President already has 
the authority to use the Navy to convoy ships, and to put this lan-
guage in the bill might someday be viewed as a precedent to argue 
that he did not get that power from the Constitution." 
Now, what you are suggesting-deploying the ,Army into a for-
eign country against that Government's will-the only justification 
for that would be if the President could argue it were necessary for 
a real defensive purpose; for example, if that country had seized 
American civilians. 
Senator BmEN. Take Nicaragua. 
Mr. TURNER. First let's take Iran and Mayaguez. 
I think the President had the right to send United States forces 
into Iran and into Cambodian territory to rescue endangered 
Americans without congressional authorization. 
Nicaragua is a more difficult case. The Congress itself has found, 
by law, that Nicaragua is engaged in a flagrant violation of the 
rules of international law contained in article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, article 18 of the OAS Charter, and other legal instru-
ments. They have clearly been engaged in armed aggression 
against their neighbors, and the United States does have some 
treaty commitments to assist victims of armed aggression in the 
region. 
My preference would be for the President to come to the Con-
gress if he felt we should use armed force against Nicaragua. 
Senator BIDEN. I understand your preference. But I am trying to 
establish clearly what the issue here is. I was here when we passed 
the War Powers Resolution, and we all have varying opinions on 
why we p~ it. But rather than go back and argue why we did, 
our task now is to determine whether to keep it, throw it out, put 
in a new vehicle, or amend the existing vehicle. 
So, let's not argue about Vietnam. and what got us where we are 
today. Weare revisiting this now in a different atmosphere. 
The real issue up here is that many of us in Congress are . con-
eemled that any President, Democrat or Republican, will, under a 
--stated authority, the Commander in Chief clause, decide to cOlnmit 
U.s. forces into a situation that establishes a substantially neV'7 for-
e· policYeF,without any participation by the Congress. The concern 
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is that the President, essentially by the projection of forces, can 
make new policy. And, in the nuclear age and given the complexity 
of the world, those hostilities could quickly widen with potentially 
dire consequences. 
We are not worried about 1898 or in 1798. 
The stakes were not as high then. 
But if a President sends forces into a half dozen regions of the 
world, it has the potential to produce a showdown between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America. Any showdown be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States of America has the 
potential for nuclear annihilation. 
So, that is one important and practical reason why everybody is 
either arguing the President should have the authority to act uni-
laterally or should not. But the issue also applies to situations 
where the scope of hostilities would in all probablity remain limit-
ed but where there are fundamental issues of policy involved. For 
example absent the existence of an emergency which involves 
clearly visible U.S. interests relating to American military person-
nel or American citizenry abroad, does the President without con-
sulting Congress have the constitutional authority to say tomorrow 
"Because I believe that the Sandinistas are a destabilizing threat to 
the Western Hemisphere, 75,000 American troops have invaded 
Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring democracy and stabilizing 
the hemisphere." Does the President have the authority to do that? 
Mr. TURNER. The answer depends upon the specific factual cir-
cumstances, Senator, but the Nicaraguan case is obviously the one 
you have in mind. But let's look at it more broadly. 
Senator BIDEN. No, no. Let's look at that one. If you don't have 
an answer to that one, let's pass. 
Mr. TURNER. Let me have just a moment. 
As Commander in Chief, the President has the power to deploy 
the military forces of the country anywhere he deems necessary 
short of engaging in \\Tar, and if that includes sending them where 
another country may be tempted to launch a war against us, that 
power has ooen conveyed to him. 
Senator BIDEN. If, in fact, that country would resist, is that 
launching against us? . 
Mr. TURNER. I'm not talking about invading countries. 
If he goes into a country at the request of the government, as in 
Beirut-many of you all complained, if you remember, that he was 
infringing the prerogatives--
Senator BIDEN. I understand all that. I'm trying to deal with 
your expertise here. . 
Mr. TURNER. The strongest legal case in which a President could 
order U.S. forces to invade another country would be if he could 
justify the action as defensive-for example, in response to armed 
aggression against this country, its citizens, or arguably an ally. 
For example, if Nicaragua continued its aggression against EI Sal-
vador-again, it is the kind of situation he ought to come to Con-
gress on, but I am not prepared to say that under no circumstances 
could the President legally use force against Nicaragua. 
On the other side, if I were talking to Abe Sofaer, I would strong-
ly urge him before advising the President that it was legal to 
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commit American forces to invade Nicaragua, to advise that he go 
to Congress and get affirmative authorization. 
I agree with Hamilton. In a case, the consequences of which 
could involve war, the President ought to exercise no doubtful au-
thority. But, in particular, if you have a regional treaty, if you 
have a clear case of armed aggression by one party against others, 
certainly the President ought to be able to "rattle the saber" if you 
will, as a means of trying to deter agression and restore peace. 
Whether or not he can go further than that, I think the best 
answer to that question is a political one, and that is he ought to 
come to Congress and get your approval-as occurred in Vietnam. I 
don't want to say as a matter of law that he can't do it. 
Senator BIDEN. I have one last question for you and then I will 
let all of the panelists comment on both of these and I 'Hill let my 
colleague interject. 
If we don't satisfactorily negotiate a base agreement with the 
Philippines, can the President say-without the authority of Con-
gress-"Mrs. Aquino, tough luck, we're staying, we're moving in, 
we're going back to the old days"? 
I'm serious. Can the President do that, because those are clearly 
the most important bases in the entire Pacific Basin and critical 
for American security interests. If the Filipinos say "Get out," can 
the President say "No way, we're staying, I don't care what the 
Congress says, and, by the way, we're moving into Manila';? 
Mr. TURNER. I would say "No." 
Senator BIDEN. OK. 
Now, would you like to comment? 
Senator ADAMS. I wanted to ask a question on this. 
Senator BIDEN. As long as you don't take them off this area. 
Senator ADAMS. No. I want to stay on this question. 
You mentioned that if we have a treaty or a series of treaty com-
mitments and one of the parties to that feels threatened-the ex-
ample used by the chairman. Are you stating that the President 
can invade another country that threatens one of the signatory 
countries to those treaties, and commit our Armed Forces to war 
without a declaration of war? 
Can we do it? This is a practical question. Could we invade Nica-
ragua based on the fact that we felt that Nicaragua was invading 
EI Salvador? 
Mr. TURNER. This is extremely important and I don't want to 
mislead you. Let me give you a couple of examples. 
Senator ADAMS. No. Could we first, Mr. Turner. Then give me ex-
amples. 
Mr. TuRNER. But it is such a complex area--
Senator ADAMS. No, it's not complex. It could happen tomorrow. 
I mean, we have the situation and we want to know what the 
power is of the President. 
We have had people up here say that the President can do any-
thing in committing troops. We have had some testify that no, if 
there is an offensive war and you go into somebody else's territory, 
you're sending troops, and that probably requires a declaration of 
war. 
Mr. TuRNER. I agree it requires prior congressional authoriza-
tion. 
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Senator ADAMS. I think I have heard you say that if there is 
some kind of treaty and we are indirectly threatened, the President 
can move troops in and can attack. The chairman used the exam-
ple of 75,000 troops into Nicaragua if there were a Nica!'aguan in-
cursion or attack on EI Salvador. 
Can he do that without a declaration of war? 
Mr. TURNER. I would want to look very carefully again at the Rio 
Treaty before making such an argument-but it is theoretically 
possible. 
The basic argument would be that if the treaty makes an attack 
on a treaty partner an attack on the United States as a matter of 
law, since treaties are part of the supreme law of the land and the 
President is required by the Constitution to faithfully execute the 
law of the land, and the President, as Commander in Chief, is au-
thorized to act defensively to an attack on the United States, he 
could in such circumstances act without further authority. 
Senator ADAMS. Wait a minute. You also have a law of the land, 
which is ignored, in the War Powers Resolution. It says that the 
President should be doing certain things, and certainly most schol-
ars have said that these cover offensive land actions. And those of-
fensive land actions can be categorized that we will go ahead. 
You forget, I think, one portion of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 
I came to Congress just after it. I was here during the time of en-
actment of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolu-
tion was in part a result of the invasion of Cambodia by President 
Nixon which meant that it fit the dermition that some of the schol-
ars have given. Some scholars have said that the only time you de-
clare war is when you are going to create a world war. I believe 
that is correct, is it not, Mr. Chairman? 
Senator BIDEN. If the Senator would yield, he is forgetting that I 
still have the floor. I think this is a worthwhile area to go off on. 
Senator ADAMS. I don't want to go off on anything. I want to stay 
on the point. 
Senator BIDEN. My point was, absent a war powers act, under the 
Constitution, does the President have the authority to deploy 
troops in the examples I have raised? 
I pursue this because the Secretary of Defense, accompanied by 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other 
people have come up here and said there is no restriction on the 
President being able to do these things. In fairness, I don't think I 
mentioned the Philippines then-but there was no restriction, they 
said, on the ability of the President to do the kind of thing I have 
suggested. 
So, it is not just idle discussion that is interesting at a cocktail 
party. 
But I would like to let the others make comments here on the 
questions that I have just asked. 
Mr. REVELEY. On the Philippines, Senator, I think probably 
there, by any reasonable defInition, you would be into aggressive 
war. In my judgment, the President cannot, unilaterally, by him-
self, engage in an aggressive use of force. It is not even clear to me 
that the President and Congress together can. 
Senator BIDEN. So, the key is not U.S. interests, but aggressive. 
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.. Mr. REVELEY. Yes, but I don't think that is very helpful. As a 
practical matter, if the President does commit troops, he and his 
.. lawyers and his political aiders and abettors will argue that the 
use of force is defensive. 
Senator BIDEN. Let's look at this as a practical matter, and I am 
a practical politician-with all due respect, I think the people sit-
ting up here, including my friends on the Republican side of the 
committee,-are probably more aware of what . practically motivates 
politicians than you all who are sitting down there. 
Mr. REVELEY. You are right about that. 
Senator BIDEN. One of the practical facts of life is that Presidents 
or Members of Congress or anyone else-and one of you mentioned 
this before-are reluctant to do things that have already been de-
fined as out of bounds. 
The issue that I am trying to narrow down is under what circum-
stances the President is able, under his own authority, to project 
American forces into a situation-whether it be the Philippines or 
Nicaragua-where any reasonable person would expect armed · re-
sistance. 
Mr. REVELEY. The Philippine example, Senator, is seems to me is 
clearly an aggressive use of force. Just because we want a base in 
somebody else's country and it's in our national interest to have a 
base there does not give us a right under international law to 
invade that country and take a base. We would like to have lots of 
Japanese yen, too. But we can't go and seize Japan to get the yen. 
If most reasonable people agree that a particular use of force is 
"aggressive" under international law, then I don't think you are 
going to find many constitutional scholars saying that the Presi-
dent alone may commit troops. 
But that is a rare situ,ation. That is at an extreme end of the con-
tinuum. 
The far more difficult questions are Cuban missile crises and Ni-
caraguas, and there you inescapably confront disagreement on the 
constitutional score. The language of the Constitution and its 
Framers' and Ratifiers' debates, strongly suggest that in the Cuban 
missile crises and Nicaraguas you need prior congressional approv-
al for American use of force. Two hundred years of practice suggest 
the opposite. 
Senator BIDEN. I would argue that we have taken care of the 
Nicaraguan situation, short of the use of American forces, through 
the Intelligence Committees and the Intelligence Act. We disagree. 
We fight about it. It does not always work. But we have reached a 
ground upon which we mediate, negotiate, and constrain, or pro-
mote Presidential action with regard to use of non-American 
forces; that is, forces other than American troops. 
Professor Glennon, would you like to comment, and then Profes-
sor Firmage, and then I will yield the floor. 
Mr. GLENNON. Senator, I think the answer that the Senate gave 
to · your question in 1973 is probably the best answer that has been 
formulated, and that is the dermition of the President's exclusive 
powers set forth in the Senate version of the War Powers Resolu-
tion which, in addition to those situations set forth in section 2 of 
the current version of the War Powers Resolution, recognizes Presi-
dential power to introduce the Armed Forces into hostilities to 
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forestall an imminent threat of attack on the United States, and 
also to rescue endangered U.S. citizens and nationals located 
abroad. 
The whole theory of this approach is one of emergency power, 
which derives from the intent of the Framers, from constitutional 
custom since the earliest days of the Republic, and from the func-
tional attributes of the two branches. The theory is that, where 
Congress has time to act and an underlying policy judgment has to 
be made about whether we should invade Japan to get more yen or 
the Philippines to get bases, that is a judgment for the elected leep-
resentatives of the people. 
It seems to me that to argue that in those circumstances that the 
President can use armed force without congressional consent would 
be to rob the congressional war power of any meaning. 
Now, Senator Adams raised a separate question and that is 
whether under such circumstances the President might infer au-
thority to use the Armed Forces in hostilities from any treaty. 
There are 7 mutual security treaties now in existence with 26 dif-
ferent countries. If one of those countries is attacked, can the 
President, relying on a treaty, respond to a real or purported re-
quest from one of those countries to introduce the Armed Forces 
into hostilities? 
The answer is "Absolutely not." 
None of those treaties in existence gives the President an iota of 
war power that he would not have had in the absence of those trea-
ties. Every one of those treaties makes clear-and the legislative 
history is abundantly clear, established by this committee-that 
the allocation of constitutional power to make war between the 
President and the Senate that existed prior to the ratification of 
those treaties was not affected by the Act of ratification. 
If the President needed to come back to Congress for authority 
prior to ratification, he still needs to after the Act of ratification. 
I might point out to the committee that I have written an article 
for the Columbia Journal of International Law on precisely this 
subject, which I will make available to the committee, if it wishes. 
Senator BIDEN. Yes, thank you. 
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.] 
Senator BIDEN. Professor Firmage. 
Mr. FIRMAGE. I agree fully with what Professor Glennon has just 
said and would underline his last point particularly. 
I think there is no base to hoist yourself up by treaty to have a 
war power that the President simply lacks. That is the power of 
the U.S. Congress. No treaty grants that. No treaty can constitu-
tionally bind a Congress and an administration not then in exist-
ence to go to war at some time in the future. Reid v. Covert laid to 
rest the notion, inferentially suggested by Justice Holmes in Mis-
souri v. Holland, that the treaty power was somehow beyond the 
bounds of the Constitution. Only the Congress of the United States 
poSsesses the war power. Only a sitting Congress can finally, abso-
lutely commit us to war. 
I would quickly tick off my response to your central questions. 
The President, in my opinion, must have congressional authori-
zation to place troops in any situation that would likely involve 
hostilities. 
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Second, no request of a host state changes that in the least. That 
has some relevance to the question of whether or not we are violat-
ing international law. It has no relevance that I can see to the 
question of the constitutional allocation of power between the Con-
gress and the President. 
Third, I do not think-I will go beyond your hypothetical situa-
tion-I do not think that the protection of U.S. citizens abroad 
gives any such right of intervention. I think that is highly suspect 
in international law and without any base in constitutional law. 
The protection of U.S. warships, U.S. forces, and other public forces 
provides a far different and stronger basis for claiming a Presiden-
tial responsive act of defense, analogous to a surprise attack upon 
our country. 
U.S. citizens abroad place themselves there under the sovereign-
ty of another state. They can never legitimately be used as the 
basis of Presidential war. 
Your other point regarding base agreements: absent base agree-
ments in the Philippines, the President of the United States pos-
sesses no right to maintain troops there. No amount of supposed 
U.S. interest creates that constitutional power, absent action by the 
Congress of the United States authorizing such a base agreement 
with subsequent acceptance by the Government of the Philippines. 
Finally, regarding the hypothetical invasion of Nicaragua, no 
notion of preemptive action can be allowed to justify such an inva-
sion or the idea of self-defense, which is rightly in the Constitution, 
simply eats up the rule of who has the war power, and that is the 
United States Congress, not the President of the United States. 
Senator BIDEN. I thank you and I yield to my colleague from 
North Carolina, Senator Helms. 
Senator HELMS. I will yield to Senator Pressler because he has 
another meeting. 
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you. 
I shall just ask one question and put the rest of my questions 
into the record. 
I thank my colleague for yielding. 
I might say that I have just been informed that the Discovery 
has been successfully launched and is going very, very well. I think 
that is good news. 
I v{ant to compliment this panel. I especially want to compliment 
Professor Turner for his "Restoring the Rule of Law." I am one 
who believes the War Powers Resolution should be repealed and I 
think this is an excellent study. 
I also apologize for not hearing all of the testimony this morning. 
We have had a caucus, plus I have another committee meeting. 
We cannot anticipate all of the circumstances that might arise. 
Also, it seems to me that we already have the appropriations proc-
ess to help Congress in its relationship with the President. 
I certainly agree we should have consensus and consultation. I 
think in some ways the war powers legislation actually causes 
more of a strained relationship between the two branches of Gov-
ernment. 
In a ~peech at Oklahoma University recently, Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in referring to the problems relating 
to the separation of powers said that each of the three branches of 
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Government has its hands in each other's pockets. I think our 
Framers did a pretty good job with that Constitution, and I see the 
War Powers Resolution as an infringement on that. 
My suggestion is that we repeal the War Powers Resolution. 
Very frankly, that probably will not happen. But I hope that in 
amending it or whatever we do, we take very careful consideration 
of Justice O'Connor's speech. 
I am intrigued with all of the other legislation in the mid-1970's 
that also struck at the President's powers. Why do you think-and 
I will address this to any panelist-why do you think it took until 
1973 before Congress legislated on the war power? 
Before that time and since that time, the Executive had used 
force abroad in one way or another approximately 200 times in the 
200 years of the Republic. Surely practice has made precedent. 
Why did it take until 1973 before Congress legislated on the war 
power, do you think? I might just ask each of you for your assess-
ment. 
Mr. FIRMAGE. I would contest your conclusion regarding 200 inci-
dents. I think when you begin to analyze those 200 incidents, which 
I have done in each case, you find that they collect into different 
groups, in the main, with maybe a dozen exceptions, into very un-
derstandable, justifiable interventions where the Commander in 
Chief clause is not really at issue. 
. In 1967 the State Department compiled an official list of 137 in-
stances where it asserted that the President, as the Commander in 
Chief of the _ Armed Forces, committed acts of war on his own au-
thority beyond the borders of the United States. Careful scrutiny of 
the examples provided by the Government belies this assertion; 8 
of the Acts involved enforcement of the law against piracy, for 
which no congresional authorization is required; 69 were landings 
to protect American citizens, many of which were statutorily au-
thorized; 20 concerned invasions of foreign or disputed territories, ' 
which, although illegal, were not acts of war if the United States 
claimed the territory; 6 were minatory demonstrations without 
combat; another 6 involved protracted occupations of various Carib-
bean states, which occupations were authorized by treaty; and at 
least 1 was an act of naval self-defense, which is justified by both 
international and municipal law. Even in the one or two dozen in-
stances when the President has acted without congressional au-
thorization, he has done so by relying falsely on either a statute, a 
treaty, or international law, never on his power as the Commander 
in Chief or the Chief Executive. Clearly, neither the Constitution 
nor historical precedent empower the President to initiate a state 
of war or engage in an act of war on his own authority beyond the 
borders of the United States. The Presidential warmaking power is 
strictly limited to defending against sudden attack-see F. W or-
muth and E. Firmage, uTo Chain the Dog of War: The War Power 
of Congress in History and Law, pages 133 to 149, 1986. 
Presidential action aimed directly against the sovereignty of an-
other state, whether or not done under the subterfuge of acting to 
protect U.S. citizens abroad, is a very different and far more dan-
gerous and utterly aggressive action, with no conceivable justifica-
tion or authorization in the U.S. Constitution. 
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Mr. GLENNON~I think that ProfesSor Firmage's analysis is abso-
lutely correct. In fact, his excellent book, "To Chain the Dog of 
War," contains an analysis of those L"lcidents. I believe the current 
number cited by the State Department is 132. 
The point that he and Professor Wormuth make is that, if you 
analyze them closely, it turns out that most of them are relatively 
minor uses of force~ involving chasing bandits across the border, 
clashing with pirates, et cetera-not sustained, large-scale involve-
ment of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities abroad, not instances in 
which the state of the Nation was changed from peace to war. 
It really is a fairly recent phenomenon that Presidents have 
claimed authority to do that without congressional consent-begin-
ning, really, as Professor Henkin has pointed out, with the Korean 
war. It was, as Professor Firmage said, the tragedy of Vietnam that 
crystallized congressional thinking on this subject. 
So, I think that is the answer to Senator Pressler's question. 
Mr. TURNER. I would arglJe that the real distinction here is 
whether it is an operation that would historically require a decla-
ration of war, or is it something like going after pirates or some 
similar use of force. In the old days, before the U.N. Charter out-
lawed aggressive war, Presidents often authorized force against 
such small states that there was really no likelihood of any kind of 
serious response. In most of those cases, Congress did not question 
such uses of force. 
I agree that Korea was the first major exception. I personally 
think Truman was wrong in Korea. I think he should have gone to 
Congress. 
I would note that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Henry Steele Com-
mager, and others strongly defended Truman's use of force in 
Korea in those days. But I disagree with that view. 
Your real question is why did they do it in 1973. I argued in my 
House testimony last month that Congress was a full partner in 
getting us into Vietnam and overwhelmingly supported the war 
until about 1967 or 1968, v/hen the public turned against it. 
Why they passed the Resolution in 1973 is, first of all, because 
public opinion did shift against the donflict, and they were trying 
to cover their tails, if you will Second, it was because of Water-
gate. The veto override came right after the "Saturday Night Mas-
sacre," and I think there is a general consensus among people who 
have studied this that the Resolution's supporters would not have 
had the votes to override had it not been for the anger at President 
Nixon over Watergate. 
Mr. RE"ELEY. Three quick points, Senator. 
First, I think you are absolutely correct that practice over 200 
years-as well as the language of the Constitution and Framers' 
and Ratifiers' debates-has to be taken into account if we are to 
reach a constitutional consensus on the war powers. You can't 
ignore practice any more than you can ignore the Framers and 
Ratifiers or the text of the document. 
Second, I think the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 
for two reasons. The first was a reaction against a period of unusu-
ally vigorous Presidential assertion of war powers, assertion that 
had gone beyond the sorts of claims to use force that the President 
had made successfully in the 19th century and the early 20th. 
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Second, and far more important, the Resolution came up for a fmal 
vote in the context of Watergate. But for Watergate at white heat, 
I don't think the Resolution ever would have passed. 
Senator PRESSLER. I have some additional questions. 
I ask unanimous consent toO insert an article by John Silber, 
president of Boston University, which appeared in the New Repub-
lic on the War Powers Act. 
I also ask unanimous consent to ask several questions for the 
record, and I apologize for my departure. 
Senator BmEN. Without objection. 
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.] 
Senator BIDEN. I have been told that Schlesinger, when he testi-
fied, and Commager, have since recanted their philosophy as "high-
flying prerogative men." 
I guess we learn, or, hopefully, I will learn from them. 
Senator Adams. 
Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I want to thank the panel for their discussion. I want to go oock 
to the particular point on consensus and whether or not something 
can be done when there is or is not a consensus. I am going to give 
you three examples, and these are not far-fetched. They are in the 
world that we have all lived in. 
As the chairman stated earlier, we are not interested in just ex-
amining history but in trying to live in a world where we are now 
a superpower. We are confronting a superpower and maybe other 
growing superpowers in areas of smaller countries that can rapidly 
escalate. After all, World War I started in very small countries; 
World War IT started in small countries. 
I would say particularly let's take, as a first example, Korea, 
which has been talked about. 
What if we had not had a president that pulled back the general 
that brought us to a point where the Chinese entered into that con-
flict? Would that not have required a declaration of war at some 
point, if we were engaged with the Republic of China in Korea, as 
opposed to what we are doing. 
Professor Glennon. 
Mr. GLENNON. Senator Adams, I think you have raised a point 
that answers the objections to the time limits in the War Powers 
Resolution, because it highlights the fact that what the critics of 
the time limits really object to is constitutional constraints on Pres-
idential use of the Armed Forces. Forget about the War Powers 
Resolution: When the President puts t.he Armed Forces into hostil-
ities abroad, at some point, as the magnitude of hostilities . in-
creases, the President constitutionally has to get congressional con-
sent. 
Senator ADAMS. Let me follow through with that. The other 
members of the panel can comment afterward. 
That is the problem, and I am prepared to work with the chair-
man and others to make this act more workable. But in each of 
these cases, we have the beginning of a hostility, generally in a 
small country, and then an escalation that goes to what would ordi-
nary be acts of war. 
I mentioned Vietnam. We were movillg then on Cambodia, an-
other nation, which, as it turns out, we probably ended up causing 
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the destruction of that nation. That was beyond what was contem-
plated certainly in any Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 
Even though our debates up here were unsuccessful in triggering 
the Act in the Persian Gulf, we did prevent what many of us were 
concerned about, which was a land invasion of the Iranian area be-
cause of the Silkworm missiles and our ships being there, with no 
congressional policy, but just a Presidential policy. 
It started first with some Kuwaiti tankers; then went to freedom 
of navigation; then all vessels; then an offensive action against the 
Iranian Navy, which was believed to be attacking. I am just thank-
ful that we did not arrive at the point of the Silkworm missiles 
ashore. 
So, the problem we are talking about up here is not theoretical. 
It is continual movement up, and at some point you cross the line. 
Now, my question is if you don't have consensus in a democracy, 
you've got to have process. Process is the only means by which you 
divide a majority from a minority; then establish a majority posi-
tion, so that the U.S. people, through their representatives, have 
said we are a majority committed to this military action. 
That's the declaration of war power, and it is clear, through all 
the constitutional debates and down through the areas of these in-
cidents, that it is a marshalling of major forces. 
What did not happen in the Vietnam war was the Reserves were 
not called up, we did not go into a taxation program, and we never 
called it a "war." It was always an "incident." 
But it marshalled U.S. powers. And those who could not be in-
volved in that-the 18-year-olds and their families and the others-
went to the streets because the consensus had not formed. 
Now I don't know whether we want to call it a "declaration of 
war" or a "special authorization," but I would like to have anyone 
of you tell me the process on the executive branch side and the 
congressional side that authorizes actions. Appropriations won't do 
it unless we put in a special provision in this law that says you 
can't have any money for any operation after so many days. You 
can operate on O&M a long time. I want the process that says 
we're in this, we're prepared to go to the next step, the minority 
has had its say, the majority has voted it, and the country is 
moving forward. 
That is what we want. 
You had your hand up first, Professor Turner, and then anybody 
else who wishes to respond, and I will ask no other questions. 
Mr. TURNER. I . think the process was established very well by the 
Founding Fathers, and that is the President, as Commander in 
Chief, can deploy whatever military force Congress gives him any-
where up to the point that he cannot launch a war. By that I mean 
that if you have a situation where a declaration of war would his-
torically be necessary, the President must come to Congress. 
Now, LBJ did that in Indochina after Congress pushed him into 
deeper involvement. 
If you go back and look at the record of the 1950's, you fmd Sena-
tors like Hubert Humphrey, John Kennedy, and J. William Ful-
bright saying that the United States had to defend South Vietnam. 
First the Senate approves a treaty that covered both Cambodia and 
South Vietnam. Second, Congress passed a joint resolution-by a 
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vote of more than 500 to 2-saying the United States was prepared 
to resist aggression in this area, using such measures as the· Presi-
dent determined, including the use of armed force; and it included 
in its parameters all of the SEA TO countries and protocol states, 
which included Cambodia. 
% e Government of Cambodia, the Lon Nol Government, made a 
public plea in 1970 at the United Nations for help in defending 
it~lf against North Vietnamese aggression. We responded to that 
by sending in troops. The conflict was fully authorized by ~e 
SEATO Treaty, as implemented by the Southeast Asian joint reso-
hition. 
But, returning to the process itself, the key consideration for the 
Founding Fathers was the knowledge that you can't fight a war or 
even defend the country by antecedent laws-you can't have a law 
that says put the First Platoon on Hill 401 but keep Congress in-
formed so it can pass another law in 30 days if the troops need to 
move, if the other side sends a larger force to the hill. 
The command of military forces is a very important power. But 
by our Constitution we confme it in our Commander in Chief, who 
is elect.ed by the people. 
Now what you are saying is that times have changed. Today, 
there is a risk that if you even send a small unit out, the Soviets 
may decide to get involved-and it could get us into World War III. 
What you are saying is that time has created a need for greater 
constraints, but even if you are right, you still can't amend the 
Constitution by law. You have to have a constitutional amendment 
to change that power. 
Senator ADAMS. No, no, no. I am not saying that the time has 
changed to add greater constraints. I am stating that we already 
have the constraints and that there needs to be a process for using 
them so we don't declare war each time. 
Mr. TURNER. Of what sort? 
Senator ADAMS. Like in the War Powers Resolution, where you 
have the President say "I'm going to the Persian Gulf, I want the 
Kuwaiti tankers, here is what I want voted. Vote it or not." 
Then, if there is a decision that we're going to invade Iran, that 
is a different kind of operation. It could be included in the first one 
if the President wanted to do it, or not. 
But there must be a way of communicating with the Congress 
when you are in a major, sustained operation. 
Professor, I'll state to you that we have been in the Persian Gulf 
for over a year and a half. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said to me that 
it was costing us $50 million a month, and this may well be sup-
ported by the Congress. But the Congress has never been involved 
in what is a sustained operation, which included offensive oper-
ations at certain points. 
I think the Congress would have authorized those. I don't know 
whether they would have authorized an invasion of Iran. 
That kind of use of the power to declare war and the powers 
which are connected in it-to take prizes and all of the other con-
stitutional powers, which are carefully separated, so that we didn't 
have a king-from the Presidential power of Commander in 
Chief-why nobody in this Congress ever has tried to say to the 
President how many ships you fire and which fires where and 
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are located. Btlt the policy of how big is this going to 
y cotlntries are we going to invade, how much money 
to t , that is what we are trying to get a s tern for 
estatlllBtI::1g 
PnlIfeEl.u- GlenneB. 
::ieIlJa1m-. ~_I.U. E:&'Cuse .me, Senator Adams, but how 10 are we 
dtJae redJight? 
[presidmg]. I just got on with my quest' , Sena-
c.tuII'l'Dlanhas authorized us to finish our question-
passed on, but I would be happy to yield to 
~[181xr ............. -~ I had just passed on for one question from Mr. 
:::iena1tn= ..: .~.a..-~ I had BeeD mere and he had not given e an op-
ue:itl'wn yet for about 2 hours. I was just t rying to get 
I wd be ppy to yield to you. 
:seJ:mD::LliEL.-s.. Very .. ell. 
tor s, the question that you raise is, 
which we determine where the bright line is 
co.uCISe, ar Powers Resolution was intended 
tm~atIlOl'Ital::·EVe, legislative answer to that question. Section 
draw the line at the point when Armed 
mtZOlC1m:ed in t ilities or situations in w ' immi-
wJl);:eDlEm in h is clearly indicated by the circum-
f the War Powers Resolution as that 
.a.&.a.&.I"- and that the 60-day time period would 
. led in section 4(a)(1) occurred. 
t turned out that way for a variety of 
lution in practice has not Deen self-
been no trigger, has there, Professor? 
right. The trigger has beeB blurred 
one but three reporting re<tmrements 
nce of a specification of the para-
which a report is submitted, it is any-
report is a 4(aXl) report or a 4(a)(2) 
the 4(aX2) and 4(aX3) reports do not 
. the case of the Persian Gulf, Congress 
communications from the President. 
~"'-ihed as a 4(aXl) report. It seems to me 
framers of the War Powers Ilesolution 
UDd2IBBe:ntial situation m which a ... triggering 
after a 60-day periOO had apired, the 
esi*~::,~wll..l. :n!Q~md to withdraw the Armed Eorces from 
m:amc.D:tailiBJ UJJClKEIBS had authorized their use there or ex-
~:ttiIIt.~·haE:lll~ lu~Ded .. 
' _I!!!!I.IE,1:O :~l[lle~:uJBt tIII! :;a~lution is, one, to e the . ght line 
~P:te~ lb.!~lI!HniJlK:wtl8t's meant by "hostilities" and requir-
report be specified; or a variation of 
pmEll set forth in Co 'ttee Print No.1; 
important, statutorily facilitating an 
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effort by an individual Member of Congress, such as Mike Lowry, 
to go to court and get a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief 
from a court in the event a President declines to comply with the 
Act, as he has in the case of the Persian Gulf. 
Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Thank you very much. 
Senator Helms. 
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. 
As I listen to various comments by various panels and various 
witnesses, on this question, I am reminded of the three blind men 
of Hindustan, who paraded loud and long, "Aween," about an ele-
phant not one of them had seen. 
Now, Professor Turner, I ha.ppen to agree with you and I sympa-
thize that you are outnumbered three to one this morning. But one 
thing is inescapable in all of the discussion: The War Powers Reso-
lution was passed in a highly charged political atmosphere. And it 
was highly charged because of the emotionalism that had been 
whipped up by politicians and by the liberal-media of this country. 
The Vietnam war was probably the first war ever fought on the 
television screens of America. 
I have often said to the boredom of my colleagues that if Frank-
lin Roosevelt had to fight, had to prosecute World War II under the 
same restrictions and conditions that prevailed, that war would 
have been lost. And probably the French people would be making 
their vichyssoise out of sauerkraut today. 
But there is no question about this thing being the bastard child 
of politics. There is no question about that. 
It's just the same as we hear today about the "Reagan deficits," 
and all of the spending. Well, it was the Congress of the United 
States that passed the Impoundment Act, prohibiting the President 
from saving any money. It also completely ignored the news media, 
saying that no President can spend a dime, that has not been au-
thorized and appropriated by the Congress of the United States. 
So, just like the War Powers Act, the Federal debt and the Fed-
eral deficits are the handiwork of Congress. The dead cat is lying 
on the doorstep of Congress. 
Now, as for the Vietnam war, it was protracted through several 
administrations, through several Presidents, and the reason it 
became such a bitter, open sore is that we sent hundreds of thou~ 
sands of men around the world to fight a war we ould not let 
them win. 
The American people got sick of it. The news medi portra it 
in their own way. And we lost that war. 
Here, again, it was the Congress of the United States~ 
Now, Mr. Turner, since you are outnumbered three to one~ _I.am 
going to confine my one question to you because I 1 eel over your 
text, and I noted that you urged there be consultatia tw 
President and the Congress. That's the way it has al ys 
heretofore. 
This hostility between the executive branch and the 1 . tive 
branch never existed before. 
At the same time, you appear to oppose quite vigorously 
agree with you-that there should not be any formal requiY'Gll'lP'IIDn 
for consultation because that is a can of worms that will be 
up politically again. 
321 
, I would like for you to elaborate for just a minute or two 
view that such formal requirements would be an unconsti-
.tu1w.w infringement on the Executive's prerogatives. 
TuRNER. Senator, I would be quite pleased to do that. 
Is.leJltially, what I am arguing is that the Founding Fathers cre-
e two political branches as coequal representatives of the 
&JI!UpIe. 
~IJBl;or HELMS. Absolutely. 
TuRNER. As coequal representatives, they each have a great 
autonomy. 
e argued that in all of these areas, it is very important that 
genuine consultation. During my service in the State De-
pa:t.1.ent, when people came to me and said to consult with Con-
ut a decision made a day earlier, I would say to them 
.. _~ if you'd come to me 2 weeks ago, I could have consulted; 
_ u are telling me simply to 'inform' Congress of a decision 
all:eady made" -and that's not the way the system ought to work. 
a big believer in genuine consultation and not just notifica-
t what I'm saying is that when you put it into law and 
.I..A..IoO:I~ by law, that the President must consult when you tell him 
re, that is comparable to the President, as Commander in 
-.......--..... .calling up General Gray and saying "Send a battalion of Ma-
er and bring the Speaker of the House to the White House, 
bee&:~ I want to consult with him." 
· unseemly, it is improper, it is not the way that coequal 
1t:::l1DC=tre:S of a sovereign government ought to deal with each other. 
principle behind setting up what I used to call a joint com-
'IIll::tl!e on national security-and the concept predates my entry 
. field by many years-to engage in consultation, is a won-
-......-u idea. But you don't put it in a law saying that whenever 
ey congressional leaders blow a whistle, the President"must 
rw"t"''''' ~'w.nl:l.r and salute, or sit down and consult. That is not the proper 
_ .'1" .-.... _ the two branches to deal with each other. 
ere the President's counsel and you tried it, I would advise 
t to go lest it be understood from this that he was now the 
CC;lmlrn of the Congress and not the great coequal representative of 
. __ . ___ erican people. 
tor HELMS. I thank you. 
· Chairman, I have some questions that I wish to submit to 
of these gentlemen in writing, so that they can respond in 
W%jttDJ~., and particularly to Professor Glennon. 
't want to develop a subject in public that I want to be made 
of the record. So, I am going to provide you, sir, with some 
.qJJlI!Stmns, which I would appreciate your answering. 
that, I think we ought to move to the second panel. But 
~belOl:e you do that, Mr. Chairman, I don't know any of the second 
.~~ personally except Charlie Rice. I have known Charlie Rice 
long time, and his advice and counsel have meant a very 
Ie-'- deal to me. He is a professor of law at Notre Dame. 
. ht ask Charlie if he likes Lou Holtz as the football coach 
· RICE. Very much. 
tor HELMS. Very much. Well, Lou is also a good friend of 
}. 
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I welcome Charlie. 
I'm going to have to leave, but I think it would perhaps be good 
to move on to the second panel. Thank you, gentlemen. 
Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, before you get up, I would like to 
note for my colleague from North Carolina that I really think it 
has been more two an.d one-half to one and one-half. 
Mr. Reveley was, I think, somewhere between Glennon and 
Turner, leaning to Turner on two points, and somewhere between 
Firmage and Turner, leaning to Firmage on one point. 
Gentlemen, all of your testimony was extremely helpful. You all 
made . very concise, straightforward statements, and the disagree-
ment is helpful to this committee, not harmful. 
I sincerely appreciate your time and your efforts in being here. 
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I did not imply any derogation of 
anybody. 
Senator BIDEN. Oh, not at all. 
Senator HELMS. Everybody has to be somewhere on every issue. 
Senator BIDEN. I realize that, and I think Mr. Reveley is a little 
more conservative than you gave him credit for. I don't know. 
Mr. REVELEY. It varies with the time and the moment. 
Senator BIDEN. I want to thank you all again. Seriously, thank 
you all very much. 
I will now call our next panel, and I understand that some of my 
colleagues will have to leave. I apologize that we have kept you all 
for so long. But, as you can see, this is an area of great interest to 
many of us. 
We truly aDDreciate your testimony. 
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PREPARED STATKMRNT OF WILLIAM TAYLOR REVELEY III 
I. 
A. 
In my judgment, the country needs war powers leCiSlation. We need it to help 
solve the severe, debilitating war powers problem that afflicts us. 
The problem is not thar the President is deliberately, wickedly usurpq ancient 
congressional prerogatives over war and peace. Nor is the problem that Conrress is de-
liberately, wickedly invading hereditary powers of the President over the use of force. 
The problem is that the country lacks a comtltutional consensus about the 
process by which the President and Congrt:- ~-:'; are to share authority over American de-
cisiorlS to use force. We continue to bicker over which branch gets to decide what, 
when. This bickering occurs at profound cost to the country. Four sorts of harm come 
quickly to mind: 
(1) The bickering poisons relations between the President 
and Congress. To be aceused of constitutional usurpa-
tion ~ no fun. It enpnders anpr, fear, defen-
siveness, countercllarges. Constitutional theologians 
from both sides - the President'S aDd eoncress' - in-
sist with passioD of truly reJJcious Intemlty that their 
view of the Constltution b the Only True View, that 
all others are beresy. The fate of heretics in the 
hard of the rlchteous Is well known. 
(2) Tbe bieker1nr UDderm1Des publie eonfldence In the 
rule of law aDd in the leIItlmaey of both the Presi-
dent and Concress. The polltleal branebes of KOvem-
ment cannot 10 on year after year accusing one an-
other of Werality in one of tbe m~t sensitive areas 
of Amer!can life - war and peace - without seriOUSly 
eroc:ti.ng the faith of the people in both of tbese 
branches of IOvernment. 
(3) The bickering prevents focused attention to ~, 
tbat is, focused inquiry into wbat the United States 
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oueht to do about particular foreiln and military situ-
ations, what our reallstic alternatives ue for cIeal.1ng 
With them, what the costs and benefits of these alter-
.. natives are, and wbleb. alternatives we OUIht to pur-
sue to maximize our natJonallDterest. Rather than 
foamnc on these ~ Issues. the debate all too 
often focuses on Jssues, on Which branch 15 
constitutionally entitled to dee1de what, when. Fa-
clLWCl attention on whether the United States OlIIht in 
the national interest to commit troops abroad is sac-
rificed to bickering over the precise way in which the 
President and Coneress are to make whatever deci-
sion is ultimately to be made. 
(4) The bickering denies American war and peace deci-
sions, first, the wisdom and, second, the staying 
power that can come only from having both the Pres-
ident and Congress meaningfully involved in our deci-
sions to use force. It is unavoidable that the Consti-
tution divides the war powers ~tween the two 
branches; thus It is inescapable that for American 
foreign and military policy to work, the two branches 
must cooperate in the exercise of their overlapping 
prerogatives. 
But wait, some soy, these sorts of harm occur not because we lack a constitu-
tional consensus on process but simply because the country lacks a current consenCius on 
~. We had a policy consensus from the end of World War n to sometime in the 
1960'S, they say, but now we've lost it and that's the problem. Well, of course, when 
people can agree easUy on what policy to adopt (whether these people are spouses deal-
iDi With one another, parents and chUdren, university faculties and administrators, cor-
porate officers and directors, litigants, voters, or Presidents and Coragresses} - when 
consensus on policy does exist. then little attention is paid to the nature of the 
decision-making process. But how often do people acree easily about dftficult and im-
portant issues? History suaests DOt all tbat orten. ADd the more difficult it Is to get 
agreement on policy the more important it becomes to have agreement on process . 
. Why? Two reasons: 
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(1) When people acre on bow deeisions should be made. 
that is. when they accept that a particular person or 
croup is entitled to make a partleular sort of deelslon. 
then they are far more Ukely to aeeept the deeIs10n 
that is ultimately made, even If they dI.saIree with It 
u a matter a polley. tban they are Ukely to aeeept 
such a deelsl.on if they beJleve It was made by people 
not authorized to deelde. Every day in eountles& con-
texts people aeeept and support deeisIons Whether 
they like them or not beeause the deeIs10ns have been 
made by a proeess that people tboucht was legiti-
mate. In other WCH"Cl;. agreement on proeess helps 
produce agreement on poIiey. 
(2) When we disagree over both proeess and poIiey -
over who gets to deeide as well as over what the deei-
sion ought to be - a two-front Strucrle results. with 
dismal effeet for focused inq.pry into what we ought 
to do in our best interest. Sound polley suffers. 
In short, process matters. We badly need a constitutional eonsensus on how the 
President and Congress are to go about making war and peace deeisions. 
B. 
'ro reach at least minimal agreement on process. all the erueial constitutional 
threads must be drawn together. The President's eonstitutional theologians must stop 
ignoring the faet that the language of the Constitution and its Framers' and Ratifiers' 
purposes ereate an enduring role for Congress in Ameriean deeisions to use force. At 
the same time, Congress' constitutional theologians must stop iCnorlnr 200 years of 
practlce under the Constitution. From George WashiDCton'S administration to date. 
practice also has been central to this country'S constitutional journey. War powers 
prcctlce indicates that. when CODIress bas provlded the neeessary toolS to the Presi-
dent - men. money and materiel - and when Concress bas not prevl<xwy banned a 
particular use of force. then the President may begin it on his own initi~tive. Two hun-
dred years of practice make that elear. 
It is essential that we weave these threa~ together in war powers legislation. 
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We might just as well howl into the wind as try to put in place a process that ignores ei-
ther the country's deep-rooted constitutional expectation of congressional involvement, 
on the one hand, or the country'S equally deep-rooted constitutional expectation of 
presidential initiative, on the other. Both expectations must be met if we are to devel-
op a war powers process that actually works. 
For now, we should focus on the irreducible constitutional minimum: on the 
"nothing less" bedrock that must exist if Congress is to be involved consistently in deci-
sions about the use of force and if the President i-; to retain the initiative that practice 
has given him and that he will exercise in light of the hazard, pace and complexity of 
foreign and military affairs and his greater capability than Congress to deal quickly and 
quietly with these affairs. 
What is the irreducible minimum? In my view, it is: 
(1) Means to encourage the President and Congress to 
consult meaningfully together before and during mo-
ments of truth; 
(2) Recognition that, informed by this consultation, ttle 
President may act alone if he thinkS It in the national 
interest, for instance, because he believes speed or 
secrecy is crucial to U.S. success; and 
(3) Recognition that, when the President alone Initiates 
the use of force, it thereafter is for Congress to ap-
prove, disapprove or limit the use if Congress chooses 
to act. 
The Irreducible minimum does not lnelude time llmlts within which Congress 
must either act to approve, or be deemed to have disapproved, presidential initiatives. 
It is far from clear that disapproval by lDaetion is constitutional; it is quite clear that 
Presidents will resist such a concept relentlessly and that Congress will rarely try to 
enforce it. Time limits won't work in the real world. 
~ cHsapproval by concurrent resolution part of the irreducible minimum? It can 
go either way. A.fter Chadha, Presidents will alsO resist releptlessly the concept that 
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concurrent resolutions can constitutionally curb their initiatives. But as a practical 
matter, U the President commits troops who remain in the field a week. two weeks. 
three weeks, two months after the ln1~ commitment, and Concress by majority vote 
in both Houses acts to l1mit or end the use of foree, it Is most unlikely that the Presi-
dent will simply disrecard such an expression of COI'lIressiOnal will. If he did. Concress 
has remedles. for instance, the power of the purse. 
In sum. the War Powers Resolution as passed in 1973 has not succeeded. It needs 
to be reduced to its most basic and workable elements. These elements, together. can 
lead the way to the constitutional consensus we so desperately lack. The consensus 
would involve less than either presidential or congressional theologians insist is their 
branch'S constitutional due, But the consensus WOUld work. 
One final note: Some people say. if war powers legislation is to be so reduced. 
why bother to have it? Better to kill the 1973 Resolution outright and thereby vindi-
cate the presidential view of the Constitution, or better to beef up the Resolution to 
require Congress' prior approval for any use of force, except for a few specified sorts, 
and thereby enshrine the congressional view of the Constitution. And. anyway. the ir-
reducible minimum just described already exists. The President and Congress don't 
need a War Powers Resolution in order to consult one anothf!r. The President has been 
acting alone and reporting to Congress from time to time without such leciSlation, and 
Concress ean already act before or durinr presidential initiatives to block. l1m1t or end 
them In a variety of ways, such as euttlnc their funds. 
True, but simply beeause most of us eould exere1se dally, eat sparincly and other-
wise see to our bodies doesn't mean that most of us do. We are more likely to do it 
. 
when pushed by an aetion-fore1nc feiElmen. The War Powers Resolution is an 
action-forcing !'eIimen. It hasn't worked well so far because it carries too much bag-
lare, sueh as SS 2(c) and S(b). Stripped to its irreducible minimum. however. the 
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Resolution just might bring the President and Congress to engage one another construc-
tively on questions of war and peace - to co~t, let the President act first if he feelS 
so compelled, but then report and let Concress go second, to approve or disapprove his 
initiative if it feels so compelled. 
To repeal the War Powers Resolution, leave it as it is, or amend it to impose 
more restraints on the President would do nothing for constitutional consensus. Re-
pealed, the Resolution would greatly disappoint expectations that Concress must playa 
sustained, meaningful role in use of force decisions. Left as it is, the Resolution would 
continue to work so fecklessly as to suggest that consistent collaboration between the 
two branches on the use of force is hopeless. Amended to try to restrain further the 
President, the Resolution would surely be ignored by just about everyone. Cut to its ir-
reducible minimum, however, the Resolution could lead us to constitutional consensus. 
C. 
The rest of my testimony is in two parts. The first puts flesh on the conclusions 
above at 'O!j t wba 't the text of the Constitution, the Framers and Ratifiersl purposes and 
two centuries of practice have to tell us. Part m is a detailed analysis of the War Pow-
ers Resolution that first appeared in my book War Powers of the President and 
Congress: Who Holm the Arrows and Ollve Branch? Though completed in 1981, the 
analysis remains teWnc in most respects today. 
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u. 
OLD CONTROVERSIES OF NEW IMPORTANCE 
For nearly two centuries the war powers have bedevUed a host of Pres1dents. 
Concressmen. and those tew JudIes w1111nI to deal with them In court. ThrouIh all. the 
nature ot these powers has remained more unsettled perhaps than any other maIn-
stream ot American constitutional law. 
The respective constitutional prel"Olatives ot ·the President and Collll'e5S over 
war and peace were ot consuminr concern to Americans whlle Washinlton, John Adams 
and Madison held ofnce. Nor have there been any administrations since in which the 
nature ot -these prerogatives has not been debat~ With some heat. Controversy has 
persisted in part because Americans have frequently had to decide whether to fight. 
Decisions to use armed force have been made well over a hundred times since 1789, and 
decisions arainst its use at least as orten. Persistence also reflects the weirhty nature 
of the subject. Profound consequences may accompany the use or non-use of armed 
force. Disputes of corresponding intensity have arisen over the extent to which each 
branch is entitled to set poUcy. 
Passion and dorged adherence to positions aroused on this account have been 
liven new edre precisely because the disputes have concerned separation ot powers. 
Presidential and conrressi~nal zeal In defense of real or imalined prel'Olativ~ is tradi-
tionallyacute. And a!'lument over the allocation of war powers conjures up two ot our 
most cherished political bulbears: the fear that American democracy will perish. 
choked by presidential tyranny, and the obverse dread that it will smother amid con-
,ress1onal1ndectslon and paroehia1ism. With stakes so hirh. partisans have been loath 
to leave the constitutional tray. 
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Persistence has resulted, too, from the accumulation of unresolved controv-
ersies. Constitutional uncertainties about the cIlvision of the war powers between the 
President IDd Conrress have not been cured by formal amendment, and, unlike most 
other areas af constitutional confusion, there has been very little 11cht shed bere by ju-
cIlcial deeJslom. Moreover, pest-1789 practice reprdlnc the cIlvision Is often inconsis-
tent. Most plausible and many quaint allocations of the war powers between the two 
branches are supported by ODe bit of precedent or another. Contrary cIlvisions of con-
trol have existed in fact. and contradictory statements have been made by cIlfferent 
people about what sorts of allocatlons are required. With unsett1lnc frequency the 
same 1umJnar1es (Madison, Hamilton and Fulbright, for example) have varied their con-
stitutional conclusions with changiJll times. 
Such flux has been encouraged by our I8Deral tendency to collapse the constitu-
tional question of where decision-making control ties into the policy question of what 
we would Wee the President or Congress to do about a pending situation. This emphasis 
on immediate result rather than on long-term constitutional structure has been with us 
since 1789, but never so emphatically as when the Cold War went sour in Indochina, 
curdllng the prevaWng taste for presidentlal·prerogative. Inevitably, then, recurrent 
disputes over the war powers ot the two branches have fueled future controversy al-
most as often as they have resulted in case-by-case definition of how authority Is to be 
split between them. 
While the war powers present no novel constitutional 1ssu~, since the Second 
World, w.ar they have presented issues of wholly ~ dlmeRSlons. True, foreign relations 
were central to survival during the first leneration under the Constitution. European 
intervention in American affairs was an armed reality thr'ouIh the War of 1812. At 
times durinr the balance of the nineteenth century, the United States was internation-
ally threatened, acutely during the CivU War. But throuih most of the 180OS, security 
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wu an easy outtrowth of rising American strenrtb. reorraphlcallsolation. modest mil1-
tary techno101Y, and European balance of power. Secw1ty problems abroad centered on 
the protection of Americans from pirates, pr1m1tives. or weak states and on the conse-
quences of manifest destiny in North America. 
Times chaDpd with the Spanish-American War. MlUtarUy, politically. 
ideo1cC1cally, economically, and lep1ly the country bas found itself lncreaslnily 
threatened since 1900. and increasingly forcecl to react to developments more numer-
ous, rapidly evolvlnr. and compUcated than before. The cbanCecllnternational environ-
ment hal placed a new premium on Informed. expert dec1s1om made in accord with 
overall American objectives. It has valued rapid. flexible action and a w1J.11nrness to 
make hard ·choices. 
Especially durinr the last three decades. we have had a threefold change 10 cir-
cumstances: in our capacity and in our will to use force abroad and in the consequences 
of that use. The purely physical ab1llty of postwar America to ccmmtt its mllitary 
abroad in larea or small numbers. swiftly or slowly. for days or years. vastly exceeds the 
country's conflict capacity before 1941. America's willingness to intervene abroad also 
stands in revolutionary contrast to a previous tradition of non-involvement except to 
trade. defend American citizens and property beset abroad. expand our boundaries. and 
police the Caribbean . 
. Ironically coupled with this new capacity and will to use force abroad are conse-
quences of intervention that defy prediction and risk catastrophe more relentlessly 
than ever before. Since 1945 the pace. complexity, and hazard of forei(n affairs have-
,",wn exponentially. A misstep lnvites troubles unimagined when the United States 
was safe behind its ocean moats. Even the time when weak states mirht be "poUced" 
with little risk of violating international law and polltical sensibilities has passed. No 
more with relative impunity may the American m1,lltary punish baCkwarctpeoples who 
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have attacked our citizens and property, or pursue crlminals acrass the borders of weak 
states. or occupy and aclm1n1ster dissolute Caribbean countries. Tbe war powers do in-
deed pose old controversies of new importance. More than at any time since 1189. we 
~ to understand and order the process by wb1cb tb1s country decides when and how 
to .. its m111tary abroad. 
~NSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS 
Tbere have been four main influences on the dlvision_ of authority over war and 
peace between the President and Conrress: (1) the text of the Constitution's 
w~PJWer provisions, (2) the purposes of those who wrote and ratified the text in 
1187-18, (3) evolving beilefs since 1789 about what1he Constitution requires, and - ir-
respective of text, purposes. and evolving beliefs - (4) the various allocations of con-
trol over the war powers tha t have existed in ract between the President arid Congress 
during the past two centuries. 
Determinants (1) and (2) are reasonably straightforward guides for constitutional 
interpretation. Determlna r.~s 3} and ( 4) are more convoluted. Together they make up 
what is leneraliy termed ",.. ~~ce .~ or "usage." Practice has been shaped not only by 
the constitutional text and oeca:e:s but also by factors of three other sorts: the hazard, 
pace, and complexity of America's international circumstances at any particular time; 
the respective institutional capa.bJl1ties of the President and Conlress to cope with 
thai cbanf1nc circumstances; and the shUt1ng balance of political strength between 
the two branehes, which has helped the President at times and Congress at others to 
creater control over war and peace. It is historical fact that all of these factors have 
contributed to the allocation of the war powers between the Pre&1dent and Congress. 
More important, they will all continue to contribute, barring a radical change 1n Ameri-
ean babits. 
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The Text of the Constitution 
U we could flnd a man in the state of nature and have him first scan the 
war-power provls1oDS of the Constitution and then look at war-power practice since 
nl9, be would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out so little. On its face, the 
tat diU dec!ts1ve1y toward Concress. comparison of Articles I and IV with Article U 
Ibows that mOlt of the specUlc (rants of authority run to Concress. ReadlnI them 
straJcht throuIh provides an lnsliht that nothlng else can into how the Constitution 
itself dlvides the war powers. The sequence in whlcb the text asstcns authority to each 
br'anebt the location of certain provtslons relative to others, and the simple .weliht of 
the words devoted to COI1(l'eSS as opposed to the President are as teW.nr as is the pre-
cise Iancuace of the rrants. 
In addition. provision for suspending habeas corpus during military emeE'lency is 
set out in the lerislatlve, not the executive. article of the Constitution. And state war 
powers are placed with the congressional rrants, rather than in Article IV with other 
state concerns. 
Moreover.ot the tew specific rrants ot power given to the President, two ot the 
mast important (over treaties and major federal appointments) he shares with the Sen-
ate. Thus the text supports arrument that, in those areas ot torelrn aftairs where mak-
tnr poUey and provldinc tools to implement it are not committed to the l~lative pro-
ces, tbey are held jointly by the President and the Senate (the executive element ot 
Co ..... ), except for certain ministerial functions mast efficiently lett to one person. 
tor inltance, mWtary command and law enforcement. and. except for powers of limited 
war or peace importance. such as rranttnc pardons and commissions. 
Prov1s1ons livinr Congress and the President weapons with which to coerce one 
another limn run heavUy toward the lertslators. Under Articles I and U the Executive 
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can try to mold Concress tbroUCh information and recommendations, by the veto, and 
thrOuIb call1nI or not call1nl special sessions. He can attack the leciSlators in his pu~ 
Uc statements but lacks authority to remove them from office. The text, on the other 
hand, allows Conaress to Depte all of these executive spurs, and the President with 
them. UDder its Article 118l1Slative authority, Concress may supply its own informa-
tion aDd recommendations and override presidential vetoes. It may also refuse to pass 
lectstatlon dear to the Executive, ancIlt can investigate other branches of rovemment 
preparatory to lawmakinr or while overseeing the execution of ex1sttnr acts. Either or 
both houses may pass resolutions censurtnr the President, and torether they can dispose 
of blJD "and all CivU Officers of the United States" throuih lmpeactunent. 
But more important in the real world than the coDiress1onal dominance sug-
,ested by the text has been the fact that the lanrua,e does not unavoidably preclude 
broad presidential prerogative. Con,ressional control 15 not established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. There are three ,roun~ for uncertainty about the textls meaning. 
First, many words and phrases in the Constitution's provisions on war and peace 
are pnerality itself - for instance "declare war" and "commander in chief." They are 
neither seU-detiniDi nor susceptible to one meanin, applicable in all circumstances. 
Each pnerallty, accordin,ly, can be made concrete in many ways. And whether ex-
panlively or narrowly construted, each has a number of dlfferent meanings, retlectiDi 
the factual dltferences in the war-power contexts that It ,overns. Thus, whether an 
ample readlnc of the declaration-of-war clause Is linked with a spare interpretation of 
tbe commander-ln-cblef proviso, or vin-versa, the meanlnc riven both provisions wUl 
vary with the type of action in question, its purpose and costs, whether there Is a need 
for tpeed or secrecy, the tools required to implement it, and so on. tlA word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged," Mr. Justice Holmes suggestecl. Rat~er, he said, "it 
is the skin of a livtnr thoucht and may vary ,reatly in color and content accord1nrr to 
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the clrcwDStancel and the time In Wbleb It Is ...... 1fbIIe dI1s eaDDOt fairly be said of 
second, doubt alSO exists becaIa tile tat p_ eertaID ~ to tile Plilltdeut 
aDd otlMn to Concress tbat can be ....s to .... tile ____ III .maalIJ ueIuIlft f....... n.e compedDC puts permit .... bnDCb 1D eIaIIIl _tbarltJ ewer ...., 
common III*ts of the war powers. Edward S. CarwID spaD of -qIal ....... ~tIbIII"" 
aDd aid that the "ConsdtuUoo, eonslde" GDlJ for Its amnaatlft paDlS of paINI'S ca-
pable of Iffecttnc the Issue. b an inYitatloD to stftIIIIe for the prlYillp of dlreetlDC 
American foreicn polley." 
In falmess to the tat. Woc1e aDd stftIIIIe do DDt ..... to ebanetertze lIS .,far-
madye crants. Strua1e rises to fever plteb GDl1 wbeD apuslve radIIIp are liven to 
W-deflned Artiele n powers of the President. tbat is. wMD the ~ cIeal1nc with ex-
ecudve power, law enforeement. and IIlllltary eomm&IMI are eaastnIed to lDYolve the 
Pres1dent in areas oyer wbieh Artlele I has liven Concnss more ezpUcit crelS of au-
thority. Compedtlon Is rreatly lessened when COOCresslooal authority Is read pner-
ously and presidential spartncly, for the CoDstitutkJn provides the Exeeutive with far 
fewer elearly defined respocmbUlt1es than It does Cqress.. 
Third, in addition to W-defined. frequently eompetitive provisions. there are also 
DUmenus pps in the war-power pI"OYislom.. Thou&b the text deals directly with SQIIle 
of the Issues. it conspleuausly falls to speD to ottas. It says DOtblnr. for IDstanee. 
IbOut whieb branc:h controls deployiDI sbIps em the bleb seas. statiaDIDC tI'OOpi on far-
eip soU or deelarlnc neutrality in other _dons'struales. 
The Constitution does lJDpose ODe ir'OD demaDd OIl the President and Coap'ess; 
that they cooperate If any sustained venture far war or ~ Is to sueeeed. Even If 
CODCiesstonal authorlty Is mast broadly eoastn8i. COlllJ"8SS mtBl work lIS will tbrouIb 
the tectslatlYe proeess, and the President Is very mudl part of tbat proeess. Under 
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Article II. SeetIaD 3,-be de~ wIleD to call eoncr-lDto spRIal ~ sbau1d It 
DOt be slttlDr. aD "UUaunIIDary 0eaIiaGs.. AJID UDder SeetIaD S .... , provide COD-
INa with lDfonutIaD aD die state of die UIdaD aDd ,.... .... 1IICb _____ ... 
rJ aDd e&Il8'I"t.· ADd UDdIr Artiele I. Sec:tIaD ., ..... , veto ., 
m-.re !bat dlelllltSlators wtIb to ......... 1aW of dlelaDd. AcearcIIDClJ. die 
text llmtts ~ CGDtrol bJ die PrIilkllD~ dlseNtIoD ..... speeiIll " .. , bIs 
rtcbt to Importune die JIIl$IatorS. aDd Ids capaellJ to faree .... to nile a two-tbIrdI 
vote In both bauses to overeome IUs opposltIarL. 1be eoastlbldaaal role of die EDcu-
ttve In tile leIISIattve process bas been spIU'iDcly eonsu.d at tIlDes. but lIS pI-.ce Is 
textually assured. Too. be bas at least aD equal YOiee with die SeDate ower ~t­
ments aDd treaties. ADd even were die bulk of·1ds rem·,m,. eoastltutloaal powers 
seen as those of • c:oncressioDal -cent. tile Il'dlspeDsabIlllJ of aD ... t lrows with tile 
ponderousness of his master and the seope of IUs assipIDents. 
On the otbel' band. II ueeutive autborlty Is read to take lllUimum adYantace of 
pnerallty. competition amonc ennts. and pps.lt still eannot live the President total 
control over Ameriean war and peace. Tbere are many important matters - trade eoo-
troJs and money. to eite an important area of polley and • erueial tool - that require 
concressional consent UDder the unav Ierms of the text. With less extreme 
readlncs of tile C~tltution. 61 eourse. the utual dependenee of the two branebes be-
comes more prooouneed. 
Dnrr!!r Revealed by Debates of die Framers aDd Ratlfiers 
The Constitutional Fathers spent preelouS Uttle tilDe OIl What autbodty the Pres-
ident sbould bave over foreiCn affairs. war aDd peace ineluded. A t issue in 1787-11 
were far more baste questlom about what sort Of aeeuttve to earve out of exIst1Dr 
concresstonal aovernment - would it be single or' plural. aet with or' without a couneil, 
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bave veto power, bow would It be cbcan, for What term and with what pcalbWty of 
,....tIoD, ~ __ were rarely CODIlderw:I with an .,. to tbe respectiye rola 01 
tile PnIIdInt ~ Concr-ln deterJD1nlnc AlI*'lcan foretp poney. To alarp atent 
tMy were merely another manifestation of tbe eaofUet over the-power of the eentral 
IOftI'DIMOt, the federaUsts favortac altl"OlJlW EDcuttYe tban the Itat. ricin .... 
That eontllct wu the transcendent problem for the Framers and .. rulen. In 
1117 It took elChteen days to move from Bolton to GeortIa. Economic and pemmen-
tal dlv1s1ori further separated the American people. Their eonstltut1ona.l neeeII1t1es 
were. first. an alloeat101l of autborlty betweeD the nationallOyernment and Itates that 
wOUld erat. a viable union, and. seeood •• dlvtston of national authority bitween the 
repNleDtattves of the larp and small states that would ensure ratUlcat10n cf the new 
plan of IOvernment. 
Not surpr1s1nc1y. when the f ramers and RatUlers felt they had to crappie with 
quest10ns of w·ar and peace, the emphasis was on the states. not on concress1onal and 
executive powers. Dancer to the nation from state exeesses in forelln affairs had pr0-
vided Important impetus to the Constitutlonal Con\'ention. Since colonial days the 
states had been loath to subordinate their immediate indtvidualinterests to the common 
lood. They were reluetant to bear their fair share of mllltary burdens unless actually 
attacked. but prone themselves to !nette Indlans. European powers, and their sister 
states. Separate dlplomatic activity by them and tbelr Ylolartons of national treaties 
were frequent. Jefferson wrote Wash1nCton early to the Pt1Uadelphta Convention about 
the need "to make our states as one to all torelcn concerns," and Madison conchJded 
that "[1]t we are to be one nation in any respeet, it clearly oucht to be in respect to 
other nations." 
8y the same token the Constitutional Fathers found the 5upremacy of nattonal 
treatia over state law far more troublesome than the manner in which the federal 
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covernment Itself would make treaties. They ... alSO vastly more eoneemed to de-
fine nat10nal autbority over war and peace. aue.Iy peat 1D tta.Jry UDder the Coafeder-
atloo, than to spUt the war powers between the PreIIdeot and cancress. ADd tbey felt 
It D8ClSsary to crant emerpney mUitary powers apUeltly to the states rather t.baD to 
the Presldent, probably OIl the assumption that state mWtla would bear the first brunt 
of repeW.nr sudden attack. 
The sldmpy attention liven CODilessloDa1 aDd executive war powers 1D 1117-11 
was a byproduct as well of the relatively sbort sbrUt liven forellD affalrs IS a wbole. 
They were rarely mentioned in dlreet terms in either the Pb1Iadelpbia or stata debates. 
The only aspects that recelved real debate were war and treaty maJdnc. Empbasis 
went to treaties, though the two merced whenaver ~ Constitutional Fathers turned to 
the termil";a tion of bostill ties. 
Predominant attention could CO to treaties, because peace was expected to be 
the customary state of the new nation. America ~d avoid agressive war abroad and 
~njoy in turn "an insulated situation" from the If'Ut powers of Europe. In Alexander 
Hamilton's words: "Europe is at creat distance from us. Her colonies in our vlc1n1ty will 
be likely to continue too much disproportioned in Strenrth to be able to live us any dan-
rerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments canDO_t In this pos1tion be neces-
sary to our seeurity." this placid view or forelp relatioDs precluded any explicit c0n-
sideration of the use 01 American force abroad, Beept for defensive Daval action to 
protect the Atlantic coat and Amerlcan COIDIIler'Ce. OOIy Hamilton sugested that it 
m.tcht be well to intervene in the Caribbean stnJRles of the Old World powers. Com-
mercial relations were to characterize American relations abroad. Contacts of other 
sorts. not much desired. would be discouraged by hobblinC treaty making. Gouverneur 
Morris opined that "[Un pneraJ. he was not soUcitous to multiply c!c facilitate 
Treaties." The isolationist mood was perhaps a reaction to the trials of the Revolution. 
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It clearly fed on fear of IIUt-power Interference In the domestic poUtics of the fledr-
11nc state, espeeia1ly tbrouch bribery 01 federal polltielaDs. Whatever the eause. a DO-
t100 of peaceful retreat did lrip Americans In the late 1 TIOs - .Job.n Adams come so tar 
• to sugest dIsbandlnc the foreip service or remaetnc It from its already meacer pro-
portiOIW. 
Arain, not SUpris1nrly. it was the needs of domestic order. not forelp interven-
tion. that provided the lncentive for an uecutive Wbo could IUd the Datloaal army aDd 
navy. The demons arisinr out of that eommaDd for the Framers and Ratlflers were 
tbose of 1787-88. not ours. Their abtdlnC fear was that the Executive would use the 
mUitary for tyrannical purposes at boDle. passlbly to make blmself a beredltary prince. 
not that he would Wie it for W-advised foreJp adVentures. Controversy centered on 
whether it was sate to allow exeeutive command In ~ field. whetbel' standlDc armieS 
might be used by the President for domestic s.of;,version. and whether be should be al-
lowed to pardon traitors, since their cr.mes c1Uld stem from efforts to help him usu.-p 
power. For some o! the Constitutional Father.i. the demons lurkinr In military .atters 
were not executive but conrressional: the tf!lislatOlS were said to hold both the purse 
and the sword, and thus feared as Incipient military despots. For these Framers and 
RaWiers the remedy wOUld have been a national military tboroughly dependent on state 
militia, state officers, and state mllltary appropriations. 
In short, American problems and assumptions in 1 TIT-81 did not anticipate all of 
ours. They were those of a small, d!vidad people apr for national unity but fearful of 
federal tyranny. Domestic rebellion and foreip invasion were their "War" cooeems. 
More important for them were safepanS apinst military usurpation at home than mU-
ltary preparedness c:Iurinr peace. Greatly more than we, they valued state authority 
over national, lertslative power over executive. They preferred peace and poUtlcal 
Isolation to a world made sate for America. The institutional arranpments developed 
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in 1717-11 reflected u.e vaw. aDd aeecls. A small, eIlte braneb of eoacr- WIll 
pWmed .. a plenary partie1paDt with the President In wbatfter American clpIoID~ 
JDiCbt arise. State m1l1tia were to .. tile brkll DG8 at .. doaa1 dIt .... emcr- tile 
arbiter at m1l1tary polley, by IOftrDIDI tile ...... at AJDeI1eaD arwaed fareas aDd 
tbeIr COIDJDltment to CODfUct. n. statal aDd Prllllidaut WGIId 181ft • IDtmID dlfeld-
ers apIDIt sudden attaek, peodInr opportuDItJ far COIIII_&Nl cIIe1sl9ni aDd tile Ez-
eeutive would act as first PMl'al aDd .aIra1 sbauId tile ~tan ..... to npt. 
The Framers aDd aat1f1en dld Inled a ... eft_tift DatloDal aecudft dam 
bad prevtously emted In the Coafederadoll CcJape& ~ by tbeIr UDderstaDdIDc 
of European practice and political tbax'y, by prIor ...... 1lft Gelllilin America. aDd 
by the dismal executive record of RevoluttoaarJ aDd caar ..... dan JIIIsIa~ TbaJ 
wanted presidential aid In eonduetinc neaotiat1ons. PtMrInC IDteIlIpnee. aDd In fram-
tnc recommendations essential to poIicymaldJlc. They boped to obtain an eDeutlve 
cheek on foolish or venal legislators. and tbey SOUCbt presidential aeeutlon of aat10aal 
poUey. B:ut with rare exception tbe Framers and RaWIers did DDt mean to surrender 
concresstOnal control over 5ettlnc American polley aDd provldlnc tools for Its imple-
mentation. Thus. they rejected executive bepmony over forelp and military affairs. 
as seen in European practice and political tbeory. Their model .. Parllament'S 
seventeenth-century steps to curb the BrltlsllldDr, and tbnJuIbout their deba~ ran a 
persistent fear of ezeeutive despodsm. 
Several eaveats are overGie. A constant of buIDan ezpertenee Is that our eon-
clusloos aboUt desirable anoeattons of power c:baa&e with sluns · in tbe t.ic facts OIl 
which those alloeattons are premised. 1be Framers aDd Rat1fiers acted on the bUIs of 
many assumptions about reality that DD lonpr bold. and they often seemed obs!!sncl 
with epbemeral economic and security eooeerm. What the ComtitutioDal Fathers 
wOUld have thoucht ctven late twent1eth-century reaUties often cannot be confidently 
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lSIiWDed from what they said amid the etrcumstaDC!eS of the late 1780's. What If they 
bad reaUzed that peace aDd DODlDvolvement with the rest of the world ~ DOt be 
America'S customary state: that die bazards. pace, and complezlty 01 lnta'Dat1oaal af-
fairs would bw'poD, aIonC with the country's eapae1ty and need to work lis will aoad; 
that treat1es would Iwdly prove to be tile lUIS of Amerlean fondp relatloas; tbat from 
the outset the Senate could DOt keep step with die President In,dIplomaeJ. and tile mill-
tta could DOt replace federal forces; tbat die replar mUltary would pow blip and 
stand during peace, Utt1e restrained by the need for coacress to raise and support It; 
and that the loyalty of naturallzed c:1ttzer.. the naviptlon of the Mississippi, and other 
compell1nl issues of the late eiChteenth eentury would quleldy fade! 
.There are, of course, aspects of the 1787-8i purposes DOt tainted by the passlDc 
assumptions and problems of thOse years. But cy attempt to move from the speelfles 
of the Framers' and Ratifiers' debates to resolve contemporary war-power Issues must 
have its adequacy measured by reference to questio.ras such as those above, and It must 
convincingly rebut the pDSSibiUty that the extrapolation Is tao speeulative to be mean-
ingful. 
Th~ other factors contribute to the hazards of extrapolating from 1787-88. 
First, records of the drafting and ratifying conventions come in fralments. The Fram-
ers did have an official secretary. WWiam Jackson, but be restricted himself Jariely to 
reeordlDc motions and votes. Even these spotty DOtes were "carelessly kept." The 
Framers debated In secret, and Jaeksonts Journal remained undisclosed. first In the 
hands of Geofle Washinrton and then in the Department of State. until it was published 
by an order of Concress in 1819. fOllOWing the deaths of IIKISt of the ConventioD dele-
rates. At that point. it was larrety beyond verification or correction. 
In subsequent years other accounts of the Framers' Philadelphia proceedinp 
were publ1!hed. most importantly the notes of James Madison in 1840. But Madison as 
510 
-20-
an old maD bad dublously revised his account after the appearance of the JoumaL HIs 
attempt to reconstruct events of more tbaD tbIrty ,.us before w. neces&lrUy eJouded 
by tile pMIIp Of time. Slmllarly. Char_ PIDckDey. attelDptlDc In 1119 to procIuee a 
copy of the plan that be bad ~ted tile CGaventkJa. could DDt N"MHllber widell 01 
four or flv. papers In his bands was tile eorreet ftnIon.. 
Even When the ava1lable If cbeckered aeeounts of tile PbUIIdelpbla praNell,. 
are mustered. their overlappq dIscusslon eomes to very little for a COIlventkJD that 
met steadlly for almost four months. Tbe standard compUation 01 the debates nms to 
less than 1,300 paces: the verbatim trlDSertpt of a pro~ .. of slm11ar Jenrth could 
easl1y reach twenty times that volume. Records of IDOIt 01 the state ratUytDc conven-
tions are even more modest than tbase of PbUadelpbla. When aecutive and CODIres 
sional preroptives clashed In the Steel Seizure Case. Mr. Justice JaekSOn lamented the 
"poverty of really useful and unamblpous authority appUcable to eoncrete problems of 
executive power • • •• Just what our forefathers did envtslon. or would have envisioned 
had they foreseen modem conditions." be said. "must be divined from materials almost 
as entematle as the dreams Joseph was called upon to Interpret for Pharaoh." The situ-
ation is not that crim, but available records are poor. 
Second, thourh attendance varied. a total of fifty-five men participated in the 
four months of deliberation In Pb1Iadelpbla. and many more toc:* part in the state rati-
fytnc conventions. Diverpnt positions had to be compromised cb1.nr the drafttnc of 
the ConttitutioD. Compromise on one provIslon did DDt prevent efforts to reassert 
more utreme positions In later provisions. Interpretation of speeific Jancuace varied 
amone deleptes. Because the Ph1ladelpbla Convention met In secret and its partici-
pants said Utne about its deUberatiom c:turInc ratUleat1on" deJeptes to the state c0n-
ventions were larply unaware of the previously expressed views of the Framers. Even 
those Framers who were also RatUiers and c:hose to tell tbeir coneaeues of the 
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Pb11adelpb1a debates did not always recall them with preclslon. Under the c1reum-
stances it is not Uke1y that a majority, mueb less all, of those who voted in the federal 
and state conventions for the Constitution'S war power provisions bald a flDely drawn. 
common "iDtent" about their meanlnc. 
Tblrd, evidence of several sorts sugestS that the Framers may bave drafted with 
a measure of cIe11berate ambicu1ty. Any constltut1oDal scbeme that depends OIl separa-
tion of powers and on cheekS aDd balances DeC rJly a.Docatel amonc tbe braDcbes of 
IOvemment competinl powers with vacueIY deflnecl frontiers or authority. Also appar-
ent on the face of the Constitution Is a draftlnr technique that esehewecl detal! for 
terse statement, leavtnc much to be assumed. 
The Constitutional Fathers were praettcal men, and tbelr 1aeoDlc draftlnc tech-
nique may well have reflected awareness or the diffiCUlty or Jaytnc down rules to ~ 
em situations whose dimensions are at best (!tmly rrasped. James Madison in remarkS 
to the VlrIiDla ratifying convention was quite expUcit about the need for upertence, 
statilli that "the organization of the gt!.i'"lerallOvemmeot of the United States was, in 
all its parts, very difficult. There was a peculiar dlffteulty in that of the executive. 
Everythinr incident to it must have participated in that difficulty. That mode whleh 
was judced most expedient was adopted, till experience should point-out one more eliCi-
ble." As Washinrton noted, "Time and babtt are nee 5 ry to fix the true character of 
IOvernm.ents." And thOUCh not a Framer, Thomas J erson suaested in 1816 what 
they "would say themselves" about the need for expedaIce, "were they to rise from the 
dead." 
Some men look at constitutions _ Ill smetimonious rever-
ence, and deem them like the ark of tbe CDftD&Dt, too sa-
cred to be toucbed. They ISedbe to U. a( the ~ 
lnr ... a wisdom more than twmao, aad suppIa what they 
did to be beyond amendment. I ImeW dial ... well; I be-
lonpd to It, and labored with It. well of Its 
country. It wa very like the wi1bDut tbe expe-
rience of the present; and forty aperleDce In 
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pvemment Is worth a century of boc*-radlnI; and this 
they would say tbemselves. were they to rile from the dead • 
• • • Let us •.• avall ourselv. Of our ruson and experience. 
to correet tbe erude "'15 Of our flnt and unaperleneed. 
a1~ wise, v1rtuouI. aDd well-mea.nIDc couneUs. 
DelIberate IJDbICUlty may also bave ... a ..... of produclnC acreement &mone 
fractious deleptes. ao.r.vemeur Moms. very lDfhaldalln ~t1Dc tbe final version of 
tbe document. ap1alned that "It became oec.ssary to select pbrases whlch. ezpnsstnc 
my own DDtions, wOUld DDt alarm otbers •••• " For men wbaIe overr1dlDc objective was 
ratification of a Constitution promis1ne a more vlable union. the precise meantnc to be 
liven &mtJtcuous but cenerally aeeeptable Iancuace COUld awalt resolution In practice. 
It follows that all Judrments about the Constitutional Fathers' purposes must be 
viewed with a COld. and suspiclous eye. Fracmentarf evidence of tbe debates. the l1mlt-
ed eztent to which there Is ever common purpose In any process as lone. contentious. 
and complex as the drattlni and ratlfying of the Constitution, the chance that the text 
includes del1berately amtncuous language to be shaped by experience. the presence of 
raps in intent ca~ by assumptions and problems pecul1ar to the late 1780's. and the 
danlers of extendlili what was said then about the war powers. in respeet to concrete 
problems of that era. to unforeseen issues in unforeseen times - all these call for re-
straint about what the Framers and Ratiflers really had in mind. 
With trepidation it can be said that tbere do seem to be certain lone-term ends 
that the Constitutional Fathers SOUCht by the way In which they divided authority over 
war and peace between the President and COIJI'l'eSS. They were: 
1. To ensure national defense 
2. To hinder the use of the mUltary for domestic tyranny 
3. To hinder its use for agress10n abroad 
4. To create and maintain consensus behind American 
action for war and peace 
5. To ensure democratic control over policy about these 
matters 
513 
-23-
6. To enmurace rational war and peaC!e deels10ns 
1. To permit continuity in American polley when desir-
able and its revislon as necessary 
8. To permit emerpney action for war or peace that 
has not yet been blessed by national consensus or 
democratic control 
9. To ensure American capacity to move toward war and 
peace rapidly or secretly when necessary, and flexibly 
and proportionately always 
10. To permit the efficient settine and executing of war 
and peace pollcy. 
Practice since 1789 
Ronald Reagan enjoys far more sweeping CORtrol over American war and peace 
than George Washington did, and Washington came to wield str1k1nlly rreater authority 
than had been expected for the President during the constitutional convention of 
1787-88. The dominant trend in war-power practice has been presidential argrandlze-
mente True, the process has not been linear between administrations or even within 
them - compare lincoln'S war powers with those of Andrew Johnson or the preroga-
~ 
tives ot the early Nixon presidency with those of his last year In the White House. But 
over the course of nearly two hundred years, presidential war powers have grown radi-
cally. 
The growth of presidential authority over war and peace has stemmed largefy 
from three factors: the evolving nature of those institutional characteristics of the 
presidency and Congress pertinent to the war powers; certain historical developments 
that have favored the Executive's characteristics over those of Congress; and, finally. 
the wUllngness of many Presidents. greater than that of Congress, to exercise their 
constitutional authority to the fullest and beyond. 
During Ameri:can ret rea t from Indochina. however. congressional Influence over 
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war aDd peace C!ame into flood tide atter a period of unpl'8C!8dented ebb. The lertsla-, 
tors c:ballenpd the President's C!Ontrol over a ranee of action that seemed about to be-
come permanently bJs by virtue of repeated C!Oncresstonal aC!qU1esC!enC!e. At the C!Ore of 
~ matters was the (!Ommltment of American forces to undeclared C!Ombat on a larp 
or small seale, openly or (!Overtly. The (!Onstitutional text aDd debates acc:ount for 
mucb of this C!Oncresstonal resUienC!e. They estabUsh C!ef'taln bard-eore IerISlative pow-
ers aDd rtve rise to proconcresstonal expectations wb1C!h, in conC!ert, create an endur'lnl 
base from whiC!h the legislators C!an reassert their hold ever war and peaC!e from time 
to time. 
In areas of hard-core C!OngresstOnal authority, Presidents have usually felt them-
selves able only to recommend aC!tion, sign or veto I:eSUlting lectsIation, and reC!eive any 
deleration of authority that Congress offered. While these areas do not include most 
typeS ot military aC!t1on, they do cover most types of nonmilitary action with C!Onse-
quenC!es for war or peaC!e and most of the tools vital to implement polley of any sort. 
Beyond these hard-core powers there has aJso been persistent popular feeUng 
that the Constitution requires legislative approval of American use of forC!e. 
Twentieth-century Presidents (unlike their predecessors) have rarely said that explicit 
C!Ongress1onal approval is needed for most military action, but the view has tl1een 
pressed with vigor by others during thLs C!entury. Even during the 19505 a re t in 
COn(1'eSS kept the faith, ~nator Talt being their leading apostle. 
The lec1S1ators' ~enC!e aJso reflects the fact that C!Ongressional intI 
be kept alive even thOUih Congress as a whole decllnes to vote on the merits, a 
Ucular pollcy. The power.of C!Ongressional C!ommittees to investigate and oveaae 
vides a mdns of spar'.clng national debate, mOldlng opinion, and thereby inO.mm~ 
presidential action. Activity by indlvidual Senators and Representatives can 
litical pressure already ex:1sting outside Congress and bring it to bear on the E.JEeI::att. 
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J.ecislators can work privately too, communlcat1Dl quietly with the President to per-
suade blm that his plans are W-advised or subject to crest potential opposition. Lects-
laton can alsO work in tandem with rebeWous elements in the bureaucracy to thwart 
presldent1al policy. 
Flnally, the door Is kept further ajar for COQln!lSS by the restraints imposed on 
an EDcutive by his own capacity to persuade others to take steps he wishes taken. 
Other centers of power within the country - the bureaucracy, courts, aDd medla In 
particular ~ lessen his freedom of maneuver. And the electorate stancZ ready to turn 
aplDst him if his policies are perceived to be unresponsive to popular neecm or, worse, 
Weclt1mate. Intenttfying these restraints Is fear of the President as a potential despot, 
a fear with us since 1787-88. In Arthur Schestnaer'S terms: "The theory .•• of the 
President as the great moloch generating its own div1n1ty and about to swallow all 
power can be reproduced at every stage in our history, beginnt.nc with those who ••• 
complained against the presidency of General Washington. Anti-Moloch pressures have 
as their by-product an opportunity for Congress to reassert its Influence when in the 
mood." 
To date, however, the legislators have proved unable to reassert themselves once 
and for all by establishing enduring channels for a congressional voice in deCisions about 
war and peace. Like most of the rest of us, legislators tend to be result-oriented. Their 
concern with the particulars of policy often overshadows their concern with the insti-
tutional process by which it Is made. Prt..DCipal interest Ioe5 to what we should do 
(whether to intervene in Nicaragua) rather than to how we should go about decidlnl 
what to do (whether by executive fiat announced to coDiress1onalleaders shortly before 
the fact, by prior conlresslonal approval, or by some Intermecl1ate method). According-
ly, mast leciSlators become seriOUSly solicitous of their prerogatives only when they dis-
8INe with executive pollcy. Then no oar Is spared to set to rilhts presidential 
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"USUrpation." But once the tempest over polley has passed, concern with the tmtina-
tiona! aspects of decis10n maJdnC fades also, to aWalt tha nut tempest. The War P0w-
ers a.olutlon of 1913 may have slpaled. chanp In concresslOnal bablts. 
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War Powers of the President and Congress: 
Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? 
(By William Taylor Reveley) 
IN THE spring of 1965 the United States sent troops a short dis-
tance into the Dominican Republic. Although desiring to pro-
tect Americans threatened there by civil strife, President J ohn-
son also feared that the Dominicans might be about to go the 
way of Castro's Cubans. His prophylactic intervention in Do-
minican affairs provided the catalyst for recent struggles be-
tween the Executive and Congress over the war powers-
Chainnan J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee ended 1965 actively disillusioned with-presidential 
direction of American foreign policy. The Indochina War mas-
sively spread his disillusionment. Spurred especially by the 
Fulbright Committee, many legislators began to reconsider 
Cold War assumptions about the proper roles of the President 
and Congress in controlling American use of force abroad. 
That reconsideration peaked only when President Nixon re-
signed. 
Although attention -focused on military action in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia, Congress was busy on related fronts as 
well. Legislators demanded that the President disclose all exist-
ing executive agreements with other states, and they moved to 
enlarge congressional control over future American commit-
ments abroad, especially those with war and peace conse-
quences. Efforts were made to cut foreign aid radically, in-
cluding grants for military purposes, and to reduce spending 
by the Defense Department for weapons and overseas bases. 
Steps were taken to winnow the huge emergency authority 
delegated to the Executive by statutes passed and left standing 
518 
226 War Powers of the President and Congress 
over the prior forty years (for instance, authority over the eco-
nomy and the size of the armed forces). Legislators also tried to 
prevent the President from either impounding congressional 
appropriations, on the one hand, or spending monies not ap-
propriated (particularly for military ends), on the other. Con-
gress sought to pry information from the Executive branch on 
a timely and comprehensive basis, vigorously rejecting claims 
of executive privilege even as to matters said to involve national 
defense. There were attempts to ensure congressional over-
sight of covert actions, whether intelligence and military opera-
tions abroad or security measures at home. Senate confirma-
tion was demanded "for appointees to a number of newly 
crucial executive posts, and Senate review of nominees was 
taken as an opportunity to scrutinize and limit executive policy. 
Then, too~ the legislators moved to lessen presidential influ-
ence by improving their own decision-making procedures, 
especially committee and budgetary practices. 
All of this ferment was important to the division of the war 
powers between the two branches. Most telling were two of its 
aspects. First, Congress ended American involvement in the 
Indochina War by refusing to fund it any longer. The final in 
a series of fiscal restraints came in the Church-Case Amend-
ment to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 1974, 
which banned outright the use of federal funds for any ··mili-
tary or paramilitary operations'" uin;" ··over" or ··off the shores 
of9 the whole of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. l Never befure 
had Congress used its appropriations power to withdraw the 
United States from a major conflict. Equally novel was the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973. Again, never before had Congress 
set out procedures for how the President and legislators are to 
go . about deciding whether to fight. Together, these unpre-
cedented developments offer Congress the best chance it has 
had since 1789 for an assured voice in war and peace decisions. 
Of the two, the appropriations ban suggests that the legislators 
will command the Executive" s attention whenever they be-
. come restless, but the War Powers Resolution has the greater 
potential for long-term legislative influence. Cutting off funds 
is a drastic remedy not easily adopted even in extreme circum-
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stances and one rarely conducive to thorough debate about 
policy. Systematic legislative influence is more likely to flow 
from procedures which cover mild as well as severe cases, 
which direct debate to the policy merits without fiscal distrac-
tions, and which provide unavoidable channels for communi-
cation between the Executive and Congress. 
The Constitution's necessary-and-proper clause permits 
Congress to adopt measures such as the War Powers Resolu-
tion, which reiterate constitutional requirements and define 
procedures for their implementation.2 Section 2(b) of the Reso-
lution duly recites: &"U nder article I, section 8, of the Constitu-
tion, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the 
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers 
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer hereof."3 
Congress's authority to reiterate constitutional requirements, 
however, is far narrower than its power to define how they are 
to be implemented. No congressional discretion exists concern-
ing the nature of the constitutional requirements (for example, 
under what circumstances the President may commit troops 
withou t prior legislative approval). So far as the necessary-and-
proper clause is concerned, Congress's only option is to reiter-
ate the Constitution, elaborating perhaps but not changing it. 
W ide legislative discretion exists, on the other hand, over the 
choice of means: The President can be ordered to give up old 
methods of implementation (for instance, episodic, often un-
timely reporting of troop commitments) and adopt new ones 
(complete, prompt reporting). 
As a practical matter, of course, the legislators do have some 
leeway with respect to the nature of the constitutional require-
ments. It comes from the same source as the President's-
uncertainty as to what the Constitution means. The greater the 
ambiguity, the greater the difficulty in separating a definition 
of constitutional requirements from the adoption of means to 
implement the Constitution. War-power legislation simply 
requiring the President to report his commitment of troops to 
combat seems to involve &Cmeans" alone. But such legislation 
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moves toward constitutional ··definition" if it requires prior 
congressional approval for American use of force except on 
certain occasions defined in the statute; or if it puts a deadline 
on any use of force begun by the President alone unless Con-
gress subsequently approves the venture; or if it pennits Con-
gress to end an executive use of force by concurrent resolution, 
that is, by a measure not subject to veto. 
Once war-power legislation moves beyond means to defini-
tion, it has no more right to automatic acceptance by the Presi-
dent than his constitutional claims have to automatic accept-
ance by Congress. If the President signs the act, he concedes its 
claims, opening the way to consensus. If he vetoes it and is 
upheld, then no law fonnally exists, but prudence may lead the 
Executive to accept many of the measure's would-be require-
ments, and the le~~lators will have a concrete notion of the war 
powers that they think are constitutionally theirs. If the Presi-
dent's veto is overridden, he may still refuse to acknowledge 
the legislation, unless the courts tell him to do so. Prudence, 
however, will dictate even more strongly his acqJ].iescence in 
the act's reQuirements, and Congress will be even more confi-
dent of its war-power role. Still, if the legislation strongly 
offends the President's understanding of his constitutional 
powers or of the national good, he may defy it. And he almost 
surely will obey only the narrow letter of the law. In other 
words, a war-power statute is most likely to foster a clear, en-
forceable division of authority between the two branches if it 
is signed by the President. Thus, if there are a few basics on 
which the two branches can agree, the legislation ought to stick 
to them, leaving other aspects of the division of authority to 
evolve from these basics. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973 and its proponents took care to stress that they were 
not engaged in constitutional definition. As Section 2(a) of the 
meaSure chastely states: &&It is the purpose of this joint resolution 
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution . . . ." Or 
in the words of Senator Muskie: . 
The bill does not undertake to impose on the President a modification 
of bis constitutional powers. It does not undertake to assert a restate-
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ment of Congress' view as to the President's role with respect to the 
warmaking power. 
""hat it undertakes to do is to establish a procedure for comity as to 
different views in the future, so that Congress can be brought in from 
the periphery of the warmaking power to its center in order to exer-
cise its proper role," 
The Executive disagreed. President Nixon felt that "the restric-
tions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of 
the President are ... unconstitutional," adding that "[t]he 
only w~y in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the 
Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution-
and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone 
is clearly \vithout force."5 While it grates to hear a President 
say that constitutional change may come only -by formal 
amendment in light of our Executives' historic taste for amend-
ment by practice, it was seemly for ~Ir. Nixon to point out that 
the War Powers Resolution does attempt a bit of constitutional 
definition in Congress's image. That fact has lessened the gen-
erosity with which the White House has implemented the 
measure. 
The steps leading to its enactment were complex and conten-
tious.6 They began with efforts by Senator Fulbright in the late 
1960s to reduce presidential freedom in foreign affairs. On 
June 25, 1969, the Senate by vote of 70 to 16 adopted the follow-
ing proviso, a m.odified version of one that the Senator had 
introduced almost two years earlier: 
Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this 
resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States on 
foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government 
or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the 
United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain 
events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment 
by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the 
executive and legislative branches of the United States Government 
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses 
of Congress specifically providing for such a commitment. 7 
On November 16, 1970, by a vote of 289 to 39, the House of 
Representatives took its initial step, passing a measure requir-
522 
230 War Powers of the President and Congress 
ing the President to report quickly to Congress, in writing, con-
cerning the legal basis, circumstances, and anticipated scope of 
any commitment of American troops abroad, whether to en-
large forces already there, make new deployments, or fight. 
Later House resolutions leading to ultimate agreement with the 
Senate in the fall of 1973 became progressively more severe in 
their limits on presidential freedom, but the Representatives 
continued to hinge their scheme on after-the-fact reporting by 
the Executive. 
The Senate, to the contrary, was more interested in prevent-
ing the President from acting in the first place without prior 
congressional approval, except in a few carefully defined cir-
cumstances. Thus Section 3 of the Senators' 1973 bill provided 
that -
[i]n the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the Armed 
Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostilities, or in 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is dearly indi-
cated bX the circumstances, only-
(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its territories 
and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions 
in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the direct and imminent 
threat of such an. attack; 
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United 
States located outside of the United States, its territories and posses-
sions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack; 
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the United 
States, as rapidly as possible, from (A) any situation on the high seas 
involving a direct and imminent threat to the lives of such citizens and 
nationals, or (B) any country in which such citizens and nationals are 
present with the express or tacit consent of the government of such 
country and are being subjected to a direct and imminent threat to 
their lives, either sponsored by such government or beyond the 
power of such government to control; but the President shall make 
every effort to terminate such a threat without using the Armed 
Forces of the United States, and shall, where possible, obtain the con-
sent of the government of such country before using the Armed 
Forces of the United States to protect citizens and nationals of the 
United States being evacuated from such country; or 
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization 8 
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As majorities in the House and Senate struggled toward com-
promise, the dominant issue remained whether to try to define 
the occasions on which the President might use force without 
prior congressional approval, and if he might, whether the 
President had independent constitutional authority to act under 
those circumstances or merely delegated authority from Con-
gress. Crucial also was the issue whether to impose time limits 
on any presidential action, and if so, what deadlines (30 days? 
120?), measured from which tripwire (from the time of an 
executiye order committing the troops? from the moment Con-
gress receives the Presidenfs report? and if that, how long to 
submit the report after the order?). Also hotly debated was 
whether Congress should be able to end an executivE initiative 
by inaction-by simply failing to vote one way or another on it, 
as opposed to explicitly voting no.9 Similarly contested was 
whether Congress might stop executive action by concurrent 
resolution or \vhether it should do so only by a vote subject to 
presidential veto. Finally, the nature of presidential consulta-
tion with Congress was the subject of much concern. While the 
House would not touch the Senate's definitional approach, it 
did warm to the notions of a deadline on presidential initiatives 
and their termination either by congressional inaction or con-
current resolution. The grO\ving militancy of the House is epit-
ornized by evolution in the consultation language included in 
the various House resolutions. The first urged the President to 
consult with Congress '''when feasible." The fourth and last de-
manded that "the President in every possible instance shall 
consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the 
C 10 ongress .... 
On October 10, 1973, the Senate agreed by a vote of 75 to 
20 to a compromise based on the House version. The Repre-
sentatives concurred two days later, 238 to 123. On October 24 
President Nixon vetoed the legislation, finding it "'both uncon-
stitutional and dangerous to the best interest of our Nation." 
On November 7 Congress overrode the veto. The text of the 
Resolution and veto appear in Appendix C. They are prime 
examples of conflicting congressional and executive claims te-
garding the war powers. 
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Congressional opinion was not monolithic. Though the War 
Powers Resolution as adopted did not include the constitu-
tional definition that Senator Jacob J avits had championed, he 
nonetheless liked it: "The fact is that never in the history of this 
country has an effort been made to restrain the \var powers in 
the hands of the President .... [I]t will make history in this 
country as has never been made before."ll But some other 
supporters of the Senate's definitional approach viewed the 
Resolution "as a historic surrender," not "a historic recapture." 12 
Thomas F. Eagleton and Gaylord Nelson, cosponsors of the 
Senate bill, bitterly opposed the final act. In Eagleton's tenns: 
If we are reluctant to deal with the constitutional issue of prior author-
ity, then we will continue to be confronted in years to come ~'ith the 
prospect of desperately trying to stop misbegotten wars. 
War powers legislation that is meaningful has to deal with the 
fundamental causes of the constitutional impasse that plagued the 
Nation for the past decade. It must . . . in the most precise legal 
language, carefully spell out those powers which adhere to the Ex-
ecutive by reason of his status as Commander in Chief and his obli-
gation to act in emergencies to repel attacks upon the Nation, its 
forces, and its citizens abroad. For the rest, such legislation must 
make clear that all remaining decisions involved in taking the Nation 
to war are reserved to the elected representatives of the people-as 
the Constitution so says, the Congress.13 
But others equally devoted to congressional prerogative 
feared precisely such a spelling out of presidential authority. 
Senator Fulbright had cautioned: 
I am apprehensive that the very comprehensiveness and precision of 
the contingencies listed . . . may be drawn upon by future Presi-
dents to explain or justify military initiatives which would otherwise 
be difficult to explain or justify. A future President nlight, for in-
stance, cite "secret" or "classified" data to justify almost any con-
ceivable foreign military initiative as essential to "forestall the direct 
and imminent threat" of an attack on the United States or its armed 
forces abroad.·" 
And, of course, a significant number of legislators saw even the 
House approach, embodi~d in the adopted Resolution, as an 
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unconstitutional or unwise re ":ction on presidential po\ver. 
These people made up m of 18 Senators and 135 Repre-
sentatives who voted to smitaJn the President's veto. 
Why after almost two eel years did Congress bring 
itself to institutionallegisl war powers? A variety of 
factors were at work, s in the Constitution and 
others in passing political s is usually the case with 
great constitutional issues. - 'es in Congress felt a need to 
reassert themselves in dec ' war and peace. President 
Nixon's 1970 Cambodian . sprung as suddenly on 
Congress as on the North - , his Christmas bombing 
of North Vietnam in 1972.. in the teeth of profound 
congressional disquiet, "nued bombing of Cam-
bodia in the summer of 1 Congress had forced an end 
to American fighting in \- . against a background of 
presidential sway during \Var, had created serious 
constitutional imbalance, so most Senators and Repre-
sentatives were concern 
Further, it was presid ative's bad luck that the 
gestation of the War Pow u 'on coincided with \Vater-
gate. The latter led most Lo~~iSmletl to see constitutional im-
balance in many aspects of . e power, not just those 
involving foreign affairs~ - ti n on the Resolution coal-
esced with the dismissal osecutor Archibald Cox 
and the ensuing resignati y General Elliot Richard-
son, as well as with the White House tapes con-
troversy. 
More mundane factors 'II-lII-g,~o t work. Before the vote on 
Nixon's veto of the Resol . use in 1973 had sustained 
five successive executive v Democratic majority was 
eager to override for the party. Similarly, the 1972 
election had produced rew members of Congress, 
most of them Democrats t e against anything N ixon-
ian. There was also a su ying effort to win for the 
override a number of R . es who had voted against 
the Resolution on the . was too weak. Five such 
votes were turned aro enide margin in the House 
was four votes. Finally, sentiment in both Congress 
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and the country had decisively rejected continued American 
involvement in Indochina, thereby removing the inhibitions on 
votes against a President and his policy that exist \\'hen the 
country is at war. Conditions were prime for Congress to :; ake 
an unparalleled claim to the war powers. 
Constitutional Definition 
In the War Powers Resolution, two-thirds of the Senate J.nd 
House defined the Constitution as subjecting to leg· ~ve 
control all American involvement in imminent or actual m-
bat, except perhaps for hostilities on American territory Thus 
under Section 5(b) of the measure, the absence of coniJes-
sional approval for such involvement compels its end iter 
sixty days, unless Congress extends the deadline, is U 0 
meet in the wake of armed attack on America, or the Pr _ ent 
obtains an extra thirty days of grace by certifying in \\ mg 
that our troops' safety requires their continued use dun _ the 
withdrawal process. And under Section 5(c), "at any time that 
United States Anned Forces are engaged in hostilities o_tslde 
the territory of the United States, its possessions and tern tories 
without a declaration of 'var or 5pecific statutory authorization, 
such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress 
so directs by concurrent resolution." In short, Congress claims 
that the President may not constitutionally commit our forces 
to foreign hostilities unless the legislators either explicitly au-
thorize combat in advance or ratify it within a set time after its 
beginning. Further, Congress asserts that no veto is constitu-
tionally permissible when the legislative process runs in re-
verse, that is, when the President commits troops without rior 
congressional authorization. In that event, Section 5(b) p . its 
either the House or Senate to terminate the executive" tive 
simply by failing to ratify it before the statutory dea and 
Section 5(c) permits majorities in both houses to abr it at 
any time by concurrent resolution. 
The principal parent of the Resolution, Repr tive 
Clement J. Zablocki, described its potential in these t s: 
Our purpose ... was to provide Congress with a two-b ap-
proach . . . to ending a commitment of troops ordered by esi-
527 
Th War Powers Resolution of 1973 235 
den . The first of that so-called two-barrel approach involves the 60-
da·~· period at the end of which the President would have to end the 
commitment of troops unless Congress, in effect, exercises its exclu-
sive warmaking powers by endorsing or approving the action 
through a declaration of war or a specific authorization. . . . 
The second barrel . . . involvestilte conCUJTent resolution which 
we regard as a statutorily legal method of ending the commitment of 
troops. The thought behind the desirability of the concurrent reso-
lution route is obvious: since the Constitution gives Congress-and 
only Congress-the power to d e war, Congress had to have a 
nonvetoable method of demo . g, ifit"sofchose, that it did not 
wish to declare war, even before .. of the OO-day period. 
We recognized that the Consti, tes that the President 
is Commander in Chief but it e'\"eIl greater clarity that 
only Congress can declare war. 
Cranted, Congress may have abclica 
few decades through inaction; as _..AA~~ 
power over the last 
'es.:left, is began to assume 
the'power. In time, this assump . 
ern9neous idea that it was an inher 
Presidents led to the 
~_!1 Presidential power .15 
Having claimed legislative co American involve-
m t in combat, Congress w esolution to read the 
Co titution as requiring prim leg~lti\re approval for such 
involvement except on Avo 0 Section 2( c): "The 
co titutional powers ofthte mas\Qer-in-Chief 
to introduce 1) nited States - to hostUiities, or into 
situations where imminent in - hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstan only pursuant to 
(l».radeclaration of war, (2~ authorization, or 
(3~a national emergency upon the United 
St , its territories Qr po ed forces." In the 
Ie . lators' view, the Fresid ority may consti- . 
tutionally commit us' repel ,an attack on 
American territory 01\ .le Ironically, this 
reading of executive" er even than the 
definition in the Sena b Iy. 
Congress nailed Section position tighter 
in Section 8(d) (2) : "No . lutitm ... shall 
be construed as granting the Pnesident with 
~espect to the introduc:tioD Annea F o~ces into 
528 
236 War Powers of the President and C ongreu 
hostilities or into situations wherein an involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority 
he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution,"' 
And the legislators apparently hoped to force the Preside 
either to accept their reading of the Constitution in Section 2( c) 7 
openly defy it, or to plead mea culpa, because Section 4(a) (B) 
demands that he explain to Congress "the constitutional . . 
authority" for any com~itment of troops to combat, should 
do so withaut prior legislative approval. 
How do the constitutional conclusions of the War Powers 
Resolutions,tarui in relation to those reached in Chapters V 
and IX? The judgment that American involvement in combat is 
. tely ubject to congressional control seems sound for re~ 
s cleve ed tliere. Equally sound is the act's provision that 
Congress y elld presidential initiatives by concurrent reso-
lution, again fer reasons already noted. 17 
But the gis 'on's apparent distinction between combat on 
Am rican te . ry and abroad lacks merit. In both instances, 
as sugges eviously, Congress should have authority to 
curb exe . e war making. 18 Nor does the Resolution indicate 
with suff . nt clarity that Congress may condition, as well as 
terminate, executive policy. The distinction between an abso-
lute con sional ban on American involvement in combat 
the . s~ · . n of congressional conditions on it has alread . 
been not E.xp . cit recognition of the distinction is import 
to avoid idential pretense that such conditions are the s 
as strate or tactics and therefore wholly within executi 
c trol. 
The act' sumption that Congress must explicitly approve 
e of fo~ce, if the use is to be constitutional, does 
,... ... .,......rrt>-aly sound. Defects in such a notion, especi ~ 
by a deadline for ratification, have already b 
. ilarly, Section 2(c)'s severe limits on presiden . 
commit troops have scant merit. Under this s -
's C--r-9'9I' ··tionaJ definition, Presidents could never on th . 
'ty direct American troops to confront those 
der to protect American civilians or property 
O n1~n'"lI!OIrI , to assist international peace keeping 
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humanitarian rescue, to defend the territorial integrity of 
Mexico against foreign attack, and the like. 
While the union of Sections 2(c), 4(a) (B), and 8(d) (2), de-
scribed earlier, suggests ~hat the legislators meant their nig-
gardly reading of presidential war powers to govern American 
practice,19 other evidence exists that this was not really con .. 
gressional intent. The October 4, 1973, uJ oint Explanatory 
Statement of the Committee of Conference" hedged: USection 
2( c) is a statement of the authority of the Commander .. in .. Chief 
respecting the introduction of United States Anned Forces into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Subsequent 
sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the lan-
guage of this subsection, as was the case with a similar provision 
of the Senate bill . . . ."20 Senator Eagleton dismissed the 
section as "the pious pronouncement of nothing. "21 Senator 
M uskie attempted an explanation that seems as cogent as any, 
other than that the provision was included to placate backers of 
the Se'nate bill:22 
It is true . . . that this language is not operative language. 
Why was it put into the bill? 
It was put into the bill as an indication that, in enacting a bill, Con-
gress did not intend to surrender any of its constitutional powers with 
respect to the making of war. 
The remainder of the bill is a procedural bill. undertaken to insure 
consultation by the President with Congress and undertaking to put 
in the hands of Congress the procedure for tenninating any hostilities 
into which the President may have plunged tls~whether or not his 
action in so doing conformed with our view as te what his constitu-
tional powers might be.23 
Presidents Ford and Carter ignored the limits of Section 
2(C),2.f and their successors are likely to ignore them. The State 
Department has concluded that the proviso H does notconstitute 
a legally binding definition of the Preside's Constitutional 
power as Commander-in-Chief. ' ,'25 And while inodest as such 
definitions go, the June 1975 formulation of that power by the 
Department's Legal Adviser offered no comfort to the provi .. 
sion: 
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Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) ... , it ap-
pears that the President has the constitutional authority to use the 
Armed Forces to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign 
nationals where such action directly facilitates the rescue of V.S. 
citizens abroad, to protect V.S. Embassies and Legations abroad, to 
suppress civil insurrecti.on, to implement and administer the tenns of 
an armistice or cease-fire designed to tenninate hostilities involving 
the V nited States, and to carry out the tenns of security commitments 
contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe that any such list 
can be a complete one, just as we do not believe that any single defini-
tional statement can clearly encompass every conceivable situation in 
which the President's Commander in Chief authority could be ex-
ercised.28 
To the extent that Section 2( c) does lack binding effect, its 
unduly restrictive view of presidential authority is softened. 
But, to precisely that same extent, the legislation takes on a 
quixotic air, detrimental to the rule of law. Clear, enforceable 
constitutional rules, as well as the war-power ends discussed 
earlier, would have been better served had Congress foregone 
the section. 
Implementing Procedures 
How does the War Powers Resolution implement the legisla-
tors' definition of the constitutional requirements? As just 
noted, it provides very few means to enforce Section 2( c). The 
legislation is far more thorough about obtaining information 
from, and consultation with, the President and about focused, 
expedited congressional action on the particulars of any use of 
force. President Nixon's veto message did not attack these 
aspects of the act. As the State and Defense Departments 
pointed out in June 1975, the message uindicated that portions 
of.the War Powers Resolution, includingsections5(b) and5(c), 
are unconstitutional. No such position was expressed as to sec-
tion 4,'· concerning presidential reports to Congress.27 In fact, 
one of the few provisions of the Resolution singled out for 
praise in the veto message was the third, or consultation, sec-
tion: 
The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires 
the fullest cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and 
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the prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsi-
bilities. [The Resolution] includes certain constructive measures 
which wauld foster this process by enhancing the flow of information 
from the /executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, 
calls for consultations with the Congress before and during the in-
volvement of United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision 
is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized 
consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circum-
stances. 
Ironically, after the act went into effect, the most bitter con-
gressional charges that uthe executive branch proclivity is to-
ward evasive and selective interpretation" of the Resolution 
have concerned consultation. 28 
Information 
Legislative decisions about the use of force depend on the 
timely receipt by Congress of pertinent infonnation, much of it 
from the President. Matters relevant to his reporting include 
what SQlct:s of circumstances require a report, how rapidly it 
must be made, its content, whether it is to be periodically up-
dated, alld the mechanics for laying it before the various legis-
lators. Sections 4 and 5( a) of the Resolution deal with these 
questions: 
Sec. 4{a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in 
which United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where immine~t involvement 
in hostilities is clearly in.dicated by the circumstances; 
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while 
equipped for combat, except for deployn'lents which relate solely to 
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or 
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed 
Forces equipped for combat already loca~ed in a foreign nation: 
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House 
. . . and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writ-
ing, setting forth-
(A) tile circumstances necessitating the introduction of United 
States Anned Forces; 
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such 
introduction took place; and 
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(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or in-
volvement. 
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the 
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsi-
bilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of 
United States Armed Forces abroad. 
(c) ... [T]he President shall, so long as such anned forces 
continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the 
Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as 
well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but 
in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every 
six months. 
Sec.5(a) Each report subnlitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall 
be transmitted to the Speaker . . . and to the President pro tempore 
.. . on the same calenc!ar day. Each report so transmitted shall be 
referred to the Committee on [International Relations] of the House 
of Representatives and to the Cnmmittee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the 
Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in 
excess of three calendar days, the Speaker . . . and the President 
pro tempore . . . if they deem it advisable (or if petit~oned by at 
least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall 
jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may 
consider the report and take appropriate action . . . . 
Sections 4 and 5(a) are basically sound, with several reser-
vations. There is no reason for Section 4(a) to dispense with a 
presidential report if Congress has declared war, while requir-
ing one if Congress has previously authorized the use of force 
by legislation other than a fonnal declaration.29 Since Section 
8(a) of the Resolution indicates that the President is to assume 
authority to use force only from the most explicit congressional 
statements to that effect, all prior legislative approvals should 
be regarded as the same, whether they are clothed in a declara-
tion of war or some other fonn. 
There is some ambiguity in. the tenns used by Section 4(a) (1) 
to (3) to describe what sorts of circumstances require a report. 
The first answer to this ambiguity must come in the Executive's 
appraisal of the facts of each case. In October 1974 Secretary of 
State Kissinger explained that 
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several months ago the Office of the Secretary of Defense instituted 
an arrangement whereby the Legal Adviser to the Chairman of the 
J oint Chiefs of Staff informs the Department of Defense General 
Counsel of all troop deployment actions routed through the Chair-
man's office which could raise a question as to whether a report to the 
Congress is required. In implementation of that arrangement a writ-
ten instruction was promulgated establishing a War Powers Report-
ing System within the Operations Directorate of the JCS. Arrange-
ments have been Inade for this Department's Legal Adviser to re-
ceive the same information as is supplied to the DOD General 
Counsel. Consultations between the two departments' legal counsels 
will be arranged as needed.30 
Especially open to disagreement are the meaning of "hostili-
ties" and "imminent involvement." Legislative history of the 
Resolution indicates that Congress meant for these words to 
cast a broad net: "In addition to a situation in which fighting 
actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of con-
frontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is 
a clear and present danger of arm'ed conflict. 'Imminent 
hostilities' denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential 
either for such a state of confrontation or for actual anned con-
flict."31 The State and Defense Departments adopted more 
restrictive "working definitions'" of these terms: 
"[H]ostilities" ... mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed 
forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units 
of hostile fort~es, and "imminent hostilities" . . . mean a situation in 
which there is a serious risk from hostile fire to the safety of United 
States forces. In our view, neither term necessarily encompasses ir-
regular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particular area . 
. . . Whether or not ... rifle fire constitute[s] hostilities would 
seem to us to depend upon the nature of the source of this rifle fire-
i.e., whether it came from a single individual or from a battalion of 
troops, the intensity of the fire, the proximity of hostile weapons 
and troops to the helicopter landing zone, and other evidence that 
might indicate an intent and ability to confront U.S. forces in 
anned combat. 32 . 
These interpretative issues matter, of course, because they 
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determine whether the President should report at all and, if so, 
whether under Section 4(a) (1), rather than under Section 
4(a) (2) or (3). Recall that under Section 5 of the act, only Sec-
tion 4( a) (1) circumstances give Congress the power to end an 
executive initiative by inaction or concurrent resolution. 
This does not mean that a President can count on avoiding 
the Resolution by flatly refusing to report or by declining to 
report under Section 4(a) (1) even though hostilities are at 
hand. Senator J avits has felt "it . . . timely to remind the 
Executive Branch-as was made clear during the floor debate 
on the Conference Report-failure properly to label a report 
required ... under Section 4, or even a failure to submit a 
required report, will in no way delay or frustrate the trig-
gering of the eo-day clock and the provisions of Sections 4 
through 7 of the law."33 In 1975 the Legal Adviser to the State 
Department did not quarrel with this view, thou~h he noted 
that the Executive is just as entitled as Congress to interpret 
what the Resolution requires: "[I] t is perfectly within the power 
of Congress to decide even if we reported under 4(a) (2) that it 
was really 4(a) (1) and treat that as the beginning of the OO-day 
or 9O-day period trigger. I don7 t agree that the competency is 
absolute. . .. . [T]he Executive can have an interpretation just 
as the Congress can have an interpretation and in the last analy-
sis it would arise on some sort of lawsuit which the courts would 
probably decide. "34 
Section 4(a) directs that the President report to Congress 
"within 48 hours" after "any case [listed in Sections 4(a) (1) to 
(3)] in which United States Armed Forces are introduced."35 It 
is not likely that the Executive can both manage a crisis and pre-
pare a report in much less time. The Mayaguez !eport antici-
pated the deadline by four hours. I t reached the offices of the 
Speaker and President pro tempore in the middle of the night, 
after the President "had to be awakened at 2 o'clock in the 
morning in order to read and sign his report . . . ."36 But it is 
also true that many American uses of forces will be over before 
a 48-hour report makes its way to the legislators. Thus, to the 
extent that the Resolution depends on congressional reaction to 
formal executive reports, it concedes ·control over short-term 
military crises to the President. 
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As regards Section 4(a) (A&C), a more particularized state-
ment of content would be desirable (since Presidents will be 
prone to say as little as possible):3i for instance, requirements 
that the Executive set forth (1) the precise objectives of his ac-
tion, (2) the American personnel, money, and other resources 
committed to it, (3) the geographical areas affected by the 
action, (4) the length of time that particular resources have 
been committed to particular areas, and (5) his projection of 
future developments regarding each of the above. If any of this 
information might aid- the enemy, procedures could be de-
veloped to make reasonably likely its submission and receipt 
in confidence. Section 4(a) (B) poses other problems. As al-
ready suggested, its requirement that the President state ccthe 
constitutional ... authority" under which he acted seems 
designed either to force him to accept the stingy reading of his 
authority in Secbon 2( c), to defy it openly, or to adnl!t guilt for 
having transgressed it. The Section 4(a) (B) requirement that he 
state ccthe legislative authority" under which he acted, if any, 
presumably refers to statutory approval other than declarations 
of war, since no report is required under the latter. This proviso 
renews the needless dichotomy between the two just men-
tioned. There would be merit, however, in requesting the Presi-
-dent to justify his action under international law, in~luding 
treaties. The degree to which the action is or is not legal under 
that law is an element Congress must weigh in determining 
whether the action's costs to the country outweigh its benefits. 
Section 4(b) is little more than hortatory, since it fails to deal 
with the extent to which the President in the exercise of his con-
stitutional war powers is entitled to withhold information from 
the legislators. If the act means to suggest that the President has 
no such right, even as to strategic and tactical data, it strays. 
Section 4( c) has greater merit. Periodic reporting by the Presi-
dent during any ongoing use of force is essential to ensure that 
Congress remains capable of infonned decision making and 
that it is presented with recurrent, unavoidable occasions to 
take a position. Whatever the content requirements for the init-
ial presidential report, supplemental reports should update all 
pertinent categories. Section 5(a) provides apt means for laying 
the facts of American involvement in combat before those con-
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gressional committees most competent to deal \vith them, as 
well as apt means for bringing the legislators as a whole to-
gether if they are out of session when crisis -develops and the 
circumstances warrant their immediate consideration of the 
President's action. 
The Resolution does not deal with secret reporting, but its 
terms implicitly accommodate it. Nothing is said, for instance, 
about automatic disclosure of the President's report in whole to 
all members of Congress, and certainly nothing is said about its 
automatic disclosure to the public. If the President is, in fact, to 
report meaningfully in all the circumstances covered by Sec-
tion 4(a), he must have reasonable confidence that secrets told 
Congress will remain secret. On the other hand, the legislators 
must be assured that vital information is not withheld from 
them simply because it undercuts executive desires; and Con-
gress cannot be bound to keep presidential secrets when it 
believes public awareness of them is crucial to the national 
interest. Most of these difficulties ~ould be met by a construc-
tive relationship between the Executive, on the one hand, and 
the Speaker, President pro tempore, and the Senate and House 
foreign affairs committees, on the other. It ought to be possible 
for these legisla.tors to receive and keep information in confi-
dence until the President agrees to its disclosure to the rest of 
Congress or until a majority of both committees so vote.38 
Consultation 
In addition to calling for formal presidential reports, the Re-
solution seeks to obtain a legislative voice in war and peace -
decisions by demanding that the President exchange views 
\vith the legislators and seek their advice about aU American 
moves into or toward hostilities, except when circumstances 
utterly preclude consultation. Section 3 states: "The President 
in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before 
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduc-
tion shall consult regularly with the Congress until United 
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or 
have been relnoved from such situations." According to the 
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Resolution's legislative history, this "consultation" is to be a 
meaty process: 
The use of the word "every" r~f1ects the committee's belief that 
such consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be 
inclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emer-
gency circumstances-even when it is not possible to get fonnal con-
gressional approval in the fonn of a declaration of war or other 
specific authorization. 
At the same time, through use of the word "possible" it recognizes 
that a situation may be so dire, e.g. hostile missile attack underway, 
and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation will 
be possible. It is therefore simultaneously firm in its expression of 
Congressional authority yet flexible in recognizing the possible need 
for swift action by the President which would not allow him time to 
consult first with Congress. 
The second element of section [3] relates to situations after a com-
mitment of forces has been made (with or without prior consultation). 
In that instance, it imposes upon the President, through use of the 
word "shall;' the obligation to "consult regularly with such Members 
and committees until such United States Armed Forces are no longer 
engaged in hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostili-
ties may be imminent." 
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of 
consultation. Rejected was the notion that the consultation should be 
synonymous with merely being infonned. Rather, consultation in this 
provision meaqs that a decision is pending on a problem and that 
Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their 
advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their ap-
proval of action contemplated. Furthennore, for consultation to be 
meaningful, the President himself must participate and all infonna-
tion relevant to the situation must be made available.39 
Two defects in Section 3 are somewhat troublesome. First, it 
does not require consultation in Section 4(a) (2) and (3) circum-
stances, only 4(a) (1). The Executive has carefully noted this 
distiD'ction, disclaiming any statutory duty to consult about new 
deployments or substantial increases in old ones. But as the 
State-Department told a House subcommittee, "The President 
has not made anything of that; he intends to consult irrespective 
, ~==--- --- of which of these paragraphs an action may fall under."40 From 
a "policy viewpoint" influential legislators have urged ·the 
538 
246 War Powers of the President and Congress 
Executive to continue to make nothing of the distinction.41 
Nonetheless, it is alive and well as a matter of law. 
Second, Section 3 leaves the President significant discretion 
to choose which Senators and Representatives he will consult 
and when to talk with them. Obviously, the less often they 
meet during a crisis, and the less the chosen legislators know 
about foreign affairs, the more trivial the consultation is likely 
to be. Triviality is probable when the President inserts into a 
continuous process of executive decision making a few epi-
sodic gatherings with congressional leaders, chosen without 
regard to their foreign affairs expertise and responsibilities. 
By way of remedy, one Representative has suggested that 
[t]o have a really meaningful advise and counsel procedure involving 
legislative action, I would think that it would be almost essential that 
[the congressional consul tees ] drop everything else they are doing 
and stay with the NSC during this ~'-day period in this instance or 
any other unfolding crisis to be there to consider and evaluate the 
facts as they are perceived and as they may change during this period 
of time. 
Otherwise, if they are brought in for advi[ c]e arid consultation at 
the time of the first meeting of the NSC with the President, all of that 
might be totally outdated by what happens a few hours later. It might 
really be well for the President in the f1!ture to do his best to insist that 
the Speaker of the House and the minority leader as well as the ma-
jority and minority leaders in the Senate come and stay there with him 
and consider this crisis as it unfolds.42 
And one Senator has argued that consultation should draw on 
"the expertise of the members of the committee that are perti-
nent to the issue": 
If you call in the leadership, they don't know what they are being 
called in for-some general subject dealing with the war in Southeast 
Asia or the seizure of the M ayagtlez. Then, you consult with them and 
then they have to go back and find out what their particular constit-
uent body thinks, whereas if he consults the substantive legislative 
standing committees he is getting the view of that body which is 
charged with making recommendations on that subject to its own 
House. 
So I respectfully submit first and foremost that that should be the 
established method of consultation, that is with the Senate Foreign 
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Relations Committee and the HouseInte naI Relations Commit-
tee. If the President would also like to cansult with the leadership-
that is fine and that is icing on the cake.~ 
Recall the remedy proposed in Chapter X: more delegation of 
foreign-affairs authority by Congress toa ifew members who 
would be expected to work with the Executive throughout the 
course of a crisis. 
~Jleaningful collaboration between President and Con-
gress, from the first through the,eleventh hours, constitutes the 
war-power millennium. Sectiom 3 of dte ,Resolution seeks it. 
The section by itself, however, does1lUtlem ore than exhort, un-
less it is backed by a growing congressional capacity for coor-
dinated, informed, timely decision making, by greater con-
gressional will to take and assume responsibility for decisions 
about war and peace, and by heightened congressional zeal to 
cajole and coerce the President into consultation. As Senator 
J avits said, "If Congress sits back passively and merely awaits 
Executive fulfillment of the reporting requirements of the law, 
the key policy decisidns will continue to be monopolized by 
the Executive Branch, as they were in the decades leading up to 
enactment of the 'Var Powers Resolution."44 
Improved Procedures for Congressional Action 
We have already seen how Section 5 ends a presidential initia-
tive when (1) the House or Senate fails to ratify it within 60 
days, subject to certain exceptions, or (2) Congress at any point 
votes it down by concurrent resolution. As is true of much of 
the other implementing detail in the act, there is nothing magic 
about the 60 days. They were born of the House's preference 
for 120 and the Senate's for 30, and many have disagreed about 
the likely effect of any particular tune period. Devotees of con-
gressional prerogative differ, for example, some finding 30 
days essential lest the President have time to lock Congress into 
his policy by fait accompli, others fearing 30 days would allow 
the President to win rally-round-the-flag support. But what-
ever the time period, it does encourage focused, expedited 
congressional attention to the policy at hand. 
The 6O-day deadline, however, does more harm than good, 
for reasons already discussed. Indeed, the purpose of a series of 
93-280 - 8Q - 1R 
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complex procedures in Section 6 of the Resolution seems to be 
to lessen the possibility that the deadline will arrive without the 
legislators' having voted yea or nay. The provisions of Section 6 
do not guarantee a definitive vote, nonetheless, because it can 
be blocked if either house U shall otherwise determine by the 
yeas and nays." It is also well to be clear that the 50-day proviso 
is not the only means to focused, expedited congressi al 
action. Section 5( c), coupled with the presidential repo 
requirements just 'considered, unavoidably focuses the 
lators on the pertinent executive action. · And Section 7 
with expediting procedures not tied to the 50-day deadline. 
related rather to congressional decision by concurrent res 
tion at any time. 
The Section 7 provisions "against filibuster, or committees 
pigeon-holing,"45 are a significant step toward rationalizing 
Congress's handling of war and peace issues. These provisions 
ensure prompt but not precipitate action in the respective for-
eign affairs committees, on the floor of each house, and in con-
gressional conference deliberations, so long as majorities in 
each house believe that rapid action is ' desirable. When a 
majority in either house does not find it necessary, the pace 
slows. Thus, Section 7 is likely to achieve an element essential to 
a responsible role for Congress in war-peace decisions: an end 
to 'obstruction of legislative judgment on presidential initia-
tives. 
Early Life 
The War Powers Resolution did not get off to a brisk start. 
More than 17 months passed before the first presidential re-
port was filed under it. During the interim there was at least 
one executive initiative that might well have been reported 
under Section 4(a) (2), if not4(a) (1). While Greece and Turkey 
were struggling over Cyprus in 1974, the American Ambas-
sador to that island requested on July 21 the evacuation of local 
Americans. President Nixon responded the next day by send-
ing five naval vessels to the area and by pennitting 22 helicop-
ter sorties from the U.S.S.lnchon to a British base in Cyprus in 
order to remove roughly 400 Americans and 80 foreign nation-
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;a11s. On July 23 a joint Britisll-A ued another 
11.35 Americans and foreigm na . r Eagleton's 
view, the Executive's failure to r this acti . · vio-
lated the Resolution. The Senator le~ ho wever, to 
bring others in Congress to take a . - w of the matter-
perhaps because no hostili ' sxesult American armed £Qrces 
did not land on any part of Cyprus \~ .. hel"€' they were wel-
come, and the President traditionally has prerogative to 
rescue Americans threateDam:abroad. T mains that the 
Resolution could have heemread' to r report on the 
operation. The President's re$usal to so" and Congress: s dis-
inclination to remonstrate, ith him , ... for a generous 
view of the legislation. 
Content of sorts for it ca e d . s of Ameri-
can military involvement in Ind t Ford sent 
three reports to Congress regarding the ev tion of Ameri-
cans and foreign nationals. The first report on April 4, 1975, 
concerned the removal of thousands of refugees from Danang, 
Vietnam, to safer points south. The second on April 12 reported 
rescuing Americans and foreign nationals trapped in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia. The third followed on April 30, about the 
evacuation from Saigon. No hostilities were involved in the 
Danang operation; limited enemy fire seems to have been re-
ceived during the Cambodian venture, with no American re-
sponse or casualties; some combat was involved at Saigon and 
there were American losses. The Saigon operation was the most 
taxing of the three. A naval task force participated offshore, 
70 helicopters and assorted fighters flew numerous sorties, and 
865 marines landed in an undertaking that lasted 19 hours. Ap-
proximately 1,400 Americans, 5,600 Vietnamese and 85 others 
were removed by helicopter while 30,000 Vietnamese were 
picked up at sea. There was a palpable possibility of heavy 
fighting with either communist forces or South Vietnamese 
troops desperate for rescue. 
The reports submitted by President Ford to Congress con-
cerning these operations were striking in several respects. First, 
none was expressly submitted pursuant to Section4(a) (1). The 
Danang and Phnom Penh reports cited 4(a) (2), and the Saigon 
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_ Iy "section 4. ·'~6 Thus the President did not come to 
der only provision in Section 4 that activates 
on eo; utive action and creates the possibility that 
ay e the vemture at' any time by concurrent reso-
the . (·nt was careful to claim independent 
ct. The first report was the most cautious, mixing 
al prerogative \\'ith statutory authority: "This effort 
ertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional 
Commander-m-Chief and Chief Executive in the 
- foreign relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assist-
- 1961 . , . which authorizes hUinanitarian assist-
ance to 'ugees. civman war casualties and other person~ 
disadv : ed by hostDities ... in South Vietnam.~'Thcnext 
two reports were more aggressive: "The operation was ordered 
and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional ex-
ecutive power and authority as Commander·in-Chief of U.S. 
Armed Forces." Third, the reports were exceptionally terse, 
involving little of 'the detail contemplated by the reporting pro-
visions of the Resolution. Their texts appear in Appendix C. 
Fourth, by the time the President reported, each of the opera-
tions was over. The Resolution did receive its first substance in 
the April 1975 reports, but not much. 
It is significant, however, that President Ford reported, 
despite the Nixon precedent on Cyprus and despite a long tra-
. ""Clition of Executives' rescuing Americans threatened abroad. 
Ford was encouraged to report because Congress had pre-
viously banned the use of federal funds for any military activi-
ties in Indochina. While it was not clear that the ban covered the 
evacuation of Americans and foreigners inextricably mixed 
with them, it could be read to do so (particularly if hostilities 
resulted), and the bali' aid seem clearly to cover foreigners not 
entwined with Americans.47 Certainly the evacuation opera-
tions involved decisions with "hostilities" implications-for 
instance, what nationalities were to be rescued, how many 
people should be brought out, by what means, over what 
period of time, to what extent reliance should be placed on 
diplomacy rather than military operations, and to what degree 
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combat would be accepted to achieve the predetf,ennined ob-
jectives. With these considerations in mind, the' President ad-
dressed the Senate and House in joint session on ,April 10, 1975: 
"And now I ask the Congress to clarify immedia'teiy its restric-
tions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the 
limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their 
evacuation if this should be necessary, and I also ask prompt 
revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have 
a very special obligation, and whose lives may be in danger, 
should the worst come to pass."48 
In response to the President's request, both houses passed 
bills, each referring to theW ar Powers Resolution. On April 25 
a conference conlmittee reconciled the two bills asthe Vietnam 
Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975. The 
Senate promptly agreed to the conference report and sent it 
to the House, where it was to be considered on April 2~J. But 
before it reached the floor, the evacuation of Saigon-was well 
underway. Calling from the White House,49 Speaker Carl 
Albert requested that the measure be withdrawn. It was con-
sidered by the House on May 1 and rejected. In short, the Presi-
dent sought explicit authority to use the military-authority 
which Congress might have provided and tied to the War 
Powers Resolution. When he had not received prior congres-
sional approval nineteen days after asking for it, he acted none-
theless. And he acted despite a legislative ban on military 
operations in Indochina, which covered at, least part of his 
initiative. The House then. declined to take a position on the 
matter, forfeiting the opportunity at least to ratify what the 
President had done and to explicitly involve Congress in its 
authorization. 
Some in the House had feared that the measure might author-
ize American reentry into Indochina. By ~Iay 1 others viewed 
the matter as moot or wished to avoid too close association with 
South Vietnamese refugees. There was strong sentiment 
among the foreign affairs leadership of the House and Senate, 
however, that the measure be adopted, whether before or after 
the fact, to associate Congress with the President in the use of 
military force under the War Powers Resolution. Senator 
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Eagleton' s postmortem was characteristically dismal, but more 
realistic than not: 
Congress fumbled the ball. When the President was forced by events 
to order the evacuation from South Vietnam on April 29, the House of 
Representatives had not yet completed the final stage in enacting the 
necessary legislation. Two days later, when the House finally had the 
opportunity to express Congressional will and intent, the House 
voted overwhelmingly not to act. 
This unfortunate decision raises grave questions about the willing-
ness of Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. The 
President obviously had no authority to use the United States forces 
to rescue foreign nationals in Vietnam. Yet our forces evacuated 
thousands of Vietnamese. Asked to explain, President Ford tried to 
justify his action on "moral'· rather than legal grounds. Yet Congress 
let the precedent stand. Future Presidents might now conclude that 
the Commander in Chief had an inherent right to do what Mr. Ford 
did.50 
And as the Milwaukee ] oumal said in a May 23 editorial: 
In the spirit of partnership, Ford asked Congre:;~ to provide both 
money and clear authority to evacuate endangered Vietnamese along 
with Americans. While South Vietnam crumbled, Congress wran-
gled. Dozens of amendments filled the air. Many a lawmaker played 
general, trying to link certain kinds of aid to certain military maneu-
vers under certain conditions. Finally, Ford was forced to rely on 
inherent presidential power and order evacuation without compan-
ion action by Congress. 
From all this, a pointed lesson emerges. On urgent foreign policy 
issues, the presidency is still the govemmenfs decision making center 
-if only because it can muve with a crisp singularity that a congres-
sional multitude cannot hope to match. 51 
There was some congressional feeling that the President 
failed to consult with the legislators during the April crises.52 
The emergencies began while Congress w~s in Easter recess. 
Nonetheless, the Executive tried to notify the congressional 
leadership about the Danang operation. The President spoke to 
Congress about the crisis that evolved into the Saigon evacua-
tion. Four days after Mr. Ford's message to the House and 
Senate, he, along with the Secretaries of State and Defense and 
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the Army Chief of Staff, met with the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. Other 
high administration officials testified before several other con-
gressional committees regarding the impending evacuation.53 
While the full objectives of Section 3 of the Resolution may not 
have been met in April 1975, neither were they wholly ignored. 
Hardly had the Indochina evacuations ended when the new 
Cambodian regime seized an American merchant ship, the 
Mayaguez, on May 12, 1975. To recover the ship and its crew, 
protect the reSCl!lers, and retaliate against the aggressors, Presi-
dent Ford sent American troops into Thailand, used that coun-
try as a staging area, and fought the Cambodians. Eight ships, 
11 helicopters, 25 planes, and 300 marines were involved in the 
Cambodian hostilities, with the loss of 15 Americans dead, 3 
missing, and 50 wounded. During the hostilities the United 
States dropped the largest bomb in its nonnuclear arsenal on 
the island of Koh Tang, to support marines in battle there. 
American forces bombed a military airfield and an oil storage 
depot in Cambodia, shortly after the crew of the Mayaguez 
had been released.54 
Since hostilities were clearly involved, the President report-
ed to Congress on May 15 under Section 4(a) (1) of the Reso-
lution. But the President chose not to report also under4(a) (3), 
although his operations in Thailand were protested by its gov-
ernment. 55 And as in April, he claimed an independent prero-
gative to use force. Like the Indochina reports, the A-I ayaguez 
account was terse, including, for instance, no explanation of the 
basis in international law for the operation. Its text is in Appen-
dix C. And like the Indochina report, the Mayaguez account 
came after the fact. Finally, the President was not slowed by 
the statutory ban on military ventures in Indochina, apparently 
because he did not read it to preclude his armed rescue of 
Americans attacked abroad. 
According to the State Department, "[A]lthough the Maya-
guez incident was a rapidly unfolding emergency situation, 
four separate sets of communications took place between the 
E(xecutive branch and the congressional leadership."56 These 
"communications" did not amount to Illuch. Senator J avits 
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accurately complained that "[t]he cbnsultation of the Congress 
prior to the Mayaguez incident resenlbled to me the old and 
discredited practice of inforrlling selected Members of Con-
gress a few hours in a.dvance of the implementation of the-
decision already taken within the executive branch."57 Still, on 
May 14 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced: 
"lW]e ,support the President in the exercise of his constitutional 
powers within the framework of the War Powers Resolution to 
secure the release of the ship and its men."58 Congress as a 
whole acquiesced in the level of consultation offered it. So 
ended an eight-week period that has been by far the most im-
portant in the Resolution's implementation to date. 
Post Mayaguez 
Several months after leaving the White House, former Presi-
dent Ford frontally attacked the Resolution on both legal and 
practical grounds. In an April 1977 speech he said that there 
had been six military crises during his presidency: the four dis-
cussed already "and two June 1976 evacuations of American 
citizens from Lebanon's civil war. No reports under the War 
Powers Resolution were submitted on the Lebanese ventures. 
Mr. Ford concluded that no reports were legally required 
either for them or for his initiatives in Indochina, although re-
ports were in fact filed on the Indochina and M ayaguez res-
cues: Uln none of those instances did I believe the \Var Powers 
Resolution applied, and many members of Congress also ques-
tioned its applicability in cases of protection and evacuation of 
American citizens. Furthermore, I did not concede that the 
resolution litself was legally binding on the President on con-
stitutional grounds. "59 
Mr. Ford assessed the act even more grimly from "a practical 
standpoint." He focused first on the difficulties of consulta-
tion during the early stages of a crisis: 
When the evacuation of DaNang was forced upon us during the 
Congress's Easter recess, not one of the key bipartisan leaders of the 
Congress was in Washington. 
. . . [H]ere is where we found the leaders of Congress: two were 
in Mexico, three were in Greece, one was in the Middle East, one was 
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in Europe, and two were in the People's Republic of China. The rest 
we found in t\velve widely scattered states of the Union. 
This, one might say, is an unfair example, since the Congress was 
in recess. But it must be remembered that critical ~or1d events, es-
pecially military operations, seldom wait for the Congress to meet. III 
fact, most of what goes on in the world happens in the middle of the 
night, Was~ington time. 
On June 18, 1976, we began the first evacuation of American citi-
zens from the civil war in Lebanon. The Congress was not in recess, 
but it had adjourned for the day. 
As telephone calls were made, we discovered, among other things, 
that one member of Congress had an unlisted number which his press . 
secretary refused to divulge. After trying and failingfo reach another 
member of Congress, we were told by his assistant that the congress-
man did not need to be reached. 
We tried so hard to reach a third member of Congress that our 
resourceful White House operators had the local police leave a note 
on the congressman's beach cottage door: "Please call the White 
House."60 
The fonner President then went into Hseveral reasons" why, 
"[ w ]hen a crisis breaks, it is impossible to draw the Congress 
into the decision-making process in an effective way . . . ." 
His reasons constitute a classic statement of executive distaste 
for measures such as the Resolution. Legislators are not suited 
for crisis management, in Mr. Ford's judgment, for a,number of 
reasons: 
First, they have so many other concerns: legislation in committee 
and on the floor, constituents to serve, and a thousand other things. 
It is impractical to ask them to be as well-versed in fast-breaking 
developments as the President, the National Security Council, the 
Joint Cl-iefs of Staff, and others who deal with foreign policy and 
national security situations every hour of every day. 
Second, it is also impossible to wait for a consensus to form among 
those congressional leaders as to the proper course of action, especial-
ly when they are scattered literally around the world and when time is 
the one thing we cannot spare. Again, we should ask what the out-
come would be if the leaders consulted do not agree among them-
selves or disagree collectively with the President on an action he con-
siders essential. 
Third, there is the risk of disclosure of sensitive information 
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through insecure means of communication, parti~lJlarly by tele-
phone. Members of Congress with a great many things on their minds 
might also confuse what they hear on the radio news in this day of in-
stant communication with what they are told on a highly classified 
basis by the White House. 
Fourth, the potential legal consequences of taking executive action 
before mandated congressional consultation can be completed may 
cause a costly delay. The consequences to the President, if he does not 
wait for Congress, could be as severe as impeachment. But the con-
sequences to the nation, if he does wait, could be much worse. 
Fifth, there is a question of how consultations with .1 handful of 
congressional leaders can bind the entire Congress to support a course 
of acnon-especWIy when younger members of Congress are be-
coming increasingly independent. 
Sixth, the Congress has little to gain and much to lose politically by 
involving itself deeply in crisis management. 
If the crisis is successfully resolved, it is the President who will g~t 
credit for the success. If his efforts are not successful, if the objectives 
are not met or if casualties are too high, the Congress will have ser-
iously compromised its right to criticize the decisions and actions of 
the President. 
Finally, there is absolutely no way American foreign policy can be 
conducted or military operations commanded by 535 members of 
Congress on Capitol Hill, even if they all happen to be on Capitol 
Hill when they are needed. 
Domestic policy-for housing, health, education or energy-can 
and should be advanced in the calm deliberation and spirited debate I 
loved so much as a congressman. 
The broad outlines and goals of foreign policy also benefit im-
mensely from this -kind of meticulous congressional consideration. 
But in times of crisis, decisiveness is everything-and the Consti-
tution plainly puts the responsibility for such decisions on the 
shoulders of the President of the United States. 
There are institutional-limitations on the Congress *hich cannot be 
legislated away. 81 
Mr . Ford's assessment did not move Congress to repeal or 
othelWise limit the Resolution. To the coatrary, in July 19TI the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered amendments 
whose aggregate effect would have been to tighten the act's 
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restraints on presidential use of force. 52 Three days of hearings · 
were held on these proposals as well as on other aspects of the 
Resolution's "operation and effectiveness." No amendments 
resulted. 
Unlike Presidents Nixon and Ford, Jimmy Carter had kind 
words for the war-powers legislation. Early in his presidency 
he described it as an "appropriate reduction" in the sort of con-
trol enjoyed by some Executives before Indochina. Siinilarly, 
Secretary of State Vance indicated during his confirmation 
hearings that the Resolution was compatible with the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority and that he anticipated no 
problems with its "good faith observance:·63 By the same 
token, during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's July 
1977 hearings, just mentioned, the Legal Adviser to the State 
Department repeated anew: "We believe that conscientious 
observance of the procedures set forth in the Resolution, in-
cluding effective consultation and timely reporting, will assure 
that both the Executive and Legislati~e Branches possess the 
means to exercise their full and proper constitutional responsi-
bilities."64 A year later, in August 1978, the Legal Adviser as-
sured the House International Relations Committee of Mr. 
Carter's continued "strong support of the War Powers Resolu-
t · "65 Ion. 
Congress constrained J in1my Carter in matters of war and 
peace less than it did Presidents Nixon and Ford when Indo-
china and Watergate coalesced, but more than has been cus-
tomary in the twentieth century. Mr. Carter was required to 
provide significant secret infonnation to Congress, especially 
its intelligence committees. These committees and others con-
cerned with foreign affairs and the armed forces have been 
frequently infonned and consulted, often heeded, by the Ex-
ecutive. Despite presidential objections, the legislators have 
insisted on the use of concurrent resolutions to disapprove ma-
jor arms sales abroad. They have cut off or curbed both Inili-
tary and economic aid to certain countries that the President 
very much wished to help. Individual Congressme~ have dealt 
directly with foreign representatives-members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee conferring with Moshe Dayan in 
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a \Vashington hotel about proposed F -15 sales to Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, for instance, and the House of Representatives 
threatening to cut off economic aid to South Korea unless its 
former am,bassador to this country were returned to testify 
about South Korean influence buying in Congress. The Senate 
has coldly scrutinized the President's treaty initiatives, es-
pecially those involving the Panama Canal and SALT II, and 
many Congressmen reacted severely when the President alone 
terminated this country's Mutual Defense Treaty with the Re-
public of China. 
Influenced by such constraints and by his own predilections, 
Mr. Carter used armed force very sparingly until late 1979, 
even when nothing more than deployment on the high seas was 
at stake. He had no need to report_ to Congress under the War 
Powers Resolution until spring 1980. Some legislators did feel 
that the administration's May 1978 activities in Zaire were re-
portable. At that time American, Belgian, and French citizens 
were threatened by Katangan forces in southern Zaire. Upon 
the request of Zaire, as well as Belgium and France, President 
Carter ordered U.S. transport aircraft to support rescue opera-
tions by Belgian and French troops. From May 19 to 23 the 
Air Force flew approximately thirty missions in Zaire, trans-
porting materiel and some French troops to staging areas more 
than 100 miles from the site of the fighting. In June, after the 
Katangans had been repulsed, the Air Force flew the Belgians 
and French out while also transporting into Zaire elements of 
. an African peace-keeping force. At one point during the June 
flights, as French legionnaires 'were loading a Peugeot onto a 
C-141, Zairian troops threatened to fire if the car departed with 
the French. The Peugeot was left on the runway without fur-
ther incident. The American pilots and their support personnel 
took no weapons into Zaire. Nor did any American infantry or 
fighter aircraft accompany them. 88 
Under the circumstances, most Congressmen who paid any 
attention to the matter concluded that American forces had not 
been introduced either into a situation "where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances" or "into the territory . , , of a foreign nation, while 
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equipped for combat." Thus, no presidential report to Con-
gress was obligatory under Sections 4(a) (1) or 4(a) (2) of the 
Resolution. A few Congressmen emphatically disagreed. Their 
disquiet led to the August 1978 House hearings mentioned 
above. 
Events in the Middle East proved to be more trying. Oil from 
that area became increasingly central to Western economies 
during the late 1970s. As the decade neared its end, Iran spun 
from being a force for tranq uility in the area to a source of acute 
instability. In November 1979 the Iranians took American dip-
lomats hostage. After the hostages had been captive for almost 
a year, Iraq invaded Iran, heightening the threat to Western oil. 
Meanwhile the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, putting Russian 
troops on Iran's border and within striking distance of the 
Persian Gulf. 
In response, President Carter became more active militarily. 
He deployed powerful naval forces in the vicinity of Iran, sent 
radar command aircraft to Saudi Arabia as well as several 
hundred military personnel to operate and maintain equipment 
and train the Saudis, established an American military presence 
in Egypt, created a Rapid Deployment Force for the Middle 
East, and declared the United States would keep the oil flow-
ing one way or another. Carter also suggested that anned action 
might be necessary to recover the hostages, and sent six C-I30 
transports, eight RH-53 helicopters, and roughly ninety combat 
troops into Iran on April 24, 1980, in an abortive effort to bring 
the captives out. American fighter aircraft from carriers off 
Iran were prepared to defend the rescuers against Iranian at-
tack had that proved necessary. 
Amid this activity, the President reported under the War 
Powers Resolution only once, on April 26, 1980. See Appendix 
C. He rejected claims that other reports were necessary when, 
for instance, the American military presence in Saudi Arabia 
and the Persian Gulf increased during the Iraqi-Iranian War; 
Senator J avits agreed with him, as Appendix C indicates. 
The April 26, 1980, report was seriously flawed. It said little 
and made no mention of Sections 4(a) (1) and (2) of the Reso-
lution, under which it should have been submitted. Tenning 
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the rescue effort a "humanitarian mission," Jimmy Carter sim-
ply ignored the fact that the mission, while "humanitarian" in 
purpose, nonetheless &&introduced" American armed forces into 
a situation &&where imminent involvement in hostilities [was] 
clearly indicated by the circumstances." Combat with the 
Iranians was likely had the rescuers reached Tehran. Combat 
with others stIch as the Soviets was ·possible had the rescue 
degenerated into a prolonged struggle between American and 
Iranian forces. Moreover, t~e rescue effort obviously intro-
duced U.S. forces "into the territory ... of a foreign nation 
... while equipped for combat:~ 
The April 26 report also claimed that Carter acted &&pursuant 
to the Presidenfs powers under the Constitution as Chief Ex-
ecutive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Anned Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d) (1) of the 
War Powers Resolution," as well as pursuant to Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. The report was certainly free to argue 
that the President acted pursuant to his constitutional authority 
and international law , but it was wrong to suggest that he acted 
pursuant to Section 8(d) (1). In the context of the entire Reso-
lution, especially Sections 2( c) and 4, it is clear that Section 8( d) 
(1) did not authorize the rescue a.ttempt. Within the tenns of the 
Resolution, the April 26 report was misleading and inadequate 
-at least as flawed as any report submitted by Gerald Ford. In 
practice, though not rhetoric, Jimmy Carter gave the Resolu-
tion's reporting requirements short shrift. 
He also disregarded its consultation provisions. No one in 
Congress was infonned, much less consulted, before the rescue 
effort began. Ironically, on the afternoon of April 24, Senators 
Church and] avits wrote Secretary of State Vance on behalf of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisting under Sec-
tion 3 of the Resolution that the President consult Congress 
before using force against Iran. "We write this letter to you in 
the context of the grave international crisis which has been 
developing for sqme months in the region of the Persian Gulf, 
precipitated by the seizure of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran and the holding of American hostages there, and by the 
brutal military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union," 
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said Church and J avits. They noted that Carter had refused to 
exclude force as means of reclaiming the hostages from Iran 
and had threatened to fight if the Soviet Union moved into the 
Persian Gulf. They argued that the legislative history of the 
Resolution "makes it clear that the consultations called for do 
not necessarily signify at all that a decision has been tnade" to 
use force, but rather "the advance consultation provisions of 
the War Powers Resolutiqn are intenqed to come into play 
before any such decision has been made, in order to ensure that 
any such decision, if made, is a national decision jointly entered 
into by the President and the Congress . . ;' . Accordingly, Mr. 
Secretary, we hereby request that you inform this Committee 
at an early date when consultations can begin .... "67 The 
Senators' invocation of Section 3 was too little, too late.68 Sub-
sequent congressional unhappiness with Carter's failure to 
consult, however, did not lead to steps to strengthen Sec-
tion3. 69 
Inertia 
A prior page suggested that it is up to Congress to break the 
gravitational pull of executive hegemony over American war 
and peace. The War Powers Resolution provided the necessary 
initial thrust. But since the legislation has been on the books, 
Congress has done little to generate any sustained thrust. ~;lost 
members of Congress remain very much result oriented.70 
Their concern with the particulars of any specific policy still 
overshadows their concern with the institutional process by 
which that policy is made. So long as they and their constituents 
applaud an executive initiative, they do not seriously dispute 
their exclusion from its development~ . 
Congress lost a singular opportunity to give the Resolution 
substance in the congressional mold when the legislators failed 
to participate in shaping the Saigon evacuation. Consultation 
under the Resolution has been minimal) largely because Con-
gress has not insisted that the President meaningfully imple-
ment Section 3. Executives will rarely pay much attention to 
that section, especially during crises that arise suddenly, re-
quire constant, rapid, flexible response, and end quickly, unless 
554 
262 War Powers of the President and Congress 
the legislators designate a small committee of Senators and 
Representatives, primed to share the command headquarters 
with the Executive and made acceptabl~ to him by a capacity 
for informed, responsible advice and by a willingness to keep 
tactical secrets. Similarly, there is little reason to imagine that 
Presidents will accept Section 2(c)'s view of their authority to 
enter hostilities without prior congressional approval. As with 
many of their predecessors, Presidents in the future \\-ill very 
probably construe the Constitution to permit them to commit 
troops whenever they believe it essential to the national 
welfare. 
Even so, the War Powers Resolution retains a potent bite. 
Following President Ford's example, his successors will doubt-
less report their military initiatives to Congress, usually having 
told congressional leaders about their plans and given them a 
moment to object. It is also probable that future Presidents 
will either accept an end to their military initiatives by the 
Section 5(b) deadlines or by the 5( c) concurrent resolutions, or 
ask the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality df these 
sections.il Equally important, future legislators will have 
guaranteed opportunities to participate in deciding whether 
America fights, if the combat lasts more than forty-eight hours. 
While the Resolution may have slight impact on quick, surgical 
applications of armed force by the President, it should ensure 
legislative approval of any long-term commitment of the 
country to war. 
Secretary of State Haig promised more for Congress during 
his January 1981 confirmation hearings. He committed the 
Reagan administration to compliance with both the letter and 
the spirit of the Resolution. Shortly thereafter several Senators 
charged the President with skirting the act while increasing the 
flow of American arms and advisers to EI Salvador's civil strife. 
Plus ~a change . : . . 
Chapter XI: The War Powers Resolution of 1973 
1. Dep·t of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-437, §839 (1974). 
For other such limits see Glennon, Strengthening the War Power! Re!olution: 
The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictioru, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13 n.30 (1975); 
Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or 
Su"ender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823,851 n.l64 (1975). 
2. The necessary-and-proper clause received little attention at the Consti-
tutional Convention. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF mE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 
344·45 (M. ~arrand ed. 1911). Recan, however, that a prime federalistobjec-
tion to Confederation government was the dichotomy between its fonnal 
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powers, reasonably ample, and its impoverished authority over means neces. 
sary to implement them. Antifederalists during the ratification struggle 
strongly attacked the necessary·and·proper language. According to 
Hamilton, it and the supremacy clause were "held up to the people in all the 
exaggerated colours of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which 
their local governments were to he destroyed and their liberties exter. 
minated." FEDERAUST PAPERS No. 33. 
Madison in Federalist No. 44 examined the problem in some detail. He 
argued that even without the necessary and proper language, Congress 
would control means: "Had the constitution been silent on this head, there can 
be no doubt that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the 
general powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable 
implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than 
that whereve~ the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a 
general power to do a thing is given, every particular powe.r necessary for 
doing it is included." 
Madison argued, moreover, that it would have been impractical for the 
Constitution itself to attempt to deal more explicitly with means: uHad the 
convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and 
proper for carrying their other powers into effect; the attempt would have 
involved a compleate digest of laws on every subject to which the constitu· 
tion relates; accommodated too not only to the existing state of things, but to 
all the possible changes which futurity may produce: For in every new ap· 
plication of a general power: the particular powers, which are the means of 
attaining the object of the general power, must always. necessarily vary with 
that object; and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same." 
Finally, Madison spoke to the possibility that Congress might attempt to 
usurp authority through necessary·and·proper legislation: "If it be asked, 
what is to be the consequence, in case the congress shall misconstrue this part 
of the constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning? I 
answer the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power 
vested in them, as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and 
anyone of these were to be violated . . . . In the first instance, the success 
of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, 
which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last 
resort, a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can by the election 
of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers." 
Since 1789 congressional authority under the necessary·and.proper dause 
has been generously read in most instances. As Chief Justice Marshall said in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the. scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro· 
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitUtion, are constitu-
tional." See also, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). Note the suggestion that the 
necessary-and-proper clause is more sweeping in its grant of authority to 
Congress than are the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments, in Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promo-
tion of Human Ri~hts, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (1966). Congressional 
power to prescribe means has been judicially restrained, as a rule, only when 
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it impaired civil liberties; e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rJI. Singleton, 361 
LT .S. 234, 247 (1960). See f!.enerally L. HENKIN, FOREICN AFFAIRS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 78,331-32 n.54 (1972). 
Many have indicated that war-power legislation would be constitutional. 
See, e.g., Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), at 7, 135 (Javits); 551, 554 
(Bickel); 653-54 (\Villiam D. Rogers); 708 (Stennis); "n4, 779 (Goldberg). But 
cf· William P. Rogers: "The question about whether a statute can change the 
President's constitutional powers or affect Congress['] constitutional powers 
is a very doubtful proposition."ld. 517. But, as will be noted in the text, there 
is a distinction between congressional authority to define the nature of consti-
tutional powers, on the one hand, ~nd the means for their realization, on the 
other. Rogers's comments seem to assume that war-power legislation does 
only the fonner. 
3. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (Supp. 1975). The Resolution as a whole covers §§ 
1541-48 of the Code and is set out in Appendix C. 
4. 119 CONGo REC. 36,194 (1973). 
5. 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1285-86 (1973). 
The text of the veto message appears in Appendix C. 
6. Former Senator William B. Spong, Jr., of Virginia actively participated 
in these steps until January 1973. He has summarized them in two articles: 
Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President 
and Congress? 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1971); The War Powers Resolution Re-
visited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender? supra note 1, at 824-37. Not-
able collections of divergent vIews on the wisdom of war-power legislation 
were compiled early in the process, during the 1971 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings cited in note 2 above and during earlier proceedings in 
the House. See Hearings on Congress, the President, and the War Powers 
Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security Policy and Scientific Developments 
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
7. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONGo REC. S7153 (daily ed. June 25, 
19(9). For further discussion of Congress and national commitments, see 48 
CONGo DIGEST 193-224 (1969). 
8. S.440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973). Jacob J a\-;ts was the guiding spirit 
behind the Senate approach. See note 33 below. See generally J. J AVITS, \\' HO 
MAKES WAft: THE PREsIDENT VERSUS CONCHESS (1973). 
9. The House of Representatives almost adopted a requirement designed 
to preclude congressional inaction. It would have provided that, within 120 
days after the beginning of a military initiative by the Executive, Congress 
"shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and authorize the continuation of the 
action taken by the President . . . or . . . disapprove such action in which 
case the President shall terminate [it] .... " 119 CONC. REC. 24,685 (1973) 
(Whalen amendment). But the most dyspeptic attack on the notion of ending 
an executive initiative by congressional inaction came in the Senate. Sam Er-
vin picked "invasion" to hammer home his point: "This measure is an ~ ,.bsurdi­
ty. It says that when the United States is invaded, Armed Forces of the United 
States must get out of the fight against an invader at the end of 30 days if the 
Congress does not take affirmative action within that time to authorize the 
President to continue to employ the Arm,ed Forces to resist the invasion. The 
bill is not only unconstitutional, but is also impractical of operation. In short, 
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it is an absurdity. Under it, the President must convert Old Glory into a white 
flag within 30 days if Congress does not expressly authorize him to perfonn 
the duty the Constitution imposes on him to protect the Nation against in-
vasion." 119 CONG. REC. 25,093 (1973). 
10. See Spong, supra note 1, at 828 n.41, 874. 
11. 119 CONG. REC. 33,559 (1973). 
12. 119 CONG. REC. 36,189 (1973); see Spong, supra note 1, at 823. 
13. 119 CONG. REC. 33,557 (1973). Senator Eagleton has described his 
concerns at length in a book, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of 
Congressional Surrender (1974). 
14. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1973) (supplemental views of 
J. W. Fulbright). See Glennon, supra note 1, at 3-S n.lS. 
15. Hearings on War Powers: A Test of Compliance Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on In'" 
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (I97S). 
16. Section 8(c) further narrows the meager ~ 2(c) discretion given the 
President by its broad definition of "introduction of United States Anned 
Forces" to include "the assignment of members of such anned forces to com-
mand, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular 
or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such 
military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such 
forces will become engaged, in hostilities." 
17. See pages 197-98. Admittedly, there is controversy over whether 
Congress may "legislate" by concurrent resolution when the legislative pro-
cess runs in reverse. The touchstone for those who think not is Ginnane, The 
Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Com-
mittees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953). Executives especially have questioned 
legislation by concurrent resolution. It does deprive them of an opportunity 
to veto copgressional limits on their initiatives. As a Congressman asked and 
the Legal Adviser to the State Department answered in 1975: 
"MR. SoLARZ. . . . [I]s it your position that if the troops were sent in in the 
first place under the President's inherent constitutional authority that the 
concurrent resolution ordering them to be withdrawn would itself be uncon-
stitutional or do you believe that the President would be constitutionally ob-
ligated to act in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution 
and withdraw the troops? 
"MR. LEIGH .... I think it would be unconstitutional on the simple logic 
that if the President had the power to put the men there in the first place that 
power could not be taken away by concurrent resolution because the 
power is constitutional in nature. There might, however, be all sorts of rea-
sons as to why the political process would force him to wish to comply with 
that concurrent resolution. 
"There is a further question as to whether a concurrent resolution in this 
situation would have the dignity of law under the Constitution. I think a very 
strong argument can be made that a concurrent resolution in this situation 
would be insufficient and that the Congress must resort to the usual process 
for a statute and submit it to the President. If he disapproves it, it must then be 
pas( sed) over his veto by a two-thirds vote in each House. " War Powers H ear-
ing', '''pm note 15, at 91. 
Precedent exists, however, for legislation by concurrent resolution. For in-
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stance, there was provision for ending presidential action by this means in 
two prominent war-power measures: the 1941 Lend Lease Act and the 1964 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It is also a fact of life that, if Presidents wish to 
have their constitutional cake by committing troops without prior congres-
sional approval, it is not likely that they will be allowed to eat it too by deny-
ing simple majorities in both houses the right to call a halt. 
It can be argued that precedents such as those just cited are not applicable 
because they "created a concurrent resolution procedure to control the 
exercise of authority delegated [by Congress] to the President," while the 
War Powers Resolution "does not delegate anything to the President. .. . 
It is ... a procedural scheme for arranging an interchange in what is .. . 
a difficult area between the two branches . . . ."" Accordingly, "to say that 
Congress would later by concurrent resolution take back what it had pre-
viously delegated overlooks the fact that nothing was delegated." W aT 
Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 96-97 (remarks of Mr. Leigh); cf. Rostow, 
Response, 61 VA. L. REV. 797, BOO-Ol (1975): "There are some instances of true 
delegation between Congress and the Presidency in' the field of foreign 
affairs. The President's discretion to change tariffs is a good example; only a 
statute could vest such authority in the President. However. in most cases a 
more accurate description is that a statute combines the overlapping powers 
of the Presidency and of Congress. In such instances, there is no delegation, 
but a pooling of the respective powers of the Presidency and of Congress. 
Thus in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the Fonnosa Resolution, and the Middle 
East Resolution, for example, language was carefully chosen to indicate that 
Congress and the President were making separate and also joint decisions, 
each exercising its own authority. Noone attempted to draw a line marking 
the exact boundaries between the presidential zone and the congressional 
zone." 
It is more likely than not, however, that Congress did delegate some 
authority to the President in the War Powers Resolution. To wholly disclaim 
that possibility, it is necessary to assume that the Executive has a constitu-
tional prerogative to commit troops whenever and wherever he pleases, sub-
ject only to later restraint by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and House, over-
riding his veto. If, as is more probable, Congress has a constitutional right 
to vote on at least some troop commitments before they are made, then the 
Resolution does delegate to the President congressional approval to act in 
these cases if he thinks it necessary, subject to the deadline and concurrent 
resolution restraints in tt 5(b) and (c). 
18. See pages 198-99. Some assume that the President has a consti-
tutional prerogative to de-fend American soil, perhaps no matter what Con-
gress thinks. Ct. Senator Ervin"s remarks in note 9 above and Legal Ad-
viser Leigh"s testimony to a House Subcommittee in 1975: "I [am] not sure 
that the Congress by imposing a condition subsequent on an appropriation 
which has not yet been fully expended could limit the President's power to 
carry out certain cor~stitutional duties such as to defend the United States 
from hostile attack against its mainland territory. There is obviously no 
judicial decision on this but 1 would think that there would be a serious doubt 
as to the constitutionality of such a limitation if it were applied to rrevent the 
President from defending the mainland territory of the United States from 
attack." W at Powers H earlng" supra note 15, at 89. 
559 
362 Notes to pages 237 to 242 
19. See also Senator J avits: "If this is a statute, every part means 
something, whether it is written in subsection 2( c) or in section 3, as in the 
Senate bill."119Cong. Rec. 33,557-58 (1973). 
20. 2 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &: AD. NEWS 2364 (1973). 
21. 119Cong. Rec.33,555(1973). 
22. According to Representative Zablocki, the conference included § 2( c) 
"[i]n order to satisfy the Senate conferees"-"but it was intended as a state~ 
ment of purpose and policy, a sort of sense of Congress. ,. War POwers 
Hearings, supra note 15, at 32. 
23. 119 CONG. REC. 36,194 (1973). For further appraisal of § 2(c)'s 
mysteries, see Spong, supra note 1, at 837 -41. 
24. See pages 297-306 and note 25 below; cf. the Executive's rejection of 
the notion that the Resolution "delegates" any authority to him. note 17 
above. 
25. 119 CONG. REC. 36,181 (1973); accord, the Legal Adviser to the State 
Department in 1975: M[W]e would not agree ... that the specification of 
circumstances in which this power [the President's authority as commander 
in chief] might be used would be limited by section 2( c) . " War Powers 
Hearings, supra note 15, at 11. See also note 26 below and accompanying text. 
26. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 90-91. 
27. Id.40. 
28. Representative Zablocki' s 1975 complaints are typical: 
"Clearly, it was not the intent of Congress to be merely infonned of decisions 
already made. In the fullest meaning of partnership and shared responsibility 
in foreign affairs, it was the desire of Congress to have a participatory role in 
thp. "rocess of decisionmaking . 
.. 
"Measured against that clear directive ofintent, it is apparent . . . thatthe 
executive branch proclivity is toward evasive and selective interpretation of 
the War Powers Resolution." War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at vi. 
29. This distinction does make sense on one score under the Resolution as 
presently written. Reports by the President pursuant to § 4(a)(1) permit 
Congress to end his initiatives by inaction or concurrent resolution. That is not 
justifiable if the President is acting with explicit congressional authorization 
(whether by declaration of war or some other fonn of approval). According-
ly, if the Resolution were amended to require presidential reports at the 
outset of any hostilities, it ought also to be amended to prevent the tennina~ 
tion under tt 5(b) or (c) of ventures previously approved by Congress. 
30. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 2. 
31. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS 2351 (1973). 
32. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 38-39. It does appear that the 
Resolution was not directed at "hostilities" involving foreign mobs, inter-
national criminals, or the like. See, e.g., the June 15, 1973, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs report on the House bill that underlay the ultimate Resolu~ 
tion: "The term 'war powers' may be taken to mean the authority inherent in 
notional sovereignties to declare, conduct, and conclude anned hostilities 
with other states." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. ~ AD. NEWS 2348 (1973) (emphasis 
added). But 50 long as another nation is the adversary, Congress defined 
Uhostilities" broadly, as ipdicated in the text. 
33. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 69. The Senator had previous-
lyelaborated: 
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"Now it is perfectly true, that [the Senate] bill which contained an authority 
test as well as a performance test was not the bill adopted in the sense that the 
House approach was adopted without the authority test. ",'e did adopt the 
House approach, the methodology being that it is a performance test, it is not 
an authority test. That is, did he or didn't he have constitutional authority? 
"The minute he puts trbops into hostilities or imminent danger of hostilities, 
the act begins to operate. And he does not have to tell us he is doing it, because 
the 6O-day clock starts to tick if a report is required, and even if he fails to do a 
report, it still begins to operate and it is up to us to press the button so he loses 
all authority if we do not agree with his actions. Now this ~ the key to this 
whole legislation. If the President takes emergency action, his action is only 
good until Congress acts dispositively because we have the declaration of 
war authority." ld. 63. 
34. Jd.87. 
3..1:). According to the Resolution's legislative history, "[A] commitment 
[or introduction] of armed forces commences when the President makes the 
final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into effect." 2 U.S . 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2351 (1973). 
36. War Powers H eaTings, supra note 15, at 77. 
37. See the terse accounts submitted by President Ford, Appendix C. 
"They are brief to the point of being "in minimal compliance with the content 
requirements set forth in the law." War Powers Hearings. supra note 15, at 69 
(remarks of Sen. Javits); ct. Thomas Ehrlich: "No one can expect preparation 
of a carefully reasoned, fully-developed brief within two days after a deci-
sion to use military force. But precisely for that reason, the requirement 
should have a useful impact. The need for justification to support a decision 
should be a strong incentive for a broader analysis of the impact of that 
decision than might otherwise be made. By requiring those in the Executive 
Branch to articulate the basis for an action, and to defend that basis, the 
Resolution will encourage them to think through their decisions more fully." 
Response, 61 VA. L. REV. 78.5, 788 (1975). 
38. The legislators cannot expect much tactical and strategic information 
from the President unless he is confident that it will not leak; e.g., Legal 
Adviser Leigh's remarks to a House subcommittee about the Mayaguez. 
hostiHties: 
"Now let me say a word about this final assault action which involved 
movements of troops from various parts of the Far East into a position to be 
effective. The President was extremely apprehensive that there be no breach 
of security in advance of the time that they actually were landed, so there 
, were strong arguments for not revealing that information-even to a select 
group of members-very much in advance of the time it was to occur . 
.. 
When I was speaking about the President's judgment of confidentiality, I was 
speaking in terms of an assumption on my part. I do not know what the 
President actually thought on this subject. I do know that he went to great 
pains to request the Members of Congress who came for the briefing in the 
Cabinet room that they maintain absolute security about this because breach 
of security might prejudice the carrying out of military operations . 
.. 
"Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution has, in my view, been drafted so as 
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not to hamper the President's exercise of his constitutional authority. Thus 
Section 3 leaves it to the President to determine precisely how consultation i~ 
to be carried out. In so doing the President may, I am sure, take into accOunt 
the effect various possible modes of consultation may have upon the risk of a 
breach in security. Whether he .could on security grounds alone dispense 
entirely with 'consultation' when ' exercising an independent constitutional 
power, presents a question of constitutional and legislative interpretation to 
which there is no easy answer. In my personal view, the resolution con-
templates at least some consultation in every case irrespective of security 
considerations unless the President determines that such consultation is 
inconsistent with his constitutional obligation. In the latter event the 
President's decision could not as a practical matter be challenged but he 
would have to be prepared to accept the -political consequences of such 
action, which might be heavy." War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 81. 
100. See also Chapter VII, note 38 and accompanying text. 
39. 2 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS 2350-51 (1973). 
40. War Powers Hearings, supra note IS, at 85. But see id. 3. 
41. E.g., id. 54, 73 (remarks of Sen. Javits}. 
42. Id.57 (remarks of Rep. Findley). 
43. Id. 62 (remarks of Sen. Javits};accord, his views at 67-70, 73. 
44. Id.67. 
45. Id. 63 (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
46. Congressional umbrage at the missing references to § 4( a} (1) was met 
by Legal Adviser Leigh with various palliatives: 
"There was nothing ulterior about this in any sense. We were not trying to 
mislead anyone. I think the factual situation was different as between the first 
case, the Danang sealift, and the other two. In the Danangsealift we were 
confident that we were not going to be involved in a section 4( a) (I) situation 
of hostilities, and in fact the President's orders required that the force avoid 
any kind of hostilities. We felt certain that that was going to fall under 4( a) (2) 
so we specified it in that case. 
"Now the other distinction is that we didn't know at the time we were 
required to make the report, which has to be within 48 hours, when we would 
complete the task of picking up refugees, and as it turned out it went on 
longer than either of the other two. 
"Now with respect to both the Cambodian and the Saigon evacuations, by 
the time the President made his report the last Americans and the last armed 
forces had already been taken out so that as lawyers we did not spe that the 
specification of which of the three subsections of 4(a} was involved, was 
crucial to the operation of the mechanism which is established in section 5 of 
the War Powers Resolution because there would be no occasion for the 60-
da,r period to even begin running. 
"It seems that the real thrust of the question is why the President in his April 
30, 1975 report referred to section 4 in general, and not to any particular sub-
paragraphs in that section. We presume that the President did so because the 
events giving rise to that report did not seem to be limited to just one of the 
three subparagraphs in section 4(a). 
"Thus, although the events as known at that time indicated that hostilities 
may have existed between U.S. and communist forces, t1 .S. forces 'equipped 
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for combat' were also introduced in the 'territory, airspace or waters' of South 
Vietnam-the situation apparently provided for in section 4(a)(2). 
"Furthennore, since the operation had tenninated by the time the report 
was prepared, the question of possible congressional action under section 5 of 
the Resolution was moot; thus, a specific reference t04(a) (1) was not needed 
to ~all attention to possible action under section 5. 
"[T]he first three war powers reports contain the phrase 'taking note 
of . . . .' You inquire whether this suggests anything other than a full binding 
legal responsibility upon the President. This phrase connotes an 
acknow ledgement that the report is being filed in accordance with section 4 
of the War Powers Resolution. No constihJtional challenge to the ap-
propriateness of the report called for by section 4 was intended. " War Powers 
Hearings, supra note 15, at 9,39,40. 
47. The evacuations sparked a brouhaha over what was statutorily per-
mitted and over the broader question of the President's constitutional right to 
order anned rescues. Compare, e.g., the views of Glennon, supra note 1, with 
those of Emerson, The ",~ar Powers Resolution Tested: The President's 
Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 187 (1975). See also, 
e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra note 15. at 26-32. 
48. 121 CONC. REC. 10,006 (1975). In making this request, the President 
did not concede any constitutional necessity to do so. The Legal Adviser to 
the State Department suggested that Mr. Ford "wanted the political support 
of the Congress in what he saw was going to be necessary, and the fact that he 
asked for it should not, in my view, be interpreted as an indication of his 
belief that in the absence:bf congressional action he could not have done the 
things that he did. On the other hand, he obviously wished to have con-
gressional support and there remains the question of the financing of this 
evacuation." ~'ar Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 18; cf. Woodrow 
Wilson's requests for prior congressional approval of his Vera Cruz and 
merchantmen ventures, pages 158-59 above. 
49. The Executive disliked restrictions in the bill as it ultimately emerged, 
e.g., its severe limits on rescuing non-Americans. See the description of the 
measure in Glennon, supra note 1, at 17-19, and Spong, supra note 1, at 852-53. 
See also Legal Adviser Leigh's objections, e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra 
note 15, at 19-20,34-35. _ -
50. Eagleton, Congress's c'Inaction" on War, N.Y. Times, May 6,1975, at 
39, col. 2. See also Glennon, supra note 1, at 19-20 n.66. 
51. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 131. 
52. E.g., id. 82 (remarks of Rep. Zablocki); Spong, supra note 1, at 855 
n.18O. 
53. See Emerson, supra note 47, at 193. 
54. On May 15, 1975, the legal adviser and legislative assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained the bombing to a House 
committee: 
"In conducting an operation of this nature, there is only one mission in-
volved ... : To achieve the return of the crew, the vessel. Thereafter you 
must execute the safe extraction of the forces that were put in in order to 
accomplish the two primary missions. 
"The potential enemy had the capability of reinforcing from the places on 
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the mainland that were struck. To strike those places . . . in the judgment of 
almost every military man involved in the situation-and I say almost 
everyone because I have not talked to everybody, everybody I have talked to 
shares this view-was essential to save the marines on that island. 
"Now, you are forced .. . to make a judgment-between using adequate 
force and failing to use sufficient force to protect the men on the ground. That 
judgment is a very close one . . . in almost every instance, whether it is a 
platoon operation under a sergeant, a division operation under a general. or 
an operation of this nature under the direct command of the Commander in 
Chief. That is a tactical decision that is easy sometimes to Monday-morning 
quarterback. The question has to be what would you do if you were responsi-
ble for thp men on the ground at the time the decision was made . . . . 
"We recognized that of all the manifestations of power, restraint is one that 
is greatly recognized. That fact was constantly a consideration in the minds of 
the military planners involved in this operation. Restraint was a goal, but 
protecting American lives . . . was the first goal. 
" 
"Mr. WIl.soN. I would like to comment that as far as the air strikes on the 
mainland were concerned, the military judgment was made apparently that it 
was necessary, but I think that the strikes on the mainland, and I would like to 
hear the Colonel's response, probably in addition to their military 
significance served to let the Khmer Rouge know we were serious about this. 
"MR. ZABLOCKI. It would serve as a deterrent to any further intentions of -
any country, including Cambodia. 
"COLONEL FINKELSTEIN. We certainly hope it will have that effect." 
Hearings on the Seizure of the ,Yayaguez. Be/m'e the House Comm.-on [nfl . 
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34,34-35 (1975). 
It seems likely that the bombing was meant both to protect American 
troops and demonstrate that America "cannot aUow U.S. vessels to be seized 
with impunity" (remarks of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in a May 21 
interview). Id.l30. See also id. 42-43, 49. 
55. According to May 14 testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: "The Thai Prime Minister has called 
in our Charge in Bangkok . . . and has in effect given us an aide memo ire 
asking that our marines leave Thailand immediately." Mayaguez HeC!rings. 
supra note 54, at 16. The President had sent approximately 1,200 marines 
from Okinawa into Thailand when the crisis broke. Two hundred of them 
had then moved from there to the Cambodian theater. Id. 16,43,58. 
56. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 78. But cf. note 38 above, and 
Mr. Leigh's recognition that "the congressional leadership under the cir-
cumstances of the emergency action had been given an opportunity to 
express dissent or contrary views before the [President's] orders were ex-
ecuted [not before they were given]." ld. bl (emphasis added). 
57. Id.61. 
58. Id.S1; N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 7. 
59. Address by Gerald R. Ford, Univ. of Kentucky, John Shennan 
Cooper Lecture, April 11, 1977, reprinted in Hearings on a Review of the 
Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution Before the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 327 (1977). 
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60. Id.328. 
61. Id.328-30. 
62. See id. 33848. Perhaps most important among numerous proposed 
changes was the amendment that would have f given operative effect to ~ 
2( c) 's presently inoperative view that prior congressional approval is re-
quired for American use of force except in very limited circumstances. The 
impact of this amendment would have been softened only slightly by its 
expansion of the existing ~ 2(c) occasions in which the President may act 
alone to include (1) protecting Americans endangered abroad and (2) 
forestalling direct, imminent threats of attack on this country. 
63. See id.187,322. · -
64. Id.I90. See also 126CoNc. REc. S4114 (dailyed. April 23, 1980). 
65. Hearings on Congressional Oversight of War Powers Compliance: 
Zaire Airlift Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of 
the House Comm. on lnt'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.lS (1978). See also 
Editorial, The War Powers Skirmish, N.Y. Times, May 2,1980, at A26, coLI. 
66. See Zaire H eatings, supra note 65, at 24, 16,32. 
67. The full text of the Church-]avits letter is in Appendix C. See also, 
e.g., Gwertzman, Senators Bid Carter Consult over Iran Under 73 War Curb, 
N.Y. Times, April 25, 1980, at AI, col. 6; 126 Congo Rec. S4109-16 (daily ed. 
April 23, 1980); id. S4192-93 (daily ed. April 24, 1980). 
68. The State Department's Assistant Secretary for Con~essional Rela-
tions, however, did write soothingly to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. The Assistant Secretary said in part: 
"As you know, your letter was received after the commencement of the 
rescue mission in Iran on which the President reported to the Congress on 
April 26. For that reason, the letter has in a sense already been overtaken by 
events. 
"The President did not find it possible to consult with the Congress before 
commencing this rescue mission, in view of its extraordinary nature which 
depended upon absolute secrecy. Nevertheless, let me assure you that this 
Administration remains fully committed to the effective implementation of 
the consultation provisions of the War Powers Resolution to which you refer, 
and to the maximum possible cooperation between the Executive and Legis-
-lative branches in decisions which might involve the United States in hostili-
ties." Letter from]. Brian Atwood to Frank Church, May 6, 1980. 
69. Cf. Editorial, The War Powers Skirmish, N.Y. Times, May 2,1980, at 
A26, col. 2: 
"Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution to remind Presidents of 
their accountability for the use of troops. It created a formal procedure for 
consultation and an as yet untested requirement that Congress consent to 
hostilities lasting longer than 90 days. 
"But for all its bark, Congress has always been reluctant to bite. Successive 
Presidents have committed forces to emergency operations on eight oc-
casions without real consultation with key committee chairmen. President 
Ford reported after the fact on the military airlift of Americans out of South-
east Asia and on the rescue of the crew of the Mayaguez. But he did not re-
port on the evacuation of civilians from Cyprus and Lebanon, nor did Mr. 
Cartel' report on airlifts into Zaire during an insurgency in 1977. 
~ 
; .. 
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"The war powers debate actually flared up before the rescue mission, in 
response to Mr. Carter's threats of a blockade against Iran. That is scarcely a 
minor matter; it could involve a direct challenge to a warship, including a 
Soviet ship. As Senators Church and J avits of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee asked even before the rescue raid, the military options the President keeps 
threatening clearly should be discussed with leading members of Congress. 
That view will have a sympathetic advocate in Senator Muskie, Mr. Carter's 
nominee for Secretary of State. 
"The legal scholar Edward Corwin once observed that the Constitution is 
'an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy: In that struggle, Congress too often confines itself to tactical details, 
ignoring strategic design. If the will is there, Congress can now insist on a 
larger role and give real meaning to its War Powers Resc·rution." 
70. Eugene V. Rostow has been among the .most.:compelling critics of 
war-power legislation, the 1973 Resolution included. S-uch measures treat an 
"imaginary disease," in his view, one that resulted when congressional re-
sult-orientation was misdiagnosed as "presidential usurpation": 
"That popular thesis [that the rules of constitutional balance were some-
how violated in Indochina] is a myth. There was no ·presidential usurpation 
of Congress' war power in either Vietnam or Korea. . . . 
"In the Korean War, and to a much greater extent during the war in Viet-
nam, we experienced naked political irresponsibility. First, the President and 
Congress, acting together in a constitutional mode that 'goes back to the time 
of Washington, made a series of d~isions involving us in the wars. Later, 
when the wars became unpopular, many of the congressmen who had voted 
and voted and voted for them suddenly began to say that they were all the 
President's fault. They claimed that the President had involved the country in 
war through stealth and concealment. They argued that the difficulties were 
the result not of human mistakes in carrying out policies duly authorized and 
pursued, but rather of some structural imbalance in the Constitution. These 
representatives told their constituents, 'The. President has stolen our clothes 
while we were swimming; we have never really authorized this Presidential 
war.' Then, having created the myth of presidential usurpation, Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution to cure the imaginary disease. 
"These events have had a significant effect on the spirit of cooperation be-
tween the Executive and Congress. When the Executive Branch deals with 
congressmen and senators who continue to vote for a war and then say, 
'There's no one here but us chickens' after the war becomes unpopular, a 
mood of suspicion develops which is rather hard to allay. I personally have 
dealt with congressmen and senators about Vietnam, often reminding them 
that the Administration had long been trying to achieve goals which th~y 
had recommended in political speeches-reconvening the Geneva Con-
ference, for example. Typically, their response was, 'I know that, but,you 
must remember that I have to be elected in my district. The President has to 
do what must be done. I must take care of my reelection: In short, a great 
many men slithered off the deck when the going got rough. This is simply a 
fact, not a reproach, something that happens in life. 
··It is the ultimate reason why the War Powers Resolution and other 
structural remedies we have been considering are so unrealistic and unreal. 
President Johnson was very conscious of President Truman's experience in 
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Korea and of the political fact that Korea became 'Truman's War: President 
Truman did not seek the support of a fonnal congressional resolution. Presi-
dent Johnson had the advantage of the SEATO Treaty, . . . the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution, and a number of other congressional actions expressly designed 
to approve the decisions of four Presidents under the Treaty. This experience 
is what President Johnson had in mind when he observed, 'I knew that if I 
wanted Congress with me at the crash landing, they had to be with me at the 
take-off. But I forgot about the availability of parachutes ... • Response, 61 
VA. L. REV. 797, 801-03 (1975). 
71. But cf. the executive views in note 17 above. It is quite conceivable 
that the Supreme Court would agree to decide such a case if asked, and it is 
probable that the President would obey a decision against him. See pages 
206-17 above. 
